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  INTRODUCTION   
Is death a harm?  Is the risk of death a harm?  These two 
questions are fundamental to risk regulation.1  Whether risky 
activities ought to be regulated and, if so, how stringently, 
largely depends on whether the activities are harmful—
whether they produce welfare setbacks for humans or other 
welfare subjects—either because the activities cause some 
humans or other welfare subjects to die, or because they impose 
the risk of death on welfare subjects, or both.2  Risk regulation 
is expensive, in many different ways.  It limits the freedom of 
action of regulated parties; it imposes compliance costs on these 
parties, costs that are spread to consumers, workers, 
shareholders, and others engaged in commercial interactions 
with the regulatees; it consumes the money and effort of 
administrators, legislators, judges, and citizens.3  Surely the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC), and the host of other federal and state 
agencies that engage in risk regulation would not be justified in 
doing so absent some substantial nexus between risk, death, 
and well-being.4  Yet legal scholars and others who write about 
risk regulation have largely ignored these two questions.5 
 
 1. Throughout this Article, I use the term “risk” to mean a fatality risk. 
 2. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 204-16 (1999) (arguing for the central role of 
overall well-being in determining normatively appropriate regulatory choice). 
 3. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of 
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 271-78 (1991) 
(providing quantitative estimates for the costs and benefits of social 
regulation). 
 4. For an overview of federal risk regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). 
 5. Major scholarly works on risk regulation that are general in scope and 
normative in focus include BREYER, supra note 4; CARL F. CRANOR, 
REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
(1993); RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE 
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Is death a harm?  How could it not be?  Uncontroversially, 
the death of some person can be a harm (welfare setback) for 
her friends, family, and others who survive her.  The death may 
pain them; they may disprefer it; and the death of a friend, or 
family member, is plausibly counted as a welfare loss in a more 
objective sense, specifically as the ending of a close relationship.  
The standard constituents of well-being—pleasure and pain, 
preference, objective goods—are all present here.6  But is death 
a harm for the person who dies?  That is the question I wish to 
focus on here and throughout this Article.  Common sense 
urges an affirmative answer.  If death is not a harm for the 
person who dies, why do most of us fear our own deaths quite 
intensely and take substantial steps to avoid fatal accidents, 
mortal illness, or dangerous substances?  Yet common sense 
may well mislead here.  Death itself (by contrast with the 
anticipation of death or the process of dying) is not painful for 
the person in that state.  More generally, death itself (by 
contrast with these other states) is not experienced by the 
person in that state.7  Events or states can be harmful without 
being painful—if, for example, the events or states are 
dispreferred or are objectively bad.  But can events or states be 
harmful to some person without being experienced by her?  It is 
a widely shared intuition that posthumous events do not harm 
the deceased person: Slandering someone, ruining her business, 
and destroying her homestead after her death may wrong her 
but, intuitively, these are harmless wrongs.8  If this intuition is 
 
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter RISK VERSUS RISK]; K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND 
RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991); 
W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR RISK (1992); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: 
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 261 (1991); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and 
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad 
Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 
(1986).  None of these works give sustained attention to the questions “Is 
death a harm?” and “Is risk a harm?”  Cass Sunstein’s very important recent 
book on risk regulation (which was published after this Article was drafted) 
addresses numerous important questions, but not these.  See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-60 (delineating elements of 
welfare). 
 7. See infra Part II (articulating and analyzing the arguments for the 
claim that death is not harmful). 
 8. See L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 126-27 (1996) 
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accepted, it seemingly follows that death itself is also no harm.  
Posthumous events are powerless to affect the well-being of the 
deceased because they are experientially remote from her.  
They cannot alter what she experiences.  Since death, too, is 
experientially remote in just this way, death is not a harm—or 
so a plausible philosophical argument goes. 
This argument was first advanced by the Greek 
philosopher Epicurus. 
Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and 
evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience, . . . 
Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, 
when we are, death is not come, and when death is come, we are not.  
It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the 
living it is not and the dead exist no longer.9 
Thomas Nagel, in his 1979 article crisply entitled Death, 
criticized Epicurus’s argument but did not decisively refute it.10  
Rather, Death triggered renewed philosophical interest in the 
Epicurean challenge to the common-sense view, and there is 
now a substantial philosophical literature devoted to the 
question, “Is death a harm?”11  This literature includes spirited 
and sophisticated defenses of Epicurus’s view by a number of 
academic philosophers.12  Yet legal scholars, policy analysts, 
welfare economists, and others who have written normative 
scholarship about risk regulation have unwaveringly assumed 
that death itself is a serious welfare setback.13  The 
philosophical literature just described has been completely 
ignored by these other academic disciplines. 
Is the risk of death a harm?  Does imposing the risk of 
death on some person constitute a welfare setback for her, 
separate from whatever setback may inhere in death itself?  
This issue has received even less scholarly attention than the 
issue of death’s harmfulness.  Much philosophical work has 
been done explicating the nature of risk and probability.14  It 
 
(discussing welfare impact of posthumous events). 
 9. Stephen E. Rosenbaum, How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of 
Epicurus, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 119, 121 (John Martin Fischer ed., 
1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Epicurus’s “Letter to Menoeceus”). 
 10. Thomas Nagel, Death, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 1 (1979), reprinted in 
THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 61. 
 11. Many of the important papers are collected in THE METAPHYSICS OF 
DEATH, supra note 9. 
 12. See sources cited infra note 110. 
 13. See, e.g., supra note 5 (citing major normative works on risk 
regulation by legal scholars and others). 
 14. Good overviews of this philosophical work include L. JONATHAN 
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turns out that risk is a many-headed monster.  There are at 
least four standard accounts of what risk consists in (the 
frequentist account, the Bayesian account, the classical 
account, and the logical account) and numerous nonstandard 
accounts as well.  The frequentist sees the risk of some event 
(for example, a death) as the frequency with which that type of 
event occurs in some large class of events (for example, all 
cases in which persons are exposed to a given toxic product).15  
The Bayesian sees the risk of some event as someone’s degree 
of belief that the event will occur; this account is seemingly 
more subjective than the frequentist account, because different 
persons can have different degrees of belief for the same event, 
while the relative frequency of a fatal event in a given reference 
class is a fact determined by the laws of physics, chemistry, and 
biology.16  Classicists and logicists, unlike Bayesians and 
frequentists, believe that risk is a conceptual rather than 
empirical matter.  What the risk of death is, in a given case, 
depends not upon what people happen to believe (as per the 
Bayesian account), or what the empirically contingent relative 
frequencies happen to be (as per the frequentist account), but 
on the conceptual scheme that we use to understand the world 
and its future possibilities.  Specifically, the risk of a given 
death is the ratio of the number of possible futures in which 
that death occurs to the number of all possible futures (this is 
the classical view), or some variation on that ratio (this is the 
logical view).17 
Much philosophical work, too, has been devoted to the 
nature of well-being.18  Here, as with the nature of risk, there 
 
COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND 
PROBABILITY (1989); DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF 
PROBABILITY (2000); HENRY E. KYBURG, JR., PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE 
LOGIC (1970); STORRS MCCALL, A MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE: SPACE-TIME, 
PROBABILITY, AND DECISION 141-47 (1994); ROY WEATHERFORD, 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY (1982); and Colin 
Howson, Theories of Probability, 46 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 1 (1995). 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82 (discussing the frequentist 
account of risk). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the Bayesian 
account of risk). 
 17. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 43-47, 74-80 (discussing the classical 
and the logical accounts of risk); GILLIES, supra note 14, at 14-49 (same); 
KYBURG, supra note 14, at 29-39, 54-67 (same); WEATHERFORD, supra note 14, 
at 18-143 (same).  The statement in the text is rough and, as discussed by the 
surveys just cited, better describes one well-known variant of the logical 
account (Rudolf Carnap’s) than another (John Maynard Keynes’s). 
 18. Good overviews include JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 7-72 (1986); 
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are multiple standard accounts.  I have already alluded to 
them: the hedonic account, which sees pleasure and pain as the 
source of welfare gains or losses; the preferentialist account, 
which looks instead to what people prefer or disprefer; and the 
objective-good account, which identifies certain “valuable” or 
“desirable” activities, occurrences, or states as welfare sources, 
independent of whether the activities, occurrences, or states 
are pleasurable or preferred.19  Each of the standard accounts 
has flaws, ably presented by the philosophical critics of that 
account.  But this flurry of argument and counterargument has 
not led to some grand, scholarly synthesis.  No single, 
consensus view of well-being has yet emerged—just as no 
single, consensus view of risk has.  Instead, philosophical 
hedonists continue to defend hedonism, with sophisticated 
modifications designed to reduce the critics’ damage, and the 
same is true of preferentialism and objectivism.20  For example, 
the sophisticated hedonist construes “pleasure” as a desired or 
desirable mental state, rather than (more simplistically) a 
positive sensation.21  The sophisticated preferentialist looks to 
idealized preferences—to what someone would prefer under full 
information, say—in addition to, or in lieu of, actual 
preferences.22  And the sophisticated objectivist counts pleasure 
and preference satisfaction as objective goods in their own 
right—as sources, if not the exclusive sources, of well-being.23 
Are you confused?  You should be.  The question “Is risk a 
harm?” is intricate and tricky. Answering that question in a 
thoughtful and rigorous way means combining the insights of 
 
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT 
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 108-43 (1998); SUMNER, supra note 8, at 45-137 
(1996); and Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 
51 (1998). 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39, 42-43, 48-56 (describing the 
hedonic, preferentialist, and objective-good accounts of well-being). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 37-60 (summarizing the debate 
about the standard accounts of well-being). 
 21. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
 22. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
 23. Martha Nussbaum’s list of objective goods includes the use of the 
“senses, imagination, and thought,” while James Griffin’s includes enjoyment.  
See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.  Both make clear that these goods 
include pleasure and/or the absence of pain. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-79 
(2000) (“Senses, [i]magination, and [t]hought” include “[b]eing able to have 
pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.”); JAMES GRIFFIN, 
VALUE JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 30 (1996) (stating, 
under the rubric of “[e]njoyment,” that “[w]e value pleasures”). 
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the two philosophical literatures just summarized.  Even if the 
classical and logical accounts of risk are rejected, as I believe 
they should be,24 we are still left with the multiple possible 
permutations between two quite different accounts of risk—
Bayesian and frequentist—and a number of divergent views of 
well-being.  Hedonism (as an account of well-being) plus 
Bayesianism (as an account of risk) may produce a different 
view of risk’s harmfulness than hedonism plus frequentism, or 
preferentialism plus Bayesianism, or an objective-good view of 
welfare plus a frequentist view of risk.  The task seems both 
demanding and yet also very inviting.  Surely there are 
nonobvious and philosophically significant truths that will 
emerge by permuting accounts of risk with accounts of well-
being.  Surely, too, the question “Is risk a harm?” has much 
importance for risk regulation, as I will elaborate in a moment.  
Yet this question is largely overlooked—not only by lawyers, 
economists, and policy analysts, but also by philosophers.  
Neither the philosophical literatures on well-being or risk nor 
the legal, economic, and policy-analytic literatures on risk 
regulation have considered the harmfulness of risk in a 
sustained way.25 
I have already stated, emphatically, that the two questions 
mooted here—“Is death a harm?” and “Is the risk of death of 
harm?”—have much significance for risk regulation.  Let me 
elaborate.  Much modern legislation is targeted at fatal and 
probabilistically fatal activities, products, and substances.26  If 
neither risk nor death is a harm, the justifiability of these risk-
regulation statutes is open to serious question.  Presumably 
they should just be repealed.  Perhaps the supporter of 
regulation could respond that some of these statutes aim to 
diminish not only death and fatality risks, but also ecological 
harm or bodily injury.  Ecological harm is indeed a distinct type 
of welfare setback27 but one that generally has limited 
 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84. 
 25. There are a few substantial articles on this issue.  See Stephen R. 
Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 321 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Stephen Fogdall, Risks as Harms 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 26. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 8 (“[R]egulation designed to screen 
out risky substances . . . is embodied in many different regulatory programs—
indeed, in at least twenty-six different statutes administered by at least eight 
different agencies.”). 
 27. See, e.g., A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF 
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relevance for risk-regulation statutes administered by 
nonenvironmental agencies, such as OSHA, the NHTSA, the 
FDA, or the CPSC at the federal level.  Further, “[t]he primary 
benefit of many important environmental statutes, as 
determined by the dollar value assigned by cost-benefit 
analysis, is the human lives that are saved.”28  Bodily injury 
absent death is clearly welfare reducing,29 but what is far from 
clear is whether the large economic costs imposed by our 
current regime of workplace safety laws, motor vehicle safety 
laws, food and drug laws, consumer product safety laws, and 
the like would be warranted by a reduction in injury rates, 
taken alone.30  A similar response could be made to the 
suggestion that these statutes reduce the third-party costs of 
death: the pain and misery death causes for the deceased’s 
friends and family.  At a minimum it seems quite plausible that 
the scope and stringency of the current risk-regulation 
regime—now thought to be warranted primarily by the 
reduction in first-party costs that result from fatalities and 
fatality risks—would change dramatically.31 
More generally, both the scope and structure of statutes 
regulating fatal and probabilistically fatal activities, and the 
proper exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to these 
statutes, will depend crucially on which box in the matrix below 
turns out to be correct. 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS (1993) 
(discussing valuation of both ecological harm and death). 
 28. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943 (1999). 
 29. Cf. VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994) 
(discussing valuation of setbacks to bodily integrity resulting both from 
disease and from death). 
 30. Cf. BREYER, supra note 4, at 11-19 (assuming that death is a harm, 
but suggesting that substantial changes in regulatory programs would occur if 
we properly valued death). 
 31. Cf. Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s 
Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER 
RESULTS FROM REGULATION 208, 219 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED] (reviewing environmental, health, and safety 
rules issued by OSHA, the EPA, the CPSC, the NHTSA, and the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration, and concluding that “[a]bout 60 percent of the 
total benefits results from reductions in the risk of death, disease, and 
injury”). 
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                       Is the Risk of Death a Harm? 
 
                        No                     Yes 
 
            No           Null View        Risk View (Frequentist 
Is Death                                            and/or Bayesian) 
a Harm? 
         Yes          Death View       Hybrid View (Frequentist  
                                                  and/or Bayesian) 
 
Consider the justifiability of regulatory statutes, and of the 
directives issued by regulatory agencies pursuant to these 
statutes, with respect to the moral criterion of overall well-
being.32  The Null View denies that either death itself, or the 
risk of death, is a first-party cost for purposes of determining 
overall well-being.  Various harms and benefits separate from 
fatalities (including ecological harms and bodily injury harms), 
plus third-party harms resulting from fatalities, are relevant, 
but the first-party effects of death or the risk of death have zero 
relevance for the welfare calculus.  The Death View changes 
this picture by giving weight to the first-party effects of death.  
Since the first-party cost of a single death is now appraised by 
regulators as somewhere in the vicinity of $6 million,33 the 
practical significance of moving from the Null View to the 
Death View is huge.  The Risk View omits the $6 million per 
death first-party cost from the calculus of overall well-being, 
but adds in a (presumably much smaller) cost for each person 
at risk, in the appropriate sense, of dying.  Finally, the Hybrid 
View stipulates both that death is a harm and that risk is an 
independent harm.  Any regulatory option that involves 
fatalities and fatality risks is attributed a $6 million cost for 
each fatality, plus a separate cost for each person at risk (in the 
appropriate sense) of dying.34 
 
 32. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 209-16, 225-38 (defending the 
moral relevance of overall well-being, and conceptualizing cost-benefit analysis 
as a good if not perfect proxy for overall well-being). 
 33. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, If It Exists, It’s Getting 
Bigger: Revising the Value of a Statistical Life 1-2 (Global Dev. & Env’t Inst., 
Working Paper No. 01-06, Oct. 2001), http://www.ecologicaleconomics.org/ 
documents/valueoflife.pdf. 
 34. Strictly, this is not correct, since the “value of statistical life” (VOSL) 
method used to calculate the current $6 million valuation of death is 
inconsistent with the “Bayesian” type of Hybrid View I argue for in this 
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In this Article, I defend a Hybrid View of risk regulation.  
More precisely, I defend a Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk 
regulation.  First, I argue against Epicurus and the modern 
philosophical Epicureans and contend that death is indeed a 
welfare setback for the person who dies.  Second, I consider the 
two main viable accounts of risk, frequentist and Bayesian, and 
argue that risk in the Bayesian sense is indeed a harm for the 
person at risk, but that risk in the frequentist sense is not.  
Death and Bayesian risk should be counted as real costs and as 
separate costs in the regulatory calculus of overall well-being.  
By contrast, a high level of frequentist risk is not a welfare cost 
and is irrelevant to policy formulation insofar as policies are 
shaped by the aggregate-welfare criterion.  More generally, 
death and Bayesian risk (but not frequentist risk) should be 
counted as separate types of welfare setbacks with respect to 
every moral criterion that incorporates welfare considerations.  
For example, if regulatory agencies are properly attentive to 
the “distributive impacts” of their decisions35—to the effects of 
regulation on the distribution of well-being across the 
population—both death and the Bayesian risk of death should 
figure separately in the distributive analysis.  Someone who 
dies, and was previously at Bayesian risk of dying, fares worse 
(ceteris paribus) than someone who was put at Bayesian risk 
but survives, and this survivor in turn fares worse (ceteris 
paribus) than someone who neither dies nor was put at 
Bayesian risk of dying.  However, the fact that some person or 
group is exposed to a high relative frequency of premature 
death has no bearing on distributive justice. 
This Article has five parts.  Part I clarifies the concepts of 
risk and well-being.  Part II considers whether death is a harm.  
Parts III and IV consider whether risk is a harm, in first the 
frequentist and then the Bayesian sense.  The upshot of the 
analysis set forth in Parts II, III, and IV is the Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View of risk just described: Death is a harm, risk in 
the Bayesian sense is a harm, but risk in the frequentist sense 
is not.  Finally, Part V surveys the large legal implications of 
this account.  As I demonstrate in Part V, the issues mooted 
 
Article.  See infra text accompanying notes 302-05 (criticizing the VOSL 
method).  Still, the $6 million figure may be approximately correct, see id., and 
in any event nothing in my Hybrid (Bayesian) View suggests that the correct 
monetary valuation of death is insubstantial. 
 35. See infra Part V.D. (discussing the role of distributive considerations 
within risk regulation). 
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here have very substantial implications for a range of 
regulatory institutions and practices: cost-benefit analysis, both 
monetized and nonmonetized; risk-risk analysis; the proper 
interpretation of the safety “thresholds” that statutes 
governing risk regulation commonly create; distributive 
assessment pursuant to “environmental justice” mandates; 
comparative risk assessment; and tort and criminal law. 
I.  CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES: THE NATURE OF 
WELL-BEING AND RISK   
A. WELL-BEING 
What is well-being or, synonymously, welfare?  
Traditionally, philosophers have offered three kinds of answers 
to this question: a hedonic answer, a preferentialist answer, and 
an objectivist answer.36 
The hedonic account of welfare, in the simple version of 
this account exemplified by the work of Jeremy Bentham,37 
states that welfare consists in pleasure and the avoidance of 
pain, with “pleasure” understood as a positive feeling or 
sensation experienced by a conscious subject and about whose 
existence and sensational qualities the subject is infallible.  
“Pain” is understood similarly, except that the feeling or 
sensation is negative.38  Simple hedonism is vulnerable to the 
following type of counterexample: “At the very end of his life, 
Freud, ill and in pain, refused drugs except aspirin.  ‘I prefer,’ 
he said, ‘to think in torment than not to be able to think 
clearly.’”39  Freud seems to have benefited, all things 
considered, from a mental life that was, all things considered, 
more painful in the Benthamite sense—more painful in how it 
felt, in the sensations that it contained. 
The Freud example suggests a more sophisticated brand of 
hedonism: define welfare-enhancing mental states as more 
valuable (or as desired) mental states rather than as more 
pleasurable mental states.  Indeed, John Stuart Mill and 
 
 36. For good overviews of the philosophical literature on well-being, see 
sources cited supra note 18. 
 37. See SUMNER, supra note 8, at 87-89 (describing Bentham’s version of 
hedonism). 
 38. See id. at 83-92. 
 39. GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 8 (citing ERNEST JONES, THE LIFE AND 
WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD, 655-56); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Well-Being 
and Value, 4 UTILITAS 1, 6-11 (1992) (further discussing Griffin’s example). 
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another famous hedonist, Henry Sidgwick, modified 
Benthamite hedonism in just this way.40  But now a different 
challenge to hedonism arises: Welfare cannot be reduced to 
mental states, however defined.  Hedonists, simple or 
sophisticated, are committed to the thesis that welfare 
supervenes on mental states: Two outcomes in which a given 
person has the same mental states must be the same for his 
welfare.  Here is one plausible counterexample to the 
supervenience thesis: If Joan prefers that her husband remain 
faithful to her, then she is worse off if he betrays her, even if 
the treachery never comes to her attention and her beliefs, 
feelings, and other mental states are no different from what 
they would have been had her husband remained faithful.41 
The preferentialist account of welfare allows 
nonexperiential features of outcomes to come into play.42  In its 
simplest version, the preferentialist account says that a person 
is benefitted by one outcome, relative to a second, if she prefers 
the first to the second.43  Note that a person can prefer one 
outcome to another even though her mental states are just the 
same in both outcomes.  For example, Joan can prefer that her 
husband remain faithful and that she (correctly) believe him to 
be so, as against her husband betraying her and her 
(incorrectly) believing him to be faithful.  Simple 
preferentialism, unlike hedonism, cannot be criticized for tying 
well-being too tightly to our experiences.  But it can be 
criticized on other grounds.44  First, a person can prefer an 
 
 40. See SUMNER, supra note 8, at 90-91 (describing Mill’s and Sidgwick’s 
versions of hedonism). 
 41. For a famous critique of the supervenience thesis, see ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974). 
 42. For general discussions of preference-based or, equivalently, desire-
based theories of well-being, see, for example, GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 10-
39; PARFIT, supra note 18, at 494-99; SCANLON, supra note 18, at 113-23; 
SUMNER, supra note 8, at 113-37; and Qizilbash, supra note 18, at 58-63.  On 
the nature of a “preference,” see, for example, S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL 
REASONS 55-83 (1989); Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive 
Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 
161-64 (1990); Arthur Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE, WELFARE, AND 
MORALITY 93, 93-111 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993); and the 
papers in PREFERENCES (Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels eds., 1998). 
 43. See, e.g., Mark C. Murphy, The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory, 33 
NOUS 247, 269 (1999) (providing a qualified defense of the “simple desire-
fulfillment theory” of well-being). 
 44. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71-83 (1996); SCANLON, supra note 18, at 
113-23; SUMNER, supra note 8, at 113-37; Tyler Cowen, The Scope and Limits 
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outcome that is, intuitively, bad—not just morally bad, but bad 
for her, or at least no better.  Assume that I am a sadist and 
prefer to torture Phil.  The world in which I am allowed to 
satisfy this preference is, of course, worse for Phil, but it also 
seems worse or at least no better for me.  Second, a person can 
prefer an outcome that is, intuitively, unrelated to her own life.  
If I have a conversation with a stranger on a train, learn of 
various projects in which he is engaged, develop a mild 
preference that the projects succeed, and never see the stranger 
again, then the projects’ success does not benefit me even 
though this is the outcome I prefer.  Third, simple 
preferentialism seems to “overcorrect” the error in hedonism.  
While hedonism binds welfare too tightly to mental states, 
preferentialism arguably makes the link too loose.  
Preferentialism, in its simple version, does not limit the 
features of outcomes that can ground preferences and thereby 
welfare differentials.  Thus it allows that an outcome can 
benefit some person, relative to some alternative, even though 
the only difference between the outcomes is something quite 
remote from the person’s experience—at the limit, something 
which it would be impossible for that person to experience, as 
in the case of dispreferred posthumous events, which according 
to simple preferentialism are welfare setbacks for the deceased. 
The first of these criticisms might be met by idealizing 
preferences, in some way.  Indeed, many preferentialists now 
stipulate that the preferences which ground welfare must be 
“fully informed.”45  Satisfying my desire to torture Phil does not 
benefit me because that desire is nonideal.  If I were to reflect, 
with full information and due deliberation, on what torturing 
Phil involved for him and for me, I would not desire it.  
However, the move to “fully informed” preferences does nothing 
to address the second and third just-listed criticisms,46 and it 
arguably fails to answer the first criticism as well.  The reason 
that torturing Phil is bad or at least no better for me is that 
 
of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993). 
 45. See Don Loeb, Full-Information Theories of Individual Good, 21 SOC. 
THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1995) (surveying full-information accounts of well-being 
and presenting criticisms); Connie S. Rosati, Persons, Perspectives, and Full 
Information Accounts of the Good, 105 ETHICS 296, 296-99 (1995) (same); 
David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 790-96 
(1994) (same). 
 46. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 18, at 115 (“The objects of a person’s 
informed desires are likely to include many things that are not related to the 
quality of the desirer’s own life, intuitively understood.”). 
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this activity lacks value; it is undesirable.  We have a sense of 
what a good human life consists in, reflected in (or constituted 
by) the evaluative concepts with which we perceive and 
describe human activity: concepts like “accomplishment,” 
“friendship,” “leadership,” “participation,” “intimacy,” “love,” 
and so on.  With full information, I would disprefer torturing 
Phil because I would bring these evaluative concepts into play 
and come to recognize that sadistic pleasure makes no positive 
contribution to my life.  To say that some outcome improves my 
welfare if I would prefer it under full information gets things 
backwards.  Rather, it improves my welfare if it is desirable or 
preferable—worthy of desire or preference.47 
We have now moved to the third type of welfare account 
typically advanced within the philosophical literature: an 
objective-good account.  Objectivism about welfare goes back to 
Aristotle48 and, more recently, has been defended by John 
Finnis, Martha Nussbaum, George Sher, and other 
distinguished philosophers.49  Objectivists are typically 
pluralists; they typically offer a list of “values” or “goods” that 
represent different dimensions of human welfare, different 
ways in which a human life can go well or badly.  For example, 
Finnis claims that these goods are life itself, knowledge, play, 
aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and 
religion.50  Nussbaum’s list includes: life, bodily health, bodily 
integrity, the uses of the “senses, imagination and thought,” the 
emotions, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other 
species, play, and control over one’s environment.51  Derek 
Parfit, describing (without endorsing) objectivism, writes that 
“[t]he good things might include moral goodness, rational 
 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 119.  Scanlon states, 
It may be true that something contributes to one’s well-being only if 
one has reason to desire it.  But even when this is so, what makes this 
thing good will not be the fact that it would satisfy that hypothetical 
desire but rather those considerations, whatever they may be, that 
provide reasons for desiring it. 
Id. 
 48. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 8, at 69-72 (summarizing Aristotle’s 
view of well-being). 
 49. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-99 (1980); 
THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 9-143 (1993); NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 
34-110; GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 
199-244 (1997).  James Griffin’s most recent work on well-being has a 
decidedly objectivist flavor.  See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 19-36. 
 50. See FINNIS, supra note 49, at 85-90. 
 51. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 78-80. 
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activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and 
being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true 
beauty.”52  James Griffin lists accomplishment, autonomy, 
understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relations.53  In 
short, there is substantial disagreement within the objectivist 
camp as to the content of the canonical list of goods or values, 
and there is also substantial disagreement as to the basis for 
that list.  Some objectivists argue that human values or goods 
are grounded in the human essence—in the properties, such as 
a capacity for rational belief and action, that a being 
necessarily possesses if she is human.54  A different proposal is 
that “what unifies the diverse elements of a good life is their 
connection(s) to near-universal, near-unavoidable goals.”55  
This, in turn, differs from an objectivist view that places more 
emphasis on culture and language: humans, living together, 
develop shared understandings of what valuable and worthless 
lives consist in.56  Despite these differences, objectivists all 
concur in the claim that welfare depends upon some set of 
objective goods or values: objective in that what is truly good or 
valuable for a given person can differ from what she believes to 
be good or valuable, or what she prefers. 
Objectivism, in theory, can remedy the various deficits in 
preferentialism mentioned above.  It will circumscribe the 
features of outcomes that count as good or bad, welfare-
enhancing or -reducing, for a given person.  Features that are 
undesirable in any life (sadistic pleasures), or unconnected to a 
given person’s life (the stranger on the train), or too 
experientially remote (posthumous events), will be ruled out.  
And objectivism, unlike hedonism, is not committed to the view 
that experience is all that matters for our welfare. 
Notwithstanding these attractions, objectivism has hardly 
defeated preferentialism or hedonism within the philosophical 
literature on well-being.  Why not?  To begin, it seems 
implausible that a person can be benefited by some outcome 
which she never prefers or comes to prefer.57  Opera might be 
better than sitcoms, but if I like and continue to like sitcoms, 
my watching opera instead of sitcoms does not benefit me.  A 
 
 52. PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499. 
 53. GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 29-30. 
 54. See HURKA, supra note 49, at 9-51. 
 55. SHER, supra note 49, at 229. 
 56. See Qizilbash, supra note 18, at 63 (discussing Griffin’s objectivism). 
 57. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 200-02. 
ADLER.3FMT.DOC 4·28·2003  7:23 PM 
1308 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1293 
 
possible response is to develop a mixed theory of well-being 
which states: an outcome benefits some person if and only if it 
is both (1) good for him and (2) preferred by him.58  But this 
mixed theory will be unpersuasive to some preferentialists, who 
will insist that “goodness” or “value” is irrelevant to welfare 
and should be abandoned in favor of the concept of “fully 
informed” (or otherwise idealized) preferences. 
As for the continued appeal of hedonism, some 
philosophers continue to find compelling the thought that 
welfare does supervene on our experience.59  Consider the 
concepts of happiness, welfare, and value.  Happiness, most 
would agree, supervenes on experience; value, most would 
agree, does not.60  Is welfare nearly the same as happiness, or 
is it nearly the same as value?  Because answers to this 
question differ, it is not surprising that reactions to the 
supervenience thesis also do. 
In short, the philosophical literature has failed to coalesce 
around a particular account of well-being, and indeed there is 
persisting and deep-rooted scholarly disagreement about which 
general type of account (hedonic, preferentialist, or objectivist) 
is correct.  Given this disagreement, how should we analyze the 
two issues at the heart of risk regulation, namely, “Is death a 
harm?” and “Is risk a harm?”  Rather than grounding the 
analysis on a particular welfare view, which would render the 
analysis unpersuasive to those who reject the view, or 
considering the two issues in light of all possible welfare 
views—an impossibly large task—my approach will be as 
follows.  I will consider how the main plausible elements of a 
welfare account, those that have received substantial and 
continuing support within the philosophical literature, bear 
upon the harmfulness of risk and death.  I take the “main 
plausible elements of a welfare account” to be the following: 
 
 58. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist 
Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 265 (2000). 
 59. For a recent defense of experientialism about welfare, see Mark 
Bernstein, Well-Being, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 39 (1998).  See also Goldsworthy, supra 
note 39, at 3, 6-20 (presenting a qualified defense, which does not choose 
conclusively between hedonism and the “non-cognitivist” position that well-
being is not a factual matter); Matthew Silverstein, In Defense of Happiness: A 
Response to the Experience Machine, 26 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 279 (2000) 
(contending that Nozick’s experience-machine example fails to refute 
hedonism about well-being); id. at 281 n.7 (citing scholarly defenses of 
hedonism). 
 60. On the concept of happiness, see SUMNER, supra note 8, at 140-47. 
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Experience, Preference, Value, and Integration. 
Experience: As we have seen, hedonists insist that welfare 
supervenes on experience: A given person cannot fare better in 
one outcome than another unless his experience or mental 
states are different in the two outcomes.  Experience might be 
incorporated into welfare accounts in weaker or, for that 
matter, more robust ways than through a supervenience 
requirement.  The basic thought behind any experience 
requirement is that welfare concerns how well a person’s life 
goes, and the “boundary” of her life—the distinction between 
those states, events, etc., sufficiently linked to her to affect her 
welfare, and those that are too remote—is best delineated in 
terms of her experience. 
Preference: Here, as with experience, there are many 
ways to incorporate the general concept of “preference” into a 
welfare account.  The preferences highlighted by a given 
welfare account might be prospective or retrospective, more or 
less tightly connected to cognitions, more or less tightly 
connected to choice, and so forth.  The basic function of 
preferences, within a welfare account, is to provide a ranking of 
outcomes from the subject’s point of view.  The thought here is 
that welfare concerns how well a person’s life goes for her—and 
thus that an outcome cannot benefit a person unless she herself 
favors that outcome (at some level). 
Value: What is valuable, i.e., what goes on the list of 
objective goods or values?  What makes something valuable: its 
connection to human perfection, to unavoidable human goals, 
to our shared sense of a valuable life, or something else?  As 
already noted, these questions remain the subject of ongoing 
debate among objectivists.  Still, there is a common idea that 
motivates the inclusion of objective goods or values within a 
welfare account: Since welfare concerns how well a person’s life 
goes (or goes for her), an outcome that is less valuable for some 
person cannot be better for that person’s welfare. 
Integration: Welfare changes are, intuitively, changes in 
the subject’s life.  They are not remote changes in the world 
that she (or someone else) prefers or that are good in a general 
sense.  Call this “integration”: a welfare account will typically 
try to delineate the boundary between the subject’s life and the 
outside, and to ensure that welfare changes occur within the 
boundary.  This boundary might be delineated with the help of 
an experience requirement, or a list of objective goods (chosen 
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to be sufficiently “personal” to the subject), but it need not be.61  
The Integration component of welfare does not necessarily 
reduce to Experience or Value. 
Experience, Preference, Value, and Integration, or some 
subset of these, will be the central constituents of any colorable 
welfare view.  They will therefore be central to my analysis of 
the harmfulness of risk and death. 
B. RISK 
At the threshold, let me distinguish between probabilistic 
and nonprobabilistic conceptions of risk.62  Probabilistic 
conceptions are dominant within economics,63 philosophy,64 and 
within the more technical literature on risk assessment,65 and 
if not dominant are certainly very important within scholarship 
on risk regulation.66  On the probabilistic view, the magnitude 
of the risk of some given adverse outcome equals the 
probability of the outcome.  Probabilists will say that Jim is 
subject to a higher risk of death in one scenario, as opposed to a 
 
 61. Many within the preferentialist tradition have suggested that the 
category of welfare-relevant preferences needs to be “restricted” in some way—
so that, for example, the satisfaction of someone’s moral preferences doesn’t 
count as enhancing her welfare.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 199-200 
& n.93 (citing sources).  Mark Carl Overvold has done the most sustained 
philosophical work in developing a theory that is preferentialist, not hedonic 
or objectivist, but distinguishes between welfare-relevant and welfare-
irrelevant preferences.  See Mark Carl Overvold, Morality, Self-Interest, and 
Reasons for Being Moral, 44 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 493, 499-501 
(1984); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and Getting What You Want, in THE 
LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 186 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds., 
1982); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice, 10 
CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 114-17 (1980) [hereinafter Overvold, Self-Interest]; see also 
David Sobel, Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. & 
PHIL. 249, 266-69 (1998) (criticizing Overvold’s account). 
 62. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1071-85 (1990) (distinguishing between “expert” and 
“lay,” i.e., probabilistic and nonprobabilistic, conceptions of risk); Ortwin 
Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 53, 58-
72 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (surveying the 
conceptions of risk adopted by scientists, economists, psychologists, and 
sociologists); Paul B. Thompson & Wesley Dean, Competing Conceptions of 
Risk, 7 RISK 361, 367-71 (1996) (distinguishing between “probabilist” and 
“contextualist” conceptions of risk). 
 63. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 19-20 (1992). 
 64. See, e.g., David McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 
ETHICS 205, 210-11 (1997); Perry, supra note 25, at 322. 
 65. See Renn, supra note 62, at 58-61. 
 66. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 3-6. 
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second scenario, just in case his probability of death in the first 
scenario is greater.  A nonprobabilistic conception of risk makes 
the risk level depend, in part, on factors other than the 
probability of the adverse outcome at issue—such as whether 
the relevant persons have voluntarily chosen to take a chance 
of incurring that outcome; whether the outcome is particularly 
“dreaded” or feared by them; and whether the outcome, and the 
causal mechanisms leading to it, are well or poorly understood 
by these persons.67  Nonprobabilists need not say that Jim’s 
risk of death is higher in the scenario where his probability of 
death is higher.  For example, the risk of Jim’s death created by 
his 1 in 10,000 probability of dying from radiation leakage from 
the nearby nuclear plant might be higher than the risk of his 
death created by a 1 in 5,000 probability of dying in a car 
accident that results from his own negligence.  Nonprobabilistic 
conceptions of risk have been influential within the 
experimental psychology68 and sociological literatures on risk 
and risk perception,69 and have also played some role in 
scholarship about risk regulation.70 
This Article focuses on the probabilistic conception of the 
“risk” of death.  Although the analysis presented will have 
important implications for nonprobabilistic accounts of risk, it 
is beyond the scope of the Article to delineate those 
implications in detail. 
The probabilist equates “risk of death” with “probability of 
death.”  This equation immediately leads us to ask: What is 
probability?  There are four standard  theories of probability.  
This Article focuses on two (the Bayesian and frequentist 
 
 67. See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, at xxi-xxxvii (2000) 
(surveying Slovic’s scholarship, which advances a nonprobabilistic conception 
of risk). 
 68. See id.; SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING 138-40 (1993). 
 69. See Roger E. Kasperson, The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in 
Developing an Integrative Framework, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra 
note 62, at 153-78 (reviewing part of the sociological literature on risk); Ingar 
Palmlund, Social Drama and Risk Evaluation, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, 
supra note 62, at 197-212 (same); Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk 
Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra note 62, at 83-115 (same); 
Ortwin Renn, The Social Arena Concept of Risk Debates, in SOCIAL THEORIES 
OF RISK, supra note 62, at 179-96 (same). 
 70. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
101, 122-29 (suggesting that some but not all of the factors that underlie 
nonprobabilistic, lay judgments of risk should be given weight in risk 
regulation independent of the criterion of “decently-livable life-years”). 
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theories) and ignores the other two (the classical and logical 
theories).71  All four theories agree on the following points.  
Probabilities are numbers that can be attached to propositions, 
or to certain types of propositions.  Probabilities are real 
numbers between zero and one.  Probabilities obey a set of 
mathematical rules known as the “probability calculus.”72  Take 
p(S) to be the probability of proposition S.  Then, for example, 
the probability calculus states that 
— p(S) = 1 - p(not S) 
— p(S or T) = p(S) + p(T) - p(S and T) 
— p(S/R), the so-called “conditional probability” of S given 
  R, equals p(S and R)/p(R) 
— If p(S/R) = p(S), i.e., if S and R are “independent,”  
   p(S and R) = p(S)*p(R) 
The Bayesian theory sees the probability of a proposition 
as someone’s “degree of belief” in that proposition.  The 
probability that “The President of the United States had an 
intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky,” for Fran, is 
Fran’s degree of belief that the President had such a 
relationship.  If Fran’s degree of belief in that proposition is 1/3, 
then according to the Bayesian theory her degree of belief in its 
negation is 2/3, and her degree of belief in the proposition “the 
President of the United States either had or did not have an 
intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky” is 1.  In effect, 
probabilities for the Bayesian are a numerical measure of a 
given person’s certainty or confidence in various propositions.73 
How, precisely, are degrees of belief assigned to 
propositions?  Different Bayesian theories give different 
answers to this question.  A person might have primitive 
judgments of the likelihood of various propositions, which 
 
 71. For good overviews of the scholarship on the nature of probability, see 
sources cited supra note 14. 
 72. For introductions to the probability calculus, see IAN HACKING, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 23-78 (2001); MICHAEL 
D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 45-80 (1987); 
BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC 
130-59 (2d ed. 1975). 
 73. For overviews of Bayesian theories of probability, see COHEN, supra 
note 14, at 58-70; GILLIES, supra note 14, at 50-87; COLIN HOWSON & PETER 
URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 75-97 (2d ed. 
1993); KYBURG, supra note 14, at 68-76; WEATHERFORD, supra note 14, at 219-
42; and Howson, supra note 14, at 2-13.  An important, recent collection of 
essays exploring the Bayesian view is SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY (George 
Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994). 
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under certain conditions can be represented numerically.74  
Alternatively, her degree of belief in a proposition might track 
the odds at which she is willing to make a small monetary bet 
for or against that proposition;75 or, it might be a number which 
we can derive once we know the “utility” she attaches to 
different outcomes and choices, since the utility for Fran of a 
choice depends on the utility of the various outcomes that 
might result from the choice, plus her beliefs about the relative 
likelihood of these various outcomes.76 
The frequentist account of probability looks not to the 
beliefs of actual or hypothetical persons, but rather to the 
frequency with which objects possess a certain property.  The 
basic idea behind the frequentist account is as follows: Start 
with a collection or “reference class” of objects.  This might be a 
class of persons (“All men over the age of thirty”), or it might be 
a class of events, which are a kind of object (“All firings of a 
revolver,” “All releases of radiation from a water-cooled nuclear 
plant”), or it might be a class containing some other kind of 
object.  Then we can define the probability that an object in the 
reference class has the property as the proportion of objects in 
the reference class with that property.  For example, the 
probability that a man over the age of thirty is bald equals the 
proportion of men over the age of thirty (the reference class of 
persons) with the property of baldness.  The probability that a 
release of radiation from a water-cooled nuclear plant exceeds 
100 curies is the proportion of radiation releases from water-
cooled nuclear plants (the reference class of events) with the 
property of exceeding 100 curies. 
The frequentist account of probability was first rigorously 
developed some seventy years ago by the statistician Richard 
von Mises.77  Von Mises’s version of frequentism focuses 
 
 74. See, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY 222-32 (1988). 
 75. The pioneer of this approach is de Finetti.  See Bruno de Finetti, 
Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources, in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE 
PROBABILITY 53, 93 (Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. & Howard E. Smokler eds., 1964). 
 76. The classic Bayesian works that develop probability and utility 
measures in tandem are RICHARD C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 59-163 
(2d ed. 1983); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 6-104 
(Dover 1972) (1954); and Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in 
STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY, supra note 75, at 63.  An excellent, 
philosophically sophisticated survey of these works and expected utility theory 
more generally is ELLERY EELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY 65-86 
(1982). 
 77. See RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 1-65 
ADLER.3FMT.DOC 4·28·2003  7:23 PM 
1314 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1293 
 
specifically on events, rather than other kinds of objects, and 
requires that the reference class of these events be infinite and 
have certain other characteristics—it must be sequentially 
ordered and it must be “random.”  Von Mises then, famously, 
defines probability as the limit of the relative frequency of an 
attribute with respect to a random, sequentially ordered, 
infinite reference class of events.78  But no reference class of 
actual events—events that have actually occurred in this 
world—is infinite. Von Mises’s infinite reference class is, thus, 
best understood as an abstract, mathematical entity that (in 
some sense) constitutes a good theoretical representation of a 
class of actual events.  Other frequentists have dispensed with 
the requirement of an infinite reference class, and instead 
define probability as the relative frequency of an attribute in a 
sufficiently large and temporally sequenced class of actual 
events.79  Still others look to large or infinite classes of 
hypothetical events: events that would occur were a certain 
kind of experiment to be repeated over and over again.80  In 
short, there are important differences of detail between 
frequentist views of probability.  All such views, however, share 
the following characteristics.  Probability is defined relative to a 
reference class of (actual, hypothetical, or mathematical) 
objects, such as events.  This reference class must be general; it 
must be infinite or at least very large.  The attribute in 
question must also be general; it must be the kind of attribute 
that many things, or at least more than one thing, could 
possess. 
Because it is structured around general reference classes, 
general attributes, and relative frequencies, the frequentist 
account is unable to attach a probability number to so-called 
“singular” propositions absent some restructuring of such 
propositions in general terms.81  A singular proposition is one 
that predicates some attribute of a particular person, event or 
other object: for example, “The card face down is a spade” or 
 
(2d rev. ed. 1957). 
 78. See id. at 28-29. 
 79. For good discussions of von Mises’s view and the variations advanced 
by other frequentists, in particular Hans Reichenbach, see GILLIES, supra note 
14, at 88-112; KYBURG, supra note 14, at 40-53; and WEATHERFORD, supra 
note 14, at 144-218.  Reichenbach’s account is presented in THE THEORY OF 
PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1949), particularly at 337-83. 
 80. See Karl R. Popper, The Propensity Interpretation of Probability, 10 
BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 25, 37-38 (1960). 
 81. See, e.g., GILLIES, supra note 14, at 119-25. 
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“John will die of cancer” or “Bush will win the next Presidential 
election.”  The frequentist account directly attaches a 
probability number only to a proposition that (1) describes a 
suitably general reference class of objects (i.e., an infinite or 
very large class, depending on the theory), and (2) predicates a 
suitably general attribute of objects within the class—for 
example, “a man over the age of seventy is infertile.”  The 
frequentist probability of that proposition is q, where q is the 
proportion of infertile men within the large or infinite class of 
men over seventy.  But a singular proposition cannot (without 
reinterpretation) be assigned a relative frequency, since the 
reference class here has only one member, the particular object, 
which either has the attribute in question or lacks it.  This 
feature of the frequentist account will be very important when 
we consider whether risk (in the frequentist sense) is indeed 
harmful.82 
Neither the frequentist account nor the Bayesian account 
is a perfectly satisfying account of probability.  Intuitively, 
probability is both physical (not mind dependent) and 
predicable of individuals (not merely of classes).  The 
probability of “this rat dying from a 10-centigray dose of 
radiation” seems to be a hard, physical number, like the pH of 
the rat’s blood, the weight of its body, or the amount of 
radiation released.  It also seems to be a number which 
attaches to this particular exposure and this particular rat, like 
the pH, weight, and amount of radiation.  However, no rigorous 
account of probability that satisfies both these intuitive 
desiderata has yet been developed.  The frequentist theory is 
mind independent—the frequency with which some attribute 
occurs in a reference class is a purely physical fact—but 
essentially links probability to classes, not individuals.  The 
Bayesian theory has no trouble with individualized probability 
ascriptions—it is perfectly intelligible to speak of some person’s 
degree of belief that this particular rat has a given attribute—
but reduces all probabilities to what actual or hypothetical 
persons would believe.  In short, neither theory dominates the 
other, and I will therefore consider both the Bayesian and the 
frequentist theories of probability in analyzing whether risk is 
harmful. 
The classical and logical accounts of probability are not 
 
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 151-59. 
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considered here.83  Both accounts insist that the probability of a 
proposition is established a priori—that a given proposition has 
one and the same probability in all possible worlds.  But this 
seems wildly implausible, at least for the conception of 
probability relevant to risk regulation.  Surely the probability 
that Jim’s exposure to a particular dose of radiation will cause 
his premature death depends at least in part upon the 
empirical correlation between such exposures and death (on the 
frequentist view), or on someone’s beliefs about that correlation 
(on the Bayesian view), or on some other, empirically 
contingent features of the world in which the exposure occurs.  
For this reason, and for others explained in the margin,84 we 
can safely ignore the classical and logical construals of the 
probability of death and focus our attention on the Bayesian 
and frequentist construals. 
C. CONSEQUENTIALISM, RISK, AND THE EX ANTE/EX POST 
DISTINCTION 
As will become clear, the analysis of the questions “Is 
death a harm?” and “Is risk a harm?” offered in this Article is 
consequentialist in its presuppositions.  In Part II, I ask 
whether two outcomes or “possible worlds” differentiated by the 
fact that some person (P) dies earlier in one outcome than the 
other are different for P’s well-being.85  In Parts III and IV, I 
ask a similar question for pairs of outcomes differentiated by 
the existence of a risk of death for P, in either the frequentist or 
the Bayesian sense of risk.86 
What justifies this consequentialist approach?  I believe, 
and have argued elsewhere, that the moral criteria bearing on 
regulatory choices include at least some consequentialist 
criteria.87  A criterion (C) is consequentialist if the right thing 
for the agent to do, in a choice situation, in light of C is to 
promote the occurrence of good outcomes—where the goodness 
 
 83. See sources cited supra note 14 (discussing classical and logical 
accounts). 
 84. The so-called Principle of Indifference, which assigns equal 
probabilities to equally possible cases, and which is central to the classical 
account, generates paradoxes that afflict that account and perhaps the logical 
account as well.  See COHEN, supra note 14, at 43 (presenting the principle of 
indifference); GILLIES, supra note 14, at 37-49 (discussing the paradoxes). 
 85. See infra text accompanying notes 101-09. 
 86. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50. 
 87. See Adler, supra note 58, at 302-13 (arguing for moral relevance of 
overall well-being); Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 209-16 (same). 
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of outcomes is specified in a suitably impartial (technically, 
“agent neutral”) way.88  Consequentialist criteria are not 
necessarily welfarist in focus.  For example, a criterion that 
ranks outcomes in light of the ecological complexity of the 
outcomes, or their aesthetic value, may give a higher ranking to 
outcomes that are worse with respect to overall well-being, the 
equal distribution of well-being, or some other welfare-focused 
measure.89  Still, there is at least one, morally weighty 
consequentialist criterion that (1) does in fact bear upon 
regulatory choice, or so I have argued; and (2) is welfarist in 
structure, indeed welfarist in the strong sense that outcomes 
differing in light of the criterion must differ for someone’s 
welfare.  This is the criterion of overall welfare.90  The 
consequentialist criterion of equal welfare has also seemed 
plausible to many philosophers and political theorists, as have 
the related criteria of equal responsibility-adjusted welfare; 
equal resources for welfare; and a criterion that looks to overall 
weighted welfare, with the welfare of poorer persons given 
greater weight.91 
Might the moral relevance of welfare and welfare changes, 
for regulators, transcend the consequentialist criteria bearing 
on their choices?  Perhaps.  Imagine that the set of criteria 
binding them includes at least one criterion that is both 
 
 88. For an accessible discussion of the concept of consequentialism and an 
overview of the debate between consequentialists and nonconsequentialists 
(“deontologists”), see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 59-77 (1998).  For 
sources containing more technical discussions, see Adler, supra note 58, at 314 
nn.188-89. 
 89. See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 59; Adler, supra note 58, at 315-17. 
 90. See Adler, supra note 58; Adler & Posner, supra note 2. 
 91. See Adler, supra note 58, at 302-13, 315-19 (discussing distributive 
views).  Distributive views are usually consequentialist in their structure—the 
criteria of appropriate distribution articulated by these views typically provide 
an agent-neutral ranking of outcomes—although the foundations of such views 
are often contractarian, and for that reason they are sometimes characterized 
as “nonconsequentialist.” See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 17-22, 189-303 
(distinguishing between the “factors” set forth by a moral theory and its 
foundations, and discussing both “teleological” and “deontological” types of 
foundations). 
     Distributive views that look to the distribution of welfare resources, or to 
the distribution of welfare adjusted for responsibility, are welfarist not in the 
strong sense that the goodness of outcomes supervenes on welfare, but in the 
weaker sense that welfare considerations are central to these views.  See 
Matthew D. Adler, Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 4-8, on file with author) 
(discussing variants of welfarism). 
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deontological and welfarist: deontological because it does not 
enjoin the agent to promote good outcomes characterized in an 
agent-neutral way, welfarist because it defines morally 
required or permitted actions partly in terms of their welfare 
impact.92  This is a conceptual possibility.  (Here is a silly 
example: a deontological criterion that prohibits the agent from 
acting in a way that reduces the welfare of anyone situated 
exactly ten miles from the agent at the time of choice.)  Nor 
would I want to argue, here, that deontological criteria do not 
exist.  But I tend to doubt that such deontological criteria as do 
exist make reference to welfare.  Consider the classic example 
of a deontological constraint: the putative constraint on the 
actor intentionally harming another person (as opposed to 
merely acting in a way that foreseeably harms her).93  I 
seriously doubt that “harming” for purposes of this constraint, 
assuming it exists, means “reducing welfare.”  Imagine that I 
intentionally pick a flower from the common garden, just to 
spite you.  Have I committed a deontological wrong?  Intuitively 
not.  Plausibly, “harming” here means producing some kind of 
physical impact on the victim which is neither necessary nor 
even sufficient for a welfare reduction.  Or consider the 
plausible, deontological constraints on lying and promise 
breaching:94 welfare-irrelevant lies and breaches would 
arguably violate these constraints, and (obviously) many 
welfare-reducing actions would satisfy them. 
Perhaps I am wrong about the deontological irrelevance of 
welfare.  Assume that a deontological constraint prohibits 
“intentional harming,” where harmings are (1) physical impacts 
of a certain sort that (2) reduce welfare.  If so, we would need to 
understand whether deaths or death risks are welfare 
reductions for purposes of this constraint—whether they are 
welfare reducing in a deontological, not a consequentialist, 
sense.  The consequentialist analysis presented in this Article 
does not address that question.  Still, as I have explained, it is 
far from clear whether the question needs to be addressed. 
Return, then, to consequentialism.  Any consequentialist 
criterion C provides a ranking of outcomes—more precisely, a 
ranking of possible worlds, that is, of maximally specified 
 
 92. See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 70-137 (describing plausible 
deontological constraints). 
 93. See id. at 100-05. 
 94. See id. at 106-25. 
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outcomes.95  These outcomes or worlds are ranked as better, 
worse, equally good, or perhaps incommensurably good.96  This 
C-ranking of outcomes, in turn, helps determine the C-ranking 
of actions for a given agent, in a given choice situation.  One 
moves from a view about the goodness of outcomes to a view 
about the rightness of the alternative actions that the agent 
might perform.97  The agent ought to choose the action that 
best “promotes” good outcomes.  But what does that mean?  
Different variants of consequentialism offer different answers 
to this question.  Here are six different possibilities: in a given 
choice situation (1) the agent should choose the action the 
actual outcome of which is better or at least not worse than the 
actual outcomes of the other actions available for choice; (2) the 
agent should choose the action with the highest Bayesian 
probability of having the best actual outcome; (3) the agent 
should choose the action with the highest frequentist 
probability of having the best actual outcome; (4) the agent 
should choose the action with the largest Bayesian expected 
goodness, where the Bayesian expected goodness of an action 
equals p1*g(O1) + p2*g(O2) + . . . pn*g(On), such that g(Oi) is a 
numerical measure of the goodness of outcome Oi and pi is a 
Bayesian probability that the action results in Oi; (5) the agent 
should choose the action with the largest frequentist expected 
goodness, where the frequentist expected goodness of an action 
equals p1*g(O1) + p2*g(O2) + . . . pn*g(On), such that g(Oi) is a 
numerical measure of the goodness of Oi and pi is a frequentist 
probability that the action results in Oi; and (6) the agent 
should follow a “maximin” approach, i.e., choose the action 
whose worst possible outcome is best.98 
 
 95. See MICHAEL J. LOUX, METAPHYSICS: A CONTEMPORARY 
INTRODUCTION 176-214 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing possible worlds). 
 96. On incommensurability, see Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1383-89 (1998) [hereinafter 
Adler, Incommensurability]; Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: 
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Law]. 
 97. On this issue see RICHARD A. FUMERTON, REASON AND MORALITY: A 
DEFENSE OF THE EGOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 92-113 (1990); KAGAN, supra note 
88, at 64-69.  For a general discussion of moral decision making under 
uncertainty, see TED LOCKHART, MORAL UNCERTAINTY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2000). 
 98. See FUMERTON, supra note 97, at 92-113 (distinguishing between 
“actual consequence,” “probable consequence,” and “value adjusted possible 
consequence” conceptions of consequentialist choice).  Since the probabilities 
employed in the latter two conceptions might be either Bayesian or 
frequentist, Fumerton’s tripartite distinction generates the first five of the six 
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As this summary suggests, risk or probability might be 
morally relevant, in two quite different ways, for any 
consequentialist criterion C.  First, the fact that someone is at 
risk of some adverse (or for that matter favorable) occurrence 
might bear upon the goodness of outcomes.  Imagine two 
possible worlds, O1 and O2, identical except that in O1 some 
event occurs and imposes a high risk of death (in either the 
Bayesian or frequentist sense) on P, while in O2 the event does 
not occur.  Then it might well be the case that O1 is a worse 
outcome, in light of C, than O2.  Second, risk or probability 
might be relevant in moving from the C-ranking of outcomes to 
the C-ranking of actions or choices available to a given agent in 
a given choice situation.  Consider, for example, the Bayesian 
expected goodness account of consequentialist rightness.  On 
this account, what the agent ought to do in a given choice 
situation, faced with possible actions {A1 . . . Am}, is the follow-
ing: (1) for each action Aj and each outcome Oi from all possible 
worlds {O1 . . . On}, there is a Bayesian probability, in some 
sense, that Aj will result in Oi; (2) using these probabilities plus 
the “goodness” numbers measuring the goodness of each 
possible world, the agent determines the Bayesian expected 
goodness of each possible action; (3) the agent chooses the 
action with the highest Bayesian expected goodness.  Within 
the Bayesian expected goodness account of consequentialist 
choice, probability numbers linking actions and worlds play an 
important role in determining what choices actors ought to 
perform, quite independent of any role that probability might 
have in shaping the goodness of worlds.  The same is true of a 
frequentist expected goodness account and of the accounts that 
specify the consequentially right action as the action with the 
highest probability (frequentist or Bayesian) of having the best 
outcome. 
Economists frequently distinguish between welfare 
maximization “ex post” and “ex ante.”99  The “ex post”/“ex ante” 
distinction, I suggest, is plausibly mapped onto the distinction 
between the goodness of outcomes and the goodness of actions 
that I have just described.  To talk about “ex post” welfare 
 
variants of consequentialism listed here. The last variant, maximin, derives 
from the literature on rational choice.  See FRENCH, supra note 74, at 36. 
 99. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE 437-44 (2002); Philippe Mongin & Claude d’Aspremont, Utility 
Theory and Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 371, 437-44 (Salvador 
Barberà et al. eds., 1998). 
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maximization is really just to specify how all the different 
possible outcomes of one or another choice are ranked in light 
of the overall welfare criterion.  That criterion provides a 
ranking or, technically, an “ordering” (partial if not complete)100 
of the set of possible worlds {O1 . . . On}.  To talk about “ex ante” 
welfare maximization is to specify how one moves from the 
overall-welfare ordering of outcomes to the overall-welfare 
ranking of actions {A1 . . . Am} available to a given agent at a 
given time. 
The focus of this Article is on the “ex post” inquiry.  I ask 
whether death or risk is a feature of an outcome that 
diminishes the welfare of the dying or at-risk person, in that 
outcome, and thereby affects the goodness of that outcome in 
light of one or another consequentialist criterion that 
incorporates welfare considerations.  I largely ignore the “ex 
ante” inquiry—for there is, after all, only so much one can do in 
a single article.  So the picture of the normative foundations of 
risk regulation painted here is, in an important respect, 
incomplete.  A complete picture would specify how one moves 
from the outcome ranking to the action ranking, and what role 
risk (in a Bayesian or frequentist sense) plays in that move 
separate from any role it plays in shaping the goodness of 
outcomes.  Still, the conclusions I reach in this Article have 
much importance for risk regulation, as elaborated in Part V.  
Whatever one’s view about the move from outcomes to actions—
about the “ex ante” perspective, as it were—my claim that 
death and Bayesian risk but not frequentist risk affect the 
welfare goodness of outcomes will be highly relevant in 
determining what regulators ought to do. 
II.  IS DEATH A HARM?   
Is death a harm?  It is, I will claim; and this claim will 
prove to have much importance for risk regulation.  At the 
outset, however, let me explain as clearly as I can what it is I 
will be claiming. 
First, “harm” is an ambiguous term which is sometimes 
used to mean a welfare setback, sometimes not.  For purposes 
 
 100. See Adler, Incommensurability, supra note 96, at 1401-05 (suggesting 
that outcomes might be incomparable with respect to overall well-being rather 
than better, worse, or precisely equal); Adler, supra note 58, at 328-30 (same); 
Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL 
ECONOMICS 1073, 1127-28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 
1986) (summary of technical, social-choice literature on partial orderings). 
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of this Article, “harm” is an exact synonym for “welfare 
setback.” 
Second, as already explained, the spirit of my analysis is 
consequentialist.  I analyze the impact of P’s premature death 
on his welfare by asking whether two outcomes or “possible 
worlds” differentiated by the time of his death are different for 
P’s welfare.  Third, and relatedly, my claim about the 
harmfulness of death concerns comparative well-being.  I will 
argue that an outcome in which a given person, P, dies at a 
particular point in time can be worse for P than an outcome in 
which he does not die at the time, but lives longer.101 
Fourth, my claim about the harmfulness of death concerns 
harm to P, not harm to third parties.  No one disputes that P’s 
premature death can adversely affect the welfare of his friends, 
family, and other survivors.  What is controversial is whether 
premature death can affect P’s own welfare.102  Fifth, the claim 
concerns death itself, not the process of dying.103  No one 
disputes that an outcome in which P dies painlessly or 
instantly, as opposed to one in which he dies a slow, painful 
death, can be better for P.  The harder question is whether two 
outcomes differentiated by the fact that P continues to live in 
one outcome, and not in the other, can differ for P’s welfare 
even if the process by which P dies in the latter outcome is not 
painful, anxiety provoking, or otherwise experientially bad. 
Sixth, my claim is that death can be a harm, not that it 
need be.  If death is necessarily harmful, then (for example) an 
outcome in which P dies at a certain point will be worse for him 
than an outcome in which he survives, but in a permanent 
 
 101. See, e.g., Fred Feldman, Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death, in THE 
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 308 (arguing that the harmfulness 
of death consists in a comparison between the individual’s actual life history 
and the alternative history that would have occurred had the individual not 
died); Nagel, supra note 10, at 67 (same).  I am not sure what it would mean 
(at least within a consequentialist framework) to describe death as 
noncomparatively bad for a person, or to describe life as noncomparatively 
good.  Such statements, I suggest, are not to be taken literally but actually 
involve covert comparisons of the premature-death outcome or continued-life 
outcome to some baseline outcome.  See JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF 
ECONOMICS 162-73 (1999) (arguing that goodness is reducible to betterness 
and that Epicurus’s experientialist argument against the harmfulness of 
death is therefore “trivially mistaken”); see also Ruth Chang, Comparison and 
the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1569-72 (1998) 
(presenting a comparativist account of justified choice). 
 102. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 62. 
 103. See FRED FELDMAN, CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE REAPER 130 (1992). 
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vegetative state.  That strikes me as untrue.  Bare life—life 
without experiences, activities, and the other features that 
subserve human welfare—certainly need not be better than 
death.104  Indeed, a welfare theorist who places emphasis on 
Experience will say that continuing P’s life in a vegetative state 
is never better for him than early death; while a theorist who 
places emphasis on Preference would at most say that 
continuing P’s life in a vegetative state is better if P (prior to 
the loss of consciousness) preferred that.105 
Seventh, my claim is that death can be a harm to P in light 
of events that would have occurred had P continued to live.  Let 
us call the outcome in which P dies earlier OE, and the outcome 
in which he dies later OL.  P dies at time T in OE; he does not 
die at that time in OL, but continues to live until some later 
time.  Obviously, if OE and OL differ in events that occur before 
T, then OE can be worse for P than OL.  Assume that, in OE, P 
lives in poverty and ignorance, has no friends or meaningful 
work, and dies at the age of forty, while in OL P has sufficient 
resources, is well educated, has lots of friends and an engaging 
career, and dies at the age of seventy-five.  It would be absurd 
to suggest that P here is no worse off in OE than in OL.  The 
proponents of the view that “death is no harm” do not mean to 
assert that.  The much more plausible and interesting assertion 
is this: if OE and OL differ only in events that occur after T, the 
time of P’s early death in OE, then OE is not worse for P than OL.  
And this is the assertion that I mean to dispute.  Assume that 
 
 104. As Nagel puts it, “[A]lmost everyone would be indifferent . . . between 
immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later 
without reawakening.”  Nagel, supra note 10, at 62. 
 105. The kind of harm involved in death is therefore subtly different from 
the harm at issue in my discussion, below, of frequentist and Bayesian risks.  
In that discussion, I focus on whether frequentist and Bayesian risks are 
intrinsic harms—features of outcomes that, ceteris paribus, make the 
outcomes worse with respect to someone’s welfare.  But in claiming that 
“death is a harm,” I am not claiming that death is an intrinsic harm.  If O and 
O* differ merely in P’s being alive (as would be the case where P dies at T in 
O, and lives longer in a vegetative state in O*), then the two outcomes may 
well be identical for P’s welfare.  Rather, my claim is that death can reduce the 
deceased’s well-being by depriving him of intrinsic benefits he would realize if 
he lived longer. 
     Note however that many and perhaps all such benefits necessitate being 
alive—for example, the benefits of having certain experiences or engaging in 
various activities.  Insofar as some welfare benefit does necessitate being 
alive, life is an intrinsic benefit as a component of a hybrid, and death 
necessarily deprives the person of that benefit.  So, in this sense, the 
harmfulness of death is not very different from intrinsic harmfulness. 
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P has a sociable and professionally engaging life in OE and dies 
a sudden death at the age of forty, in 1980; in OL, he lives 
exactly the same life up until 1980, but does not die and 
continues to prosper until the age of seventy-five.  Is OE here 
worse for P than OL?  I believe it is, while modern philosophical 
Epicureans deny that it is.  That is the crux of the dispute. 
More generally, where the earlier-death world OE and the 
later-death world OL differ in events that occur both before and 
after T, the time of P’s death in OE, then the later-occurring 
events, like the earlier occurring events, can make a difference 
to P’s welfare.  Assume P leads a life of poverty in OE, and dies 
at the age of forty, while in OL he leads a sociable and 
professionally engaged life until the age of seventy-five.  Then 
OL is better for P than OE, both because of the better life P leads 
in OL up to the age of forty, and because of the additional, 
fruitful years of life he enjoys in OL after the age of forty.  
Longer life can be one feature of an outcome (among others) 
that makes that a better outcome for some person.  This is the 
form of my “death is harmful” claim that will have the most 
practical relevance for regulators.  Regulatory choices typically 
produce or prevent deaths that occur or would occur at some 
point in time subsequent to the choices; thus, regulators are 
typically comparing outcomes in which some persons live 
longer, as against outcomes in which those persons’ lives are 
both shorter and otherwise different. The pure case in which 
P’s life in the earlier-death world OE and the later-death world 
OL is just the same, up until the time T that P dies in OE, is an 
analytic device designed to sharpen understanding of death’s 
harmfulness, not a realistic scenario.  However, because this 
pure case is particularly clear and simple, that case will be the 
focus of my discussion in this Part. 
Finally, my claim concerns lifetime well-being, not 
momentary well-being.  Lifetime well-being is, I believe, a 
meaningful construct.106  A person’s (actual or possible) life 
history can be compared with another (possible) life history, 
and one can often if not always determine that the first life 
history is better or worse, with respect to the welfare of that 
person, than the second.  Momentary well-being may also be a 
meaningful construct.  Intuitively, one can ask and often 
determine how well a person is doing at one moment, as 
 
 106. See John Bigelow et al., Death and Well-Being, 71 PAC. PHIL. Q. 119, 
120-23 (1990); J. David Velleman, Well-Being and Time, in THE METAPHYSICS 
OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 329. 
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compared to another moment later or earlier in her life, or in a 
different possible life.  However, momentary well-being is not 
my concern here.  It is a serious mistake to think of the 
harmfulness of death in terms of momentary well-being.  
Imagine OE and OL that are identical up until T, the time of P’s 
death in OE.  At times prior to T, P’s momentary well-being is 
the same in both worlds.  At T and at later times, P does not 
exist in OE, and so lacks a momentary well-being in that world.  
Therefore P’s momentary well-being at or after T in OL is not 
greater than her momentary well-being at or after T in OE.  The 
comparison is meaningless.  Think of the parallel case of 
happiness: Since the dead cannot be happy or sad during post-
mortem moments, it is meaningless to ask whether the dead 
are less happy at those moments, than they would be had they 
continued to live.107 
The upshot is that P’s momentary well-being in OL is never 
greater than her momentary well-being in OE; neither during 
the moments before T (in the pure case we are considering), nor 
at or after T.  Thus my claim that OL can be better for P than 
OE is, and must be, a claim about lifetime well-being.  But does 
not lifetime well-being reduce to momentary well-being?  The 
answer is no.  As David Velleman explains, 
[T]he welfare value of a life is not in general determined by, and 
cannot be inferred from, the amount of momentary well-being that 
the life contains. 
   . . . . 
  Consider two different lives that you might live.  One life begins in 
the depths but takes an upward trend . . . .  Another life begins at the 
heights but slides downhill . . . .  Surely, we can imagine two such 
lives as containing equal sums of momentary well-being.  Your 
retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood is in the other; 
your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage in the other. 
  Yet even if we were to map each moment in one life onto a 
moment of equal well-being in the other, we would not have shown 
these lives to be equally good.  For after the tally of good times and 
bad times have been rung up, the fact would remain that one life gets 
progressively better while the other gets progressively worse . . . .  To 
most people, I think, the former story would seem like a better life-
story  . . . in the sense that it is the story of a better life.108 
P’s life in OL, her overall package of experiences, activities, 
accomplishments, relationships and so on, can be better than 
 
 107. But see Bigelow et al., supra note 106, at 134-39 (arguing that death 
typically lowers “temporal well-being” as well as “global well-being”). 
 108. Velleman, supra note 106, at 330-31. 
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her life in OE, even though there is no moment at which P’s 
happiness or momentary well-being is greater.109 
To sum up, the claim I will defend in this Part (for short, 
“death can be harmful”) is as follows: It is possible that the 
lifetime well-being of a person who dies prematurely is lower 
than it would have been, had she continued to live, in virtue of 
events that would have occurred during that additional period 
of life.  The loss of life years can diminish a person’s lifetime or 
overall well-being. 
Isn’t this obvious? In a word, no—not if one is sensitive to 
the thorny conceptual and normative issues that are posed by 
death, welfare, and their intersection.  In the remainder of this 
Part, I will seek to accomplish two goals in tandem: first, to 
clarify why my claim is philosophically controversial; and, 
second, to defend it.  Epicurus and the modern philosophical 
Epicureans110 raise serious challenges to the common-sense 
view that death can be harmful, but these challenges are 
ultimately unsuccessful.  Indeed, the claim that death can be 
harmful is true across reasonable theories of well-being.  This 
claim does not presuppose a commitment to a hedonic theory 
that gives great weight to Experience; a preferentialist theory 
that gives great weight to Preference; or an objectivist theory 
that gives great weight to Value.111  On this score, the 
philosophical literature is quite misleading.  Philosophical 
 
 109. I should note that the view about lifetime well-being presupposed by 
this Article is not identical to Velleman’s view.  This Article presupposes, and 
Velleman would agree, that lifetime well-being is a coherent and morally 
important concept distinct from momentary well-being.  Further, my 
discussion of legal implications in Part V assumes that it is lifetime well-
being, not momentary well-being, that is relevant to legal standards (such as 
cost-benefit analysis) that incorporate welfare considerations and do so in a 
consequentialist way.  This is surely a contestable assumption, but 
unfortunately not one that I have space to defend within the confines of this 
Article.  Velleman, by contrast, does not argue that momentary well-being has 
less moral and legal importance than lifetime well-being.  See Velleman, supra 
note 106, at 347-54 (arguing for the “independent validity of momentary 
perspectives”).  Finally, Velleman contends that two lives “containing equal 
sums of momentary well-being” may differ for lifetime well-being—that 
lifetime well-being  also depends upon, as it were, the narrative structure of a 
life.  Id. at 331.  This last contention may well be true, but is not important for 
my purposes, since in standard cases of premature death the two outcomes 
will not contain the same aggregate momentary well-being. 
 110. See, e.g., Walter Glannon, Epicureanism and Death, 76 MONIST 222 
(1993); O.H. Green, Fear of Death, 43 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 99 (1982); 
Stephen Hetherington, Deathly Harm, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 349 (2001); 
Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 117. 
 111. See infra text accompanying notes 115-35. 
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critics of the Epicureans have typically argued for the 
harmfulness of death by advancing a specific welfare theory: 
hedonism, preferentialism, objectivism, or some hybrid.  As we 
shall see, the claim that death can be harmful is much more 
robust than these critics have suggested. 
                                        
                                       ***** 
 
Why do Epicureans deny that death can be harmful?  Let 
us start with Epicurus’s own words on the subject and those of 
an early disciple, Lucretius.  Epicurus argues, 
Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and 
evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all 
sentience, . . . Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to 
us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and when death is 
come, we are not.  It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the 
dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.112 
Lucretius explains, 
Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, . . . For he 
whom evil is to befall, must in his own person exist at the very time it 
comes, if the misery and suffering are haply to have any place at all; 
but since death precludes this, and forbids him to be, upon whom the 
ills can be brought, you may be sure that we have nothing to fear 
after death, and that he who exists not, cannot become 
miserable . . . .113 
One clear theme in these passages concerns the 
experiential element of well-being. Epicurus contends that 
“good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all 
sentience”; Lucretius reasons that death precludes harm 
(“evil”) because it precludes “misery and suffering,” that is, 
unpleasant, dispreferred, or undesirable mental states.  
Modern philosophical Epicureans, too, suggest that death 
cannot be harmful for the person who dies because, at death, 
that person loses the capacity to have experiences—the 
capacity to feel pains or pleasures, to have beliefs, or to possess 
other types of mental states.  Steven Rosenbaum, a prominent 
contemporary defender of the Epicurean view, writes, 
I offer [and defend as cogent] the following reconstruction of 
Epicurus’s argument.  In formulating the arguments as I do, I 
attempt to do justice to Epicurus’s philosophical insight, caring less 
for historical accuracy than for versimilitude.  The reconstruction 
 
 112. See Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Epicurus’s “Letter to Menoeceus”). 
 113. See FELDMAN, supra note 103, at 129 (first alteration in original) 
(quoting Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura). 
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runs as follows: 
A state of affairs is bad for person P only if P can experience it at 
some time. . . . 
 . . . P’s being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at 
some time. 
 . . . . 
THEREFORE, P’s being dead is not bad for P.114 
Like Epicurus and Lucretius before him, Rosenbaum is in effect 
voicing some version of the following general argument: 
Because the right theory of well-being includes an Experience 
element, death cannot be harmful for the person who dies. 
Is the argument cogent?  As I have already noted, the 
Experience element of welfare might be specified in different 
ways.115  Standardly, that element is specified as a 
supervenience  requirement, which states that two outcomes 
cannot differ, with respect to the welfare of some person P, if P 
has the same mental states in both outcomes.116  Note, 
however, that my “death can be harmful” claim is consistent 
with a supervenience requirement.  To say that “death can be 
harmful” is to say that OE (the earlier-death outcome) can be 
worse for P than OL (the later-death outcome) even if OE and OL 
are identical in features that occur before T, the time of P’s 
early death in OE.  Imagine, therefore, that OE and OL are 
identical in their pre-T features but differ in their post-T 
features as follows: In OE, P is dead and experiences nothing, 
while in OL, P continues to live and experiences various pains, 
pleasures, and other mental states.  In more colloquial terms, 
imagine a case in which P would continue to possess a mental 
life (in OL), were he not to die (in OE).  This is hardly an esoteric 
case.  Although premature death does not necessarily cut short 
a mental life that would otherwise continue—the premature 
death of a comatose person, who would die later without 
regaining consciousness were the premature death not to occur, 
shortens life but not mental life—it is certainly normal, 
unsurprising, and in any event quite possible for premature 
death to deprive a person of experiences she would otherwise 
have.  So it is normal, unsurprising, and in any event quite 
possible for P not to have the same mental states in OE and OL.  
But if P does not have the same mental states in OE and OL, the 
 
 114. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121-22. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
 116. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 88, at 180-81; Bernstein, supra note 59, 
at 42-47. 
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supervenience requirement is satisfied.  As Jeff McMahan puts 
it: “[A]lthough one does not experience death, it does affect 
one’s experience—by limiting or ending it.”117 
McMahan’s comment here about “experienc[ing] death” 
suggests a different specification of the Experience element—
one that makes a particular type of mental state, namely 
awareness or cognizance, a precondition for welfare changes.118  
Similarly, when Rosenbaum writes that “a state of affairs is 
bad for person P only if P can experience it at some time” and 
“P’s being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at 
some time,”119 he is seemingly using the term “experience” as 
synonymous with awareness or cognizance.  Imagine, then, 
that our welfare theory includes an “awareness requirement” 
which stipulates that some feature (F) of an outcome can make 
a difference to P’s well-being only if P is aware of F when or 
after it occurs.  If this latter requirement obtains, then death 
cannot be harmful.  Why?  Consider our test case for the 
harmfulness of death: two outcomes OE and OL, where P dies at 
T in OE and the outcomes are identical in their pre-T features.  
The crucial point to see is that P in OE cannot be cognizant of 
its post-T features (specifically, the fact that she is not alive 
and does not engage in the various activities, relationships, etc. 
that she would have pursued had she not died).  But the post-T 
features of OE are the only features that differentiate it from 
OL.  Therefore, given the awareness requirement, OE cannot be 
worse for P than OL.120 
 
 117. Jeff McMahan, Death and the Value of Life, in THE METAPHYSICS OF 
DEATH, supra note 9, at 234; see also BROOME, supra note 101, at 170-73 
(arguing that experientialism about welfare permits death to be harmful, since 
death can deprive a person of  experiences he would have if alive). 
 118. See McMahan, supra note 117, at 234-45 (distinguishing between 
“Narrow Experience Requirement” and “Wide Experience Requirement”). 
 119. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121-22.  Rosenbaum goes on to state that 
experience has a causal aspect,  and that the concept in one sense entails the 
subject’s awareness but in another sense simply entails a causal connection 
between the “experienced” event or state and the subject.  Id. at 124.  I do not 
believe that redefining Experience to include a causal element undermines the 
argument presented in this section for the harmfulness of death, since what is 
at issue is comparative lifetime well-being across different possible worlds, not 
some putative effect that death causes and the dead person “experiences” (in 
the causal sense) after her death. 
 120. The proposition that OL is better for P than OE is, at first blush, 
consistent with the awareness requirement, since P in OL is alive after T and 
can be cognizant of the features that differentiate that outcome from OE.  One 
might then (1) permit the asymmetry of “better” and “worse” and conclude 
that OL really is better for P even though OE is not worse; or (2) demand 
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How should the defender of the claim that death can be 
harmful respond to this powerful, Epicurean line of argument?  
Unless cognizance and awareness somehow continue after 
death—and my assumption here is that they do not, that death 
necessarily means the end of the person’s existence and 
therewith his awareness and his mental states more 
generally—the argument from an awareness requirement to an 
Epicurean conclusion seems ironclad.121  I will therefore need to 
show that the awareness requirement itself is mistaken.  Let 
me postpone the issue, for the moment,122 and examine whether 
the Preference component of welfare also argues for 
Epicureanism.  As we shall see, Preference might be 
understood to generate an “endorsement requirement” that is 
closely related to the awareness requirement.  I will delineate 
this new requirement, and then try to demonstrate why the 
twin requirements, endorsement and awareness, are too robust 
to be incorporated in the correct theory of welfare. 
The Preference component of welfare stipulates that the 
welfare ranking of outcomes, for a given person, depends at 
least in part on the person’s own ranking of the outcomes—on 
his  preferences as between the outcomes.  The stipulation, 
thus stated, is quite general.  Are the preferences actual or 
hypothetical?  Are they retrospective or prospective?  Are they 
closely or only tenuously linked to choice?  Need they have a 
certain kind of cognitive or affective component?  Welfare 
theorists who share a basic commitment to Preference can 
disagree about the answers to these more specific questions.123  
The crucial question, for our purposes here, concerns the timing 
of the preferences that are incorporated in the welfare theory. 
Let us first consider the case of a welfare theory that 
incorporates a Preference component, and specifies in some 
way which preferences are determinative of welfare—for 
example, by stipulating that such preferences are actual 
preferences which are sufficiently informed and sufficiently 
grounded in deliberation—but does not define the category of 
 
symmetry and conclude that OL is not really better for P than OE since (given 
the arguments stated in the text) OE is not worse; or (3) demand symmetry 
and conclude that OE is really worse for P since OL is better.  On these issues, 
see McMahan, supra note 117, at 235-40. 
 121. But see supra note 120 (describing a line of argument that, together 
with the putative symmetry of “better” and “worse,” seeks to square the 
awareness requirement with the harmfulness of death). 
 122. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
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welfare-determinative preferences in a way that excludes 
prospective preferences.  Clearly, this type of preferentialist 
welfare theory permits death to be harmful.  Assume that P 
prospectively prefers continued life, to premature death, except 
under unusual circumstances where continued life would be 
miserable or painful.  P carefully and with good information 
considers how he would rank a world like OE, as compared to a 
world like OL, and determines that he would give a lower 
ranking to OE.  Further, assume that this preference or ranking 
of P’s is his ranking at all times, both in OE and in OL.  Finally, 
assume that the actual world is OE.  P ends up dying 
prematurely at time T, as opposed to enjoying continued life.  
Under these circumstances, premature death can be worse for 
P than continued life even though the premature-death world 
(OE) and the continued-life world (OL) are identical in their pre-
T features.  P had a preference, prior to his premature death, 
not to die prematurely and forego the experiences and activities 
he would otherwise enjoy.  Although this preference was 
prospective, it was actual, informed, and deliberative, and thus 
counts as a welfare-determinative preference within the theory 
just described.124  
By contrast, if the Preference element of welfare is 
specified so that the only welfare-determinative preferences are 
retrospective, not prospective, death cannot be harmful.  
Specifically, imagine that our welfare theory includes an 
“endorsement requirement,” which states that a feature F can 
make an outcome better (or worse) for some person P only if P 
 
 124. See generally Bernard Williams, The Makropulos Case: Reflections on 
the Tedium of Immortality, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 
73 (presenting a preferentialist account of death’s harmfulness).  As Williams 
notes, “[A] man could . . . have a reason from his own point of view to prefer a 
possible world in which he went on longer to one in which he went on for less 
long . . . .”  Id. at 78. 
     Isn’t it incoherent to imagine a human person, with the epistemic and 
conceptual limitations characteristic of humans, actually having preferences 
with respect to entire possible worlds?  This question raises deep issues for the 
actual Preferentialist that I cannot, and need not, consider here.  Whatever 
the answer, my claim that a Preference requirement permits death to be 
harmful, if the relevant preferences can be prospective, holds true.  If the 
answer to the question is “yes,” then the Preferentialist will either shift 
entirely to idealized rather than actual preferences, or instead will weaken her 
demand with respect to actual preferences (for example, by requiring that the 
person actually prefer some of the features differentiating the two worlds in 
question).  In either case, OE can be worse than OL, assuming prospective 
preferences. 
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(dis)endorses F during or after the time F occurs.125  Consider 
now our two outcomes OE and OL.  The feature of OE that 
putatively makes it worse for P is the fact that P does not enjoy 
various welfare goods, which he would have enjoyed (in OL) had 
he not died prematurely.  But this feature of OE does not occur 
until P dies.  Therefore, P cannot have a retrospective 
preference with respect to this feature.  Since he is dead after 
T, he cannot have any preferences, actual or hypothetical.  P 
might prefer, before his premature death, not to die 
prematurely; but he cannot prefer, after his premature death, 
not to have died prematurely.126 
The endorsement requirement is one possible specification 
of the Preference element of welfare.  The awareness 
requirement, discussed earlier, is one possible specification of 
the Experience element of welfare.127  But these two 
requirements are closely linked.  Both are based on the 
intuitive idea that P’s own perspective is crucial to his 
welfare.128  Both requirements are also grounded in the thought 
that the authoritative perspective is backward looking, not 
forward looking.  It is only after experiences, activities, and 
other putative constituents of welfare have occurred (or failed 
to occur) that we can really assess their welfare impact—or so 
the argument goes.  P might prospectively prefer or disprefer 
some feature F of an outcome, but this preference (since 
prospective) merely concerns a possible occurrence.  Possible 
features, when actualized, can surprise even the best informed.  
It is a truism that people often end up disliking what they 
imagined they would like, or endorsing what they imagined 
they would disprefer.129  Thus our prospective likes and dislikes 
with respect to possible occurrences should be given much less 
weight, in a welfare theory, than our retrospective likes and 
 
 125. Cf. SUMNER, supra note 8, at 122-83 (emphasizing the importance of 
retrospective evaluations rather than prospective desires to well-being). 
 126. The symmetry of benefit and harm might be adduced to show that 
death can be harmful, consistent with an endorsement requirement, since life 
can be beneficial.  See supra note 120 (noting a parallel argument in the 
context of the awareness requirement).  Because, I believe, the endorsement 
requirement, like the awareness requirement, can successfully be attacked 
head-on, see infra text accompanying notes 127-33, I do not pursue the 
symmetry issue here. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
 128. SUMNER, supra note 8, at 26-80. 
 129. See id. at 129-33 (arguing against the equation of welfare with the 
satisfaction of antecedent desires). 
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dislikes with respect to what actually happens.  Until P has 
both become aware of F and developed a retrospective 
preference for or against F, F cannot make an outcome better 
or worse for P. 
The line of reasoning just articulated has real force, but 
ultimately fails to persuade. Retrospective awareness and 
preference are not preconditions for welfare.  Consider the 
plausible “idealizing” conditions, other than temporal position, 
that make a perspective or point of view relevant for welfare 
assessment.  Plausibly, the point of view must be one where the 
person, P, is sufficiently informed130 about the features being 
assessed; those features must be sufficiently vivid to her;131 she 
must be sufficiently thoughtful about the features; she must be 
sufficiently engaged by the ranking exercise;132 and so on.  
Virtually all the plausible “idealizing” conditions I can think 
of—even conditions like vividness and engagement—can be 
true of prospective as well as retrospective points of view.  One 
exception is an actuality condition: a requirement that the 
features under assessment be actual, not merely possible, 
features.  A moment’s thought, however, will show that the 
actuality condition is too demanding.  When P prospectively 
evaluates a possible life history O, as against another possible 
life history O*, he is comparing one group of possible features 
to another.  When P retrospectively evaluates his actual life 
history O, as against a possible life history O* that did not 
occur, he is comparing one group of actual features to a group 
of possible features.  If features must be actual to be properly 
evaluated, then retrospective evaluation, like prospective 
evaluation, falls short.  Intrapersonal judgments of 
comparative well-being always involve comparisons of multiple 
outcomes, at least some of which must be merely possible, not 
actual. 
Note further that the awareness requirement and 
endorsement requirement make prospective points of view 
flatly irrelevant to welfare evaluation, rather than merely—and 
more plausibly—discounting their relevance vis-à-vis 
retrospective points of view.  Imagine that P prospectively 
prefers one outcome to another, and then later, retrospectively, 
 
 130. Cf. sources cited supra note 45 (surveying, but criticizing, full-
information preferentialist accounts of welfare). 
 131. RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 111-12 
(1979). 
 132. On these last two elements, see GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 26-31. 
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switches his ranking.  Perhaps we might give priority to the 
retrospective ranking, in determining which outcome is really 
better for P.  But the premature-death case is different.  Here, 
we have (or may have) a prospective ranking by P of continued 
life over premature death, and no retrospective ranking 
whatsoever by P if he does die prematurely.  Surely this 
prospective ranking could be good enough—sufficiently 
informed, engaged, vivid, etc.—to be authoritative for P, in the 
absence of a conflicting retrospective ranking. 
Finally, note that the awareness requirement and 
endorsement requirement would apply to all changes in a 
person’s circumstances that preclude awareness and 
endorsement—not just death.  The awareness and endorsement 
requirements, taken separately or together, imply that no such 
changes can be harmful.  Consider the family of experiential 
changes that preclude awareness and endorsement.  In O, P 
lives a normal life.  In O*, P continues to live, but suffers 
catastrophic brain damage which lowers his IQ to fifty and 
prevents him being aware of this damage and from having all 
but the most infantile preferences.133  Or, O* is an outcome in 
which P continuously experiences terrible pain—pain so 
intense that more advanced cognitive states like belief 
(awareness) and preference are simply crowded out.  Or, O* is 
an outcome in which P lives but is unconscious.  Or, in O* P 
develops a severe and rapidly progressing case of Alzheimer’s 
disease.  Intuitively, these kinds of radical, negative changes in 
the quality of someone’s experiential life are very bad, indeed, 
for her welfare.  And I see no real reason why a welfare theory 
should insist otherwise.  What changes is experience (so the 
Experience requirement is satisfied); the persons involved 
might strongly and with good reason prefer, beforehand, that 
the changes not occur (so Preference is satisfied); and the 
changes either introduce bad things into the person’s life, or 
deprive her of good things (so Value is satisfied, as is 
Integration).  Yet an awareness requirement and/or an 
endorsement requirement would inter alia lead to the 
conclusion that catastrophic brain damage, radical and 
permanent pain, continuing unconsciousness, severe 
Alzheimer’s, and the like are not welfare setbacks. 
Let me summarize the analysis to this point.  We are 
 
 133. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 65-66 (inferring death’s harmfulness from 
the harmfulness of severe brain damage). 
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considering whether death can be a harm: whether a life 
history OE ending in premature death for P at T can be worse 
for P than an alternative life history OL differing only in events 
that occur after T.  I suggested that the Experience component 
of welfare, if specified in certain ways, is consistent with the 
claim that “death can be harmful” and the same holds true for 
Preference.  Experience and Preference can be specified in ways 
that contradict the “death can be harmful” claim, but these 
specifications—the awareness and endorsement requirements, 
respectively—were shown to be mistaken.  I see no other 
plausible specifications of Experience and Preference that 
contradict the claim, and so will now consider whether Value or 
Integration do so. 
The Value element of welfare poses no difficulty for the 
“death can be harmful” claim.  Different theorists generate 
different lists of objective “goods” and “bads” and adduce 
different rationales for these lists.134  Still, any viable list and 
rationale will count certain activities and experiences as 
valuable; and death, then, can be harmful within the 
framework of this list and rationale, because death precludes 
activity or experience.  For example, Parfit offers “moral 
goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, 
having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the 
awareness of true beauty”135 as a paradigmatic list of goods 
that an objectivist might adduce.  Premature death prevents 
the dying person from performing any additional morally good 
acts, from continuing to engage in rational activity, from 
developing his abilities any further, from having more children 
or engaging in good parenting, from acquiring more knowledge, 
or from being aware of true beauty. 
While the Value element of welfare doesn’t provide 
Epicureans with ammunition for their view that death is 
harmless, the Integration element clearly does.  There are a 
cluster of difficult metaphysical problems raised by the “death 
can be harmful” thesis—problems concerning the subject of the 
putative harm and the time of the putative harm.  Epicurus 
alludes to these problems when he writes: “Death, therefore, 
the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we 
are, death is not come, and when death is come, we are not.”136  
 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56. 
 135. PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499. 
 136. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121. 
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As Thomas Nagel explains, 
[T]here are special difficulties, in the case of death, about how the 
supposed misfortune is to be assigned to a subject at all.  There is 
doubt both as to who its subject is and as to when he undergoes it.  So 
long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he 
no longer exists; so there seems to be no time when death, if it is a 
misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject.137 
Consider, once more, my claim that an earlier-death outcome 
OE can be worse for a person P than a later-death outcome OL, 
even if the two outcomes are identical in events that occur 
before the time T of P’s death in OE.  Isn’t this claim 
metaphysically incoherent?  If P dies prematurely, at what 
time is she worse off than if she had continued to live?  In 
short, at what time does premature death harm P?  
Presumably not before time T, because P has not died yet. Yet 
it also appears that premature death does not harm P at any 
time after T, because at those later times P does not exist and 
cannot be harmed.  Finally, it seems odd to think that the harm 
of premature death is an instantaneous harm, which occurs 
neither before T, nor after T, but precisely at the instant of P’s 
death. 
The problems I have just sketched are, in effect, problems 
of Integration.  My claim is that P’s well-being is lower in one 
outcome (OE), as compared to another outcome (OL).  
Integration demands that the difference between OE and OL be 
a difference that “concerns” P.  This difference must not be 
merely a difference in the general or impersonal goodness, 
beauty, or value of the outcomes.  It is not enough to show that 
OE is worse than OL from some detached viewpoint.  OE must be 
worse than OL for P.138  More precisely, the Integration element 
of welfare plausibly includes the following requirement: A 
person’s lifetime well-being is lower or higher in the actual 
world O, as compared to a counterfactual alternative O*, only if 
P in O (at some time) has the property of being worse or better 
off than her counterfactual self in O*.  Yet there is, apparently, 
no time in the premature-death world OE where P would have 
the property of being worse off than her counterfactual longer-
lived self in OL. 
Much philosophical ink has been spilled proposing, and 
criticizing, various solutions to the related problems of 
identifying (1) the time at which premature death is harmful 
 
 137. Nagel, supra note 10, at 64. 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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and (2) the subject of that harm.  Indeed, more attention has 
been given to these problems than to any other issue discussed 
in the “Is death harmful?” literature.  One general approach to 
solving the timing and subject problems is to argue that dead 
people do, in some sense, exist.  Harry Silverstein and Palle 
Yourgrau have taken this approach.139  The other general 
approach is to concede that dead people do not exist, but then 
either (I) identify a discrete moment or stretch of time at which 
premature death is harmful, or (II) argue that there is no 
discrete moment or stretch of time at which death is harmful.  
Joel Feinberg, George Pitcher, and Julian Lamont fall in 
category I.  Feinberg and Pitcher argue that premature death is 
harmful for the dying person before the premature death 
occurs.140  Lamont argues that premature death is harmful for 
the dying person at the point of death and thereafter.141  Fred 
Feldman, Thomas Nagel, and William Grey fall in category II.  
Feldman argues that premature death is harmful “eternally,” 
i.e., at all times: 
[W]hen we say that [the dying person’s] death is bad for her, we are 
really expressing a complex fact about the relative values of two 
possible worlds.  If these worlds stand in a certain value relation, 
then (given that they stand in this relation at any time) they stand in 
that relation not only when [the person] exists, but at times when she 
does not.142 
Nagel argues that premature death is harmful at no time, 
while Grey argues that the harm in premature death does have 
a temporal location, but this location is vague—it cannot be 
precisely defined.143 
One important point has been missed, or at least under-
emphasized, in this philosophical back and forth.  The specific 
problem of explaining how premature death can be harmful for 
the dying person is simply one instance of a more general 
problem, namely explaining how a person’s lifetime well-being 
can ever be higher or lower than a counterfactual alternative.  
 
 139. See Harry S. Silverstein, The Evil of Death, in THE METAPHYSICS OF 
DEATH, supra note 9, at 95, 110-15; Palle Yourgrau, The Dead, in THE 
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 137, 142-45. 
 140. See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, 
supra note 9, at 171, 186-88; George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, in 
THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 159, 168. 
 141. Julian Lamont, A Solution to the Puzzle of When Death Harms Its 
Victims, 76 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 198, 209-12 (1998). 
 142. Feldman, supra note 101, at 321. 
 143. See William Grey, Epicurus and the Harm of Death, 77 AUSTRALASIAN 
J. PHIL. 358, 363-64 (1999); Nagel, supra note 10, at 67. 
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To see this, imagine that we are comparing the actual world O, 
to a counterfactual alternative O* in which P dies at exactly the 
same time as in O.  The issue of premature death is thus 
eliminated.  But here, too, the Integration requirement 
seemingly cannot be satisfied.  The Integration requirement 
stipulates that P’s lifetime well-being is higher or lower in O, as 
compared to O*, only if O is better or worse for P than O*—only 
if the difference between the outcomes is expressible as a 
relational property of P, such that P in O has the property of 
being better or worse off than his counterfactual counterpart in 
O*.  Yet at what time is O better or worse for P than O*?  
Seemingly not before P’s death.  At that point, P’s life is not 
over, and his actual lifetime well-being has not yet been 
determined.  How can we say that P’s life has in fact been 
better or worse for him, as compared to a counterfactual 
alternative, until P has died—until we know what path his life 
history has in fact taken?  On the other hand, the time at which 
O is better or worse for P than O* cannot, seemingly, be the 
time P dies or thereafter, because P does not exist at or after 
that time. 
In short, if it is metaphysically incoherent to say that 
premature death is harmful for the dying person, then more 
generally it is metaphysically incoherent to make statements to 
the effect that one life history is better or worse for a person 
than another life history.  This leaves three options.  The first 
is to give up the concept of lifetime well-being.  But lifetime 
well-being is a coherent concept, and indeed is crucial to moral 
assessment.  As David Velleman and others have persuasively 
argued, judgments of well-being cannot be reduced to 
judgments of momentary well-being.144  The first option should 
be rejected. 
The second option is to give up the Integration 
requirement.  If the Integration requirement is abandoned, 
then to say that P’s lifetime well-being in O is higher or lower 
than her lifetime well-being in O* does not imply that O is 
better or worse for P than O*.  The third option is to preserve 
the Integration requirement, and show how it is possible for P 
in one world to be better or worse off—with respect to lifetime 
well-being—than her counterfactual counterpart in another 
outcome.  This is where the various proposed solutions to the 
“timing” and “subject” puzzles advanced by Silverstein, 
 
 144. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
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Yourgrau, Feinberg, Pitcher, Lamont, Feldman, Nagel and 
Grey come into play.145  These “solutions” are different ways to 
pursue the third option—different ways to show that one life 
history can be worse for the subject than the alternative.  Note 
that this third option must be correct if the first two are 
properly rejected.  If lifetime well-being is a coherent concept, 
and the Integration requirement obtains, then one of the 
proposed solutions to the timing and subject puzzles must be 
cogent. 
Which one?  I cannot hope to address that extremely 
difficult metaphysical question here.  My contribution, if any, is 
to have shown that the timing and subject puzzles are 
generally implicated in comparisons of lifetime well-being, and 
reciprocally to have argued that the coherence of such 
comparisons plus an Integration requirement implies the 
solubility of these puzzles.  I do not know when, if ever, it 
becomes true that P in OE, the premature-death world, is worse 
off than P in OL, the continued-life world.146  What I have 
argued is this: If P in OE is never worse off than P in OL, and if 
this implies that premature death is not a harm for the dying 
person, then it follows that nothing which alters someone’s life-
plan can be harmful or beneficial for him.  Because this is an 
absurd conclusion, we should infer that an Integration 
requirement poses no obstacle to the claim that death can be 
harmful.  Although the metaphysicians continue to debate how 
to reconcile the harmfulness of death with the Integration 
requirement, what is clear is that some such reconciliation 
 
 145. Since Nagel and Feldman do claim that death can be harmful for the 
dead person, I am inclined to interpret them as pursuing the third option 
(preserving Integration) rather than the second (abandoning it) even though 
they do not identify a discrete stretch of time during which the harm occurs. 
 146. I am inclined to think that those who die prematurely are worse off, as 
compared to hypothetical alternative life histories, at the point of death and 
thereafter (and not before).  This is Lamont’s view, and it rests upon the quite 
plausible premise that nonexistent things can have relational properties.  See 
David Hillel Ruben, A Puzzle About Posthumous Predication, 97 PHIL. REV. 
211, 222-36 (1988).  But see Jack Li, Commentary on Lamont’s When Death 
Harms Its Victims, 77 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 349, 352-53 (1999) (criticizing 
Lamont).  If indeterminism is true and our futures are indeed open, it would 
not be true that the person who ends up dying prematurely was actually worse 
off, earlier on, than in the counterfactual outcome where he continues to live.  
The “no time” solutions are, I think, inconsistent with Integration: If P has the 
relational property of being worse off than some counterfactual counterpart, 
then she possesses this property at some time.  I cannot, however, defend 
Lamont’s position here, and—as explained in the text—do not need to do so in 
order to argue that death is harmful. 
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must be possible if any judgments of comparative lifetime well-
being are. 
III.  IS THE RISK OF DEATH A HARM? RISKS AS 
RELATIVE FREQUENCIES   
Is the risk of death a harm?  Here, as with the question “Is 
death a harm?”, I use the term “harm” to mean a setback to 
well-being.  Here, as there, I adopt a consequentialist approach 
and focus on what economists would call “ex post” welfare 
impacts—namely, whether the risk of death is a feature of an 
outcome or possible world that changes a person’s welfare in 
that world.147  Finally, my focus remains comparative rather 
than noncomparative well-being, lifetime rather than 
momentary well-being, and harm to the person herself (here, 
the person at risk) rather than harm to third parties.148 
In short, the question I intend to ask is this: Does (or can) a 
risk of death lower the lifetime well-being of a person who is 
subject to that risk, as compared to an outcome in which she is 
not at risk?  In answering this question, I will focus on 
probabilistic conceptions of risk and, within that category, on 
the two most attractive accounts of probability: the relative-
frequency account and the Bayesian account.  Frequentist 
accounts of risk are discussed in this Part and Bayesian 
accounts in Part IV. 
Throughout this Part and the next, I will assume that risks 
of death occur as a result of events.149  A risky event might be 
simple in structure (a nuclear reactor near to P’s home releases 
some radiation at a particular place and at a particular time), 
or it might be more complex (P’s supervisor misinforms him 
 
 147. See supra Part I.C. (explaining the consequentialist and “ex post” 
approach of this Article). 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09 (explaining that the 
analysis of death’s harmfulness focuses on comparative well-being, lifetime 
welfare setbacks, and harm to the person who dies). 
 149. Probabilities, as I have explained, are numbers attached to 
propositions.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.  But those 
propositions—at least on a frequentist account—are, paradigmatically, 
propositions that predicate some property of some event.  See, e.g., COHEN, 
supra note 14, at 40-51 (summarizing the frequentist view).  And 
presentations of the probability calculus that are agnostic as between 
frequentist, Bayesian, classical, and logical accounts of probability are often 
formulated in terms of events.  See HACKING, supra note 72, at 38 (“Most 
statisticians and most textbooks of probability talk about the probability of 
events.”). 
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about workplace safety procedures regarding certain chemicals; 
P, over the course of his adult life, consumes a diet that makes 
him particularly susceptible to those chemicals; and P’s 
coworkers, at different points, engage in negligent behavior in 
an area of the factory close to the chemicals).  Risky events 
include natural events as well as human actions and—within 
the latter category—P’s own actions as well as the actions of 
others. 
Events that produce premature death risks also frequently 
lead to other kinds of welfare setbacks.  Imagine that a toxic 
waste spill not only produces a death risk for P, but damages 
his property and injures his pets.  Or, imagine that the 
consumption of a dangerous food additive increases P’s risk of 
death, and also causes P physical discomfort or injury of some 
kind.  For that matter, imagine that the risk of premature 
death imposed on P by some event is realized, so that P suffers 
not only the harm of risk (such as it may be) but the additional 
and separate harm of death itself. 
The general issue under consideration here is whether the 
imposition of a risk of death on P by an event E is a feature of 
an outcome that can make the outcome worse for P’s lifetime 
well-being, as compared to an outcome in which P suffers no 
such risk.  I will sharpen and simplify analysis of this issue by 
focusing on the simple case where the outcomes under 
comparison are identical except for the risk of death.150  In this 
simple case, OR, the riskier world, contains some event (E) that 
imposes a substantial risk of premature death on P; OS, the 
safer world, does not contain that event; and OS and OR are 
otherwise identical with respect to P’s well-being.  The question 
I will address, in detail, is whether—given the multiple 
considerations plausibly relevant to well-being, specifically 
Preference, Experience, Value and Integration—P’s lifetime 
well-being in OR is lower than his lifetime well-being in OS.  In 
short, is the risk of death itself a harm?  As we shall see, the 
answer is “no” on a frequentist account of risk, but “yes” on a 
Bayesian account. 
A. WHAT IS THE RISK OF DEATH?  A FREQUENTIST ACCOUNT 
At the threshold, a conceptual problem arises.  Is the risk 
of death an intelligible concept for the frequentist?  OR is a 
 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (adopting a similar 
procedure for analyzing whether death is harmful). 
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world in which P is at substantial risk of premature death from 
some event E.  More precisely, OR is a world in which E occurs 
and the proposition “P will die earlier than he would have had 
E not occurred” has a high probability.  But does the 
frequentist account permit us to attach a probability number to 
this kind of proposition—a so-called singular proposition? 
Some frequentists (call them “hard-core” frequentists) 
would say no.  Consider what Richard von Mises, the 
statistician and philosopher whose book Probability, Statistics, 
and Truth (1928) is a landmark in the development of the 
frequentist view of probability, had to say about the probability 
of death. 
The rational concept of probability, which is the only basis of [the] 
probability calculus, applies only to problems in which either the 
same event repeats itself again and again, or a great number of 
uniform elements are involved at the same time.  Using the language 
of physics, we may say that in order to apply the theory of probability 
we must have a practically unlimited sequence of uniform 
observations [i.e., a suitably large reference class]. 
   . . . . 
   . . . When we speak of ‘the probability of death,’ the exact 
meaning of this expression can be defined in the following way only.  
We must not think of an individual, but of a certain class as a whole, 
e.g., ‘all insured men forty-one years old living in a given country and 
not engaged in certain dangerous occupations.’  A probability of death 
is attached to this class of men or to another class that can be defined 
in a similar way.  We can say nothing about the probability of death 
of an individual even if we know his condition of life and health in 
detail.  The phrase ‘probability of death,’ when it refers to a single 
person, has no meaning for us.  This is one of the most important 
consequences of our definition of probability . . . .151 
The hard-core frequentist has a straightforward answer to the 
question “Is the risk of death a harm?”  The answer is no, she 
will claim, because the putative harm (the harm to a particular 
person arising from his risk of death) presupposes a “risk” or 
“probability” (the risk or probability of a particular person 
dying) that in fact does not exist.152  According to von Mises, 
“[I]t is utter nonsense to say . . . that Mr. X . . . has [a given] 
probability . . . of dying in the course of the next year;”153 a 
fortiori, for von Mises and other hard-core frequentists, it 
should be “utter nonsense” to say that Mr. X’s risk of death 
harms him. 
 
 151. VON MISES, supra note 77, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 152. See id. at 16-18 (discussing the probability of death). 
 153. Id. at 17-18. 
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Yet not all frequentists adopt such a position.  For 
example, Hans Reichenbach, who along with von Mises is 
standardly seen as a leading contributor to the frequentist 
school, suggests that a proposition which ascribes an attribute 
to a particular object rather than a class of objects might be 
assigned a probability as follows: first, subsume the object 
under an appropriate reference class; second, calculate the 
frequency of the attribute in that reference class.  According to 
Reichenbach, “If we are asked to find the probability holding 
for an individual future event, we must first incorporate the 
case in a suitable reference class.”154  He elaborates, 
I regard the statement about the probability of the single case, not as 
having a meaning of its own, but as representing an elliptic mode of 
speech.  In order to acquire meaning, the statement must be 
translated into a statement about a frequency in a sequence of 
repeated occurrences.  The statement concerning the probability of 
the single case thus is given a fictitious meaning, constructed by a 
transfer of meaning from the general to the particular case.  The 
adoption of the fictitious meaning is justifiable . . . because it serves 
the purpose of action to deal with such statements as meaningful.155 
Let us call this the “soft-core” frequentist view.  The soft-core 
frequentist thinks that probability numbers are meaningfully 
attachable to singular propositions such as “P will die” or “P 
will die as a result of E” or “P will die earlier than he would 
have had E not occurred.”  Consider the proposition “P will die 
earlier than he would have had E not occurred.”  The 
probability of that proposition would be seen, by the soft-core 
frequentist, as the frequency with which people like P die 
prematurely when events like E occur. 
To be a bit more precise, we can imagine a large or infinite 
reference class of events {E1, E2 . . . En} that includes the 
particular event of interest E.156  We can also imagine a large 
or infinite class of persons {P1, P2 . . . Pn}, where each Pi is alive 
 
 154. REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 374. 
 155. Id. at 376-77. 
 156. As I have mentioned, the events or, more generally, the objects that 
the frequentist uses to determine relative frequencies and therewith 
probabilities might be conceptualized in different ways: as actual objects, 
hypothetical objects, or mathematical constructs that represent actual or 
hypothetical objects.  See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.  Thus the 
class of events {E1 . . . En} and matching class of persons {P1 . . . Pn} employed to 
determine the frequentist probability that E results in P’s premature death 
might be classes of actual or hypothetical events and persons or of 
mathematical constructs that represent them.  As far as I can tell, nothing in 
my argument against the harmfulness of frequentist probability depends on 
how the classes are specified.   
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when the matching event Ei occurs.  In each case we could, in 
principle, determine whether the given Pi dies prematurely, i.e., 
dies earlier than he would have had Ei not occurred.  The 
relative frequency of premature death is the number of 
premature deaths, divided by the total number of events in the 
reference class {E1 . . . En}—or the limit of the number of 
premature deaths divided by the total number of events, in the 
case of an infinite reference class {E1 . . . En . . . }.157 
A simple example might help clarify how this soft-core 
frequentist strategy for ascribing death probabilities would 
work.  A particular person P eats a food item containing the 
food additive sodium nitrite.  This event E (P’s ingestion of the 
food item) is alleged to impose a high probability of death on P.  
A soft-core frequentist would subsume E within some broader 
class.  For example, E falls within the large class {Ei} including 
every ingestion within actual human history of a sodium 
nitrite-containing food item.  For each Ei within this class, the 
matching Pi might be defined as the person who ingested the 
food item.  For each such Ei, we can ask whether the person Pi 
who ingested the item died “prematurely,” i.e., earlier than he 
would have had the ingestion not occurred.  Imagine that {Ei} 
includes 10 million events, and that in 20,000 cases the 
ingestor Pi died earlier than he would have had the ingestion 
not occurred.  Thus, the relative frequency of premature death 
within this reference class {Ei} is 20,000/10 million = 1/500.  
This relative frequency number, 1/500, might be taken as the 
probability of the proposition “P will die earlier than he would 
have had E not occurred.” 
In sum, the soft-core frequentist would characterize the 
difference between the safer world OS and the riskier world OR 
as follows: 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the frequency 
    with which people like P, exposed to events like E, die    
   prematurely, is high. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
 
 157. To put this another way, given our particular event E and person P, 
we are subsuming the ordered pair (E, P) in a class of ordered pairs {(E1, P1), 
(E2, P2), . . . (En, Pn)}.  I am indebted to Paul Edelman for a helpful discussion 
on this issue. 
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Yet there remains a crucial incompleteness in this 
characterization of OS and OR.  Given a particular event E, 
there are many different reference classes in which E might be 
subsumed.  E has multiple characteristics; each such 
characteristic, and each conjunction of E’s characteristics, 
defines a different reference class that E is “similar to,” in a 
certain way.  For example, a particular release of uranium by a 
nuclear plant upriver from a major city falls in the reference 
class of “releases of toxic material,” “releases of radioactive 
material,” “releases of uranium,” “releases of uranium by 
nuclear plants proximate to large cities,” “releases of toxic 
material by facilities proximate to large cities,” and so on.  An 
analogous point can be made about the person P exposed to the 
“risk” of death.  That risk depends upon the frequency of 
premature death within a class {Pi} including P, but of course 
there are many (indeed, an infinite number) of such classes. 
[Consider] the probability of a particular man aged 40 living to be 41.  
Intuitively the probability will vary depending on whether we regard 
the individual merely as a man or more particularly as an 
Englishman; for the life expectancy of Englishmen is higher than that 
of mankind as a whole.  Similarly, the probability will alter depending 
on whether we regard the individual as an Englishman aged 40 or as 
an Englishman aged 40 who smokes two packets of cigarettes a day, 
and so on.158 
Because P and E can be characterized in different ways, 
there are multiple different probabilities that E will result in 
P’s premature death—corresponding to the multiple reference 
classes of events {Ei}
A, {Ei}
B . . . and matching classes of persons 
{Pi}
A, {Pi}
B . . . that contain E and P, with each such pair of 
classes generating a different relative frequency of premature 
death.  This point might be seen to have quite immediate and 
dire implications for the claim that risk, in the relative-
frequency sense, is harmful.  After all, if the frequentist 
probability that E causes P’s premature death is high, relative 
to one description of E and P, but low, relative to another 
 
 158. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 119.  This crucial problem for frequentist 
theory—the problem of the reference class and the closely related problem of 
singular probabilities—has been much discussed in the literature on 
probability theory.  See, e.g., id. at 119-25; HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73, 
at 338-42; KYBURG, supra note 14, at 47-51; WESLEY C. SALMON, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 90-94 (1966); WEATHERFORD, supra 
note 14, at 165-67; Howson, supra note 14, at 21-23.  The multiplicity of 
reference classes subsuming a particular event is crucial to Stephen Perry’s 
argument that risk in the frequentist sense is not harmful.  See Perry, supra 
note 25, at 330-39. 
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description, how can it be said that E’s occurrence has really 
harmed P?  I do not believe, however, that the dependence of 
frequentist probabilities on how we describe particular events, 
etc., necessarily makes these probabilities irrelevant to our 
welfare.  The soft-core frequentist can argue as follows: There 
is a welfare-relevant way to characterize the event of interest E 
and the person of interest P.  When we characterize E and P in 
the welfare-relevant way, we come up with classes {Ei}
WELFARE 
and {Pi}
WELFARE; the frequency with persons in {Pi}
WELFARE die 
prematurely as a result of events in {Ei}
WELFARE might be high or 
low; if it is high, we can say that the welfare-relevant 
characterization of P and E generates a high probability of 
premature death; and in this case P has indeed been harmed, 
regardless of whether a different (welfare-irrelevant) 
characterization of P and E generates a different probability of 
premature death. 
Does this line of argument work?  Is there indeed a 
welfare-relevant way to characterize events and persons such 
that a high frequency of premature death, relative to this 
characterization scheme, is indeed harmful?  I suggest that the 
answer is “no,” and will try to show why by examining a 
number of different ways in which events and persons can be 
assigned to reference classes.159 
At this juncture, I should register both my great debt to, 
but also partial disagreement with, Stephen Perry’s scholarship 
on the harmfulness of risk.  In a seminal article, Risk, Harm 
and Responsibility, Perry rigorously analyzes the harmfulness 
of risk for purposes of tort law.160  Perry distinguishes between 
Bayesian (what he calls “subjectivist”) and frequentist 
conceptions of risk;161 focuses on frequentist risk (on the 
grounds that Bayesian risk seems unlikely to have moral 
significance);162 explains how ascriptions of frequentist risk are 
relative to reference classes;163 and concludes that frequentist 
risk is not harmful, at least in a deterministic world.164  The 
core of Perry’s argument on this last point, I take it, is that (1) 
in a deterministic world a person who is not physically injured 
by some action is at zero frequentist risk of injury, relative to 
 
 159. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 160. Perry, supra note 25, at 322-39. 
 161. Id. at 322-27. 
 162. Id. at 327-28. 
 163. Id. at 333-35. 
 164. Id. at 334-36. 
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what I will term a “physical” reference class, namely one 
specifying all the causally relevant features of the action and 
person; and therefore (2) the fact that the person has nonzero 
frequentist of injury relative to a less finely specified reference 
class cannot itself by a welfare setback for her. 
[If] the processes that caused or might in the future cause physical 
harm are deterministic, then there is no basis for saying that a person 
who has been put at risk by another of suffering such harm has, just 
by reason of being put at risk, sustained damage distinct in kind from 
the physical harm . . . . The basis for saying that a person is at risk of 
suffering a certain type of physical harm is that he or she belongs to a 
particular reference class with which is associated a known objective 
[i.e., frequentist] probability of harm of that type.  But there is 
nothing magical about the particular reference class selected: 
generally it will simply be the narrowest class, given the current state 
of our knowledge, for which we are able to determine with some 
degree of accuracy the relative frequency of the type of harm in 
question.  If we were in a position to describe the objective 
probabilities associated with a still narrower reference class to which 
we knew the person in question also belonged, presumably we would 
do so.  Moreover we know, given the assumption of determinism, that 
it is in principle possible to partition any such reference class into two 
subclasses, one for which the probability of physical harm is one and 
one for which the probability is zero. Thus, there is simply no ground 
for the claim that the objective [frequentist] probability of harm, 
associated with the particular reference class that we are currently in 
a position to describe, itself constitutes a distinct form of damage.165 
I agree with Perry’s conclusion, here, but think the 
argument is too quick.  To determine whether someone is 
harmed by a high frequentist risk of injury or premature death, 
we need to consider different plausible accounts of well-being 
and different possible specifications of the reference class 
generating the high risk.  Perry does not do this.  His 
assumption, as suggested by the above quotation, seems to be 
that our interest in frequentist risk is only epistemic—as an 
indicator of whether the person at risk will be injured or not.  
However, frequentist risk relative to some reference class (for 
example, a conventional class) might be welfare relevant on 
some welfare theory (for example, a theory that emphasizes 
Value and the role of conventional ascriptions in fixing Value) 
independent of its epistemic function.  Further, the fact that 
frequentist risk is epistemically irrelevant to perfectly informed 
agents in a deterministic world does not show that it lacks 
epistemic and thereby welfare relevance for imperfectly 
informed agents.  Why look, in determining welfare, to what 
 
 165. Id. at 336. 
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the person whose welfare is at issue would believe or prefer 
under hypothetical conditions of full information, rather than 
to what she actually believes and therefore prefers? 
In point of fact, I do think that full-information preferences 
are an important part of the welfare analysis, and in part for 
that reason ultimately concur in Perry’s conclusion.  Yet, I 
believe, we cannot establish the harmlessness of risk without 
explicitly considering the whole range of plausible welfare 
theories (more precisely, the whole range of plausible elements 
of welfare theories, namely Experience, Preference, Value and 
Integration.)  So I will, in my own fashion, reanalyze the 
question that he addresses in Risk, Harm, and Responsibility.  
My analysis does, at important junctures, overlap with his, and 
at every such juncture I have (I hope) noted the debt. 
B. STATISTICAL REFERENCE CLASSES 
Reichenbach suggests the following principle for 
subsuming a particular event within a reference class: choose 
“the narrowest class for which reliable statistics can be 
compiled.”166 
Reichenbach’s principle, and variations thereof, is a 
standard proposal within the frequentist literature.167  This 
proposal might be used to generate a probability of premature 
death, as follows.  Given a particular event E and a particular 
person P, we consider progressively more detailed (joint) 
characterizations of E and P.  Imagine that E is the ingestion, 
at 10 p.m., on a hot summer day, of an all-beef hot dog 
containing sodium nitrite, by a thirty-five-year old Caucasian 
man P weighing 200 pounds, with a family history of liver 
cancer, and who tends to eat red meat and other high-fat, high-
 
 166. REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 374.  For a similar suggestion, see 
A.J. Ayer, Two Notes on Probability, in THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 202 (1963).  Reichenbach’s approach need not generate a 
determinate probability, since there may be multiple classes, none narrower 
than any of the others, for which reliable statistics are available and which 
include a given event.  See GILLIES, supra note 14, at 121.  In my analysis 
below, I ignore this difficulty, assume that a determinate probability is 
generated, and show why—nonetheless—frequentist risk relative to a 
Reichenbachian reference class is not harmful. 
 167. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 158, at 91 (modifying Reichenbach’s 
proposal by stipulating that the reference class should be “homogeneous”—not 
further specifiable in a way that changes the frequency of the relevant 
attribute—and that the broadest such class should be used to determine a 
single-case probability). 
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cholesterol foods.  We can characterize E as “the ingestion of a 
sodium nitrite-containing food item by a man,” and P as “the 
man who ingests the item.”  We can, with greater specificity, 
characterize E as “the ingestion of a sodium nitrite-containing 
food item by a man with a family history of cancer” and P as 
“the man, with a family history of cancer, who ingests the 
item.”  With even greater specificity, we can describe E as “the 
ingestion of a sodium nitrite-containing food item by a man P 
with a family history of cancer and a high-fat diet” and P as 
“the man, with a family history of cancer and a high-fat diet, 
who ingests the item.”  For some characterizations of E and P, 
reliable statistics will presumably be available at or around the 
time of E, while for other characterizations such information 
will be unavailable.168  For example, there might be reliable 
statistics about the frequency with which the ingestion of a 
sodium nitrite-containing food item results in premature death, 
but not about the frequency with which the ingestion of sodium 
nitrite-containing hot dogs by large Caucasians with a history 
of liver cancer results in premature death.  Choose the most 
specific characterization of E and P for which reliable statistics 
are available.  This characterization generates a reference class 
for E and P, which I will call the “statistical” class and 
abbreviate {Ei}
STAT and {Pi}
STAT.  If the most specific such 
characterization of E and P is, say, “the ingestion of a sodium 
nitrite-containing food item by a man with a history of liver 
cancer,” then {Ei}
STAT is the set of all  ingestions169 of sodium 
nitrite-containing food items by men with a history of liver 
cancer, and {Pi}
STAT is the set of men who ingest those items.  
 
 168. See REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 377-78.  Reichenbach states, 
We can ask only for the best reference class available, the reference 
class that, on the basis of our present knowledge, will lead to the 
greatest number of successful predictions, whether they concern hits 
of bombs, cases of disease, or political events.  If no statistics are 
available for the common class A.C., we shall base our probability 
calculations on the reference class A, and must renounce 
improvement in the success ratio that might result from the use of 
the reference class A.C. 
Id. 
 169. More precisely, {Ei}
STAT could be: (1) the finite set of all such ingestions 
that have actually occurred; (2) the infinite set of hypothetical ingestions that 
would occur, were the right sort of event-generating scenario (here, having a 
man with a history of liver cancer eat a sodium nitrite-containing food item) to 
occur repeatedly ad infinitum; or (3) a set of mathematical constructs 
representing the first or the second.  See supra notes 77-80 (discussing 
whether the relevant objects, for the frequentist, are actual, hypothetical, or 
mathematical). 
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These classes can then be used to calculate what I will call the 
“statistical” probability that our particular event E will result 
in the premature death of our particular person P, namely, the 
frequency with which persons within {Pi}
STAT die earlier than 
they would have had the matching events within {Ei}
STAT not 
occurred. 
Consider, now, our two outcomes, safer OS and riskier OR, 
on the assumption that the high probability of death in OR is a 
statistical probability. 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with  
Statistical Probabilities 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the frequency 
   with which people statistically similar to P, exposed to                                
   events statistically similar to E, die prematurely, is                                                             
   high.  In other words, the relative frequency of                                                                    
   premature death by persons within {Pi}
STAT, as a result                                                        
   of events within {Ei}
STAT (where {Pi}
STAT and {Ei}
STAT are                                                     
   the  narrowest classes for which reliable statistics can be                                                     
   compiled) is high. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s 
   welfare. 
Is OR worse for P than OS?  I think not. 
First, OR need not be worse than OS with respect to the 
Experience component of welfare.  An event E creates a high 
statistical probability of P’s premature death just in case the 
most specific characterization of E and P (given currently 
available information) generates a high frequency of premature 
death. The occurrence of such an event does not entail any 
change in P’s mental states.170  E itself could be an event 
external to P’s mind (either an event that occurs in the outside 
world, or an event that involves bodily but not mental changes 
in P).  And the statistical classes {Ei}
STAT and {Pi}
STAT are the 
narrowest classes for which reliable statistics can be compiled; 
this may not be information about which P herself is aware.  
For example, a dangerous event such as a toxic release, unsafe 
behavior by co-workers, or a change in supervisory practices, 
could occur in P’s workplace without P’s knowledge or 
awareness, and without her knowledge or awareness of the 
frequency with which statistically similar events result in 
 
 170. Cf. Perry, supra note 25, at 338 (arguing that frequentist risk is not 
harmful in itself, but could be once discovered by the person at risk). 
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premature death to statistically similar persons.  In such cases, 
the claim that OR is worse for P than OS runs afoul of the 
standard Experientialist principle that welfare supervenes on 
mental states.171 
To be sure, one can imagine unusual cases where OR is 
statistically riskier for P than OS, where the two outcomes are 
otherwise identical for P’s welfare, but where OR and OS still 
differ with respect to P’s experience.  This will occur when the 
event of interest, E, itself involves a change in P’s mental life.  
For example, E might be a shockingly scary nightmare, and it 
might emerge that the statistical frequency with which 
shockingly scary nightmares result in the premature death (by 
heart attack, say) of the persons experiencing such nightmares 
is high.  Even here, however, an Experientialist would deny 
that the statistical probability of premature death is itself 
harmful.  What makes OR worse for P, if anything, is the scary 
nightmare—not the statistical probability of death thus 
produced, i.e., the fact that statistically similar nightmares 
often result in premature death to persons statistically similar 
to P.  That fact, itself, need not enter P’s experience.  Further, if 
we imagine a case in which P does become aware of the 
statistics about the risky event, then we have added something 
to OR other than the high statistical probability of P’s 
premature death—namely, P’s awareness of that probability—
and it is this additional feature, not the probability itself, that 
makes OR worse for P. 
Second, the claim that statistical probabilities are harmful 
runs afoul of the Preference component of welfare.  Why?  After 
 
 171. Conceivably, the Experience component of welfare might be specified 
in a form weaker than a supervenience requirement.  See supra text 
accompanying note 61 (noting this possibility).  For example, the 
Experientialist might stipulate that two outcomes can differ for P’s welfare 
only if they differ in some way accessible to P’s experience. The Experience 
requirement, thus weakened, is consistent with the harmfulness of statistical 
and more generally frequentist risk.  But is the requirement, in this form, a 
plausible part of a welfare account?  Why hew to the intuition that welfare has 
something to do with our mental states and yet flesh it out in such a minimal 
way?  I do not pursue these issues here because even if the view that 
statistical and, more generally, frequentist risk is harmful is consistent with 
the best construal of the Experience requirement, it is problematic on other 
grounds.  See infra text accompanying notes 172-83, 186-90, 195-200 (arguing 
that frequentist risk relative to statistical, physical, and conventional 
reference classes does not satisfy the Value, Preference, and/or Integration 
elements of welfare, and raising further objections to the claim that 
frequentist risk in the physical or conventional sense is harmful). 
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all, people can prefer or disprefer anything.  P might prefer  the 
nonoccurrence of events which impose a high statistical 
probability of premature death on him.  If P has this 
preference, then P prefers OS to OR, and won’t the 
Preferentialist therefore conclude that OS is better for P’s 
welfare than OR?  The problem is that Preferentialists, quite 
typically (and quite plausibly), stipulate that welfare-
constitutive preferences must be fully informed.172  Yet it is 
very hard to see why P, under conditions of full information, 
would prefer OS to OR. 
Consider once more the case where E is the ingestion, at 10 
p.m., on a hot summer day, of an all-beef hot dog containing 
sodium nitrite by a thirty-five-year old Caucasian man P 
weighing 200 pounds, with a family history of liver cancer, and 
who tends to eat red meat and other high-fat, high-cholesterol 
foods.  The narrowest reference class {Ei}
STAT for which reliable 
statistics are available might be all “ingestions of a sodium 
nitrite-containing food item by a man with a history of liver 
cancer.”  Yet P, under full information, would also know the 
relative frequency of premature death given a much more 
specific reference class including all the causally relevant 
features of E—namely, “ingestions of sodium nitrite-containing 
food items by Caucasian men who weigh 200 pounds, who 
subsist on high-fat diets, who have a family history of liver 
cancer, and who . . . .”  I will use the term “physical probability” 
to mean frequencies relative to classes of events and persons, 
{Ei}
PHYS and {Pi}
PHYS, that share all the causally relevant features 
of E and P—not merely the features about which good 
statistical data is actually available.173  I submit that P’s 
preferences, under conditions of full information, would be 
driven by the physical probability of death and not the 
statistical probability. 
Statistical and physical probabilities are gauges or 
indicators of P’s security; they indicate whether E is a 
substantial or insubstantial threat to P’s continued existence.  
It is plausible that P (both in his actual state and his fully 
informed state) would prefer his continued existence not to be 
insecure.  Thus P would plausibly prefer that the best available 
gauge not indicate a high level of insecurity.  But the physical 
 
 172. See sources cited supra note 45. 
 173. For rigorous discussions of what I am calling physical probability, see 
GILLIES, supra note 14, at 125-29; HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73, at 338-
42. 
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probabilities are a better gauge of P’s security than the 
statistical probabilities.  The statistical reference class {Ei}
STAT 
includes events that are roughly similar, in their causal 
features, to E; the physical reference class {Ei}
PHYS includes 
events that are perfectly similar, in their causal features, to 
E.174  Any deviation between the statistical and the physical 
probabilities reflects a lacuna in the stock of information used 
to generate the statistical probabilities.  Society, at or around 
the time of E, simply lacks reliable relative-frequency data 
about the correlation between some of E’s casually relevant 
features, and premature death; and thus those relevant-but-
poorly-understood features are ignored in generating the 
statistical reference class {Ei}
STAT.175 
The third plausible component of well-being, along with 
Experience and Preference, is the Value component.  Here, too, 
serious difficulties arise for the claim that a high statistical 
probability of premature death is harmful.  How can I say 
anything definitive about the comparative value of OR and OS?  
After all, various philosophers of well-being including Martha 
Nussbaum, John Finnis, George Sher, and others have 
proposed diverse lists of putative welfare values and have 
grounded these lists in different foundational considerations 
(the human essence, near-universal and -unavoidable goals, 
shared understandings of the good life).176 
Notwithstanding this continuing scholarly disagreement 
about the content of welfare-values, and about their basis, it is 
 
 174. Reichenbach himself was quite straightforward about the fact that 
statistical probabilities reflect our imperfect information.  See REICHENBACH, 
supra note 79, at 375 (“[T]he probability of a single case [generated using the 
narrowest class for which reliable statistics can be compiled] is . . . dependent 
on our state of knowledge . . . .”).  Perry generally argues that frequentist 
probabilities, other than physical probabilities, are not welfare relevant 
because our interest in such probabilities does not persist as our information 
increases.  See Perry, supra note 25, at 334-37. 
 175. I am conceding here that a high physical probability of premature 
death does satisfy the Preference component of well-being—more precisely, 
that two outcomes differentiated by a high physical death probability are 
(consistent with Preference) different for the subject’s welfare.  That 
concession may be unwarranted.  Arguably the preferences over outcomes of a 
fully informed agent, concerned about her own physical security, would be 
driven neither by the statistical probability of premature death, nor by the 
physical probability, but just by the occurrence of premature death itself.  See 
infra note 185.  But this point, if true, hardly rehabilitates the case for the 
welfare relevance of statistical probability. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56 (discussing these proponents 
of a Value-based theory of welfare). 
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(I think) possible to make a claim that all value theorists would 
assent to, namely, that welfare values are objective.177  Values 
do not merely reflect what P himself prefers or wants; they 
have a more robust normative status than that.178  In turn, it is 
quite plausible that there is a deep connection between 
objective values and the preferences of idealized agents.  
Plausibly, one outcome is objectively more valuable than 
another only if all persons (or perhaps all persons within a 
certain type of group, for example a society), under ideal 
conditions, would prefer the first outcome.  The philosopher 
Michael Smith, among others, has argued persuasively for this 
account of “objective value.” 
  [W]hat it is desirable for us to do is what we would desire that we 
do if we were fully rational.  In other words . . . what it is desirable for 
us to do in certain circumstances—let’s call these circumstances the 
‘evaluated possible world’—is what we, not as we actually are, but as 
we would be in a possible world in which we are fully rational—let’s 
call this the ‘evaluating possible world’—would want ourselves to do 
in those circumstances. . . . 
  Typically, of course, the evaluated world will be the actual world.  
Thus, what it is desirable for us to do in our actual circumstances is 
what our more rational selves, looking down on ourselves as we 
actually are from their more privileged position, would want us to do 
in our actual circumstances.179 
Assume Smith’s account of objective value is correct.  Then 
OS is better for P than OR only if all persons, fully informed (or 
at least the appropriate group of persons, fully informed) would 
 
 177. See, e.g., HURKA, supra note 49, at 5 (describing his account as 
“objective”); PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499 (presenting a list of plausible 
welfare goods under the rubric of an “Objective List Theory” of well-being); 
SHER, supra note 49, at 229 (describing his account as “objective”); SUMNER, 
supra note 8, at 45-80 (discussing and criticizing objective theories of well-
being, including Finnis’s and Nussbaum’s).  Griffin declines to describe his list 
of welfare values as “objective,” meaning that these obtain independent of 
desires, but he would, I think, agree that the values do not reduce to the 
subject’s own desires and, in that sense, are objective.  See GRIFFIN, supra 
note 23, at 29, 35-36. 
 178. On the nature of value, see generally GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 52-67; 
JOEL J. KUPPERMAN, VALUE . . . AND WHAT FOLLOWS 1-83 (1999); NOAH M. 
LEMOS, INTRINSIC VALUE: CONCEPT AND WARRANT 3-100 (1994); RAMON M. 
LEMOS, THE NATURE OF VALUE: AXIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1-71 (1995). 
 179. MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 151-52 (1994); cf. David Lewis, 
Dispositional Theories of Value, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN 
SOCIETY 63 Supplemental Vol. 113 (1989) (defining value in terms of second-
order desires); Connie S. Rosati, Internalism and the Good for a Person, 106 
ETHICS 297, 307 (1996) (defining the good for a person P as roughly what P 
hypothetically would care about under idealized conditions that P actually 
regards as welfare relevant). 
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prefer to be P in OS rather than P in OR.  But I have already 
argued that P, if fully informed, would focus on the physical 
probability of his premature death rather than the statistical 
probability.  The physical probability of P’s premature death is 
a better indicator of P’s security than the statistical probability 
of his premature death.  For just the same reason, other fully 
informed agents (if contemplating the choice between being P 
in OR, and being P in OS) would care about the physical and not 
the statistical probability of premature death.  Therefore, the 
fact that OR is statistically riskier for P than OS does not make 
OR less valuable for P.180   
We come now to the fourth and final component of welfare: 
Integration.  Integration demands that welfare changes occur 
“within” the subject’s life.181  They must be changes in the 
world that make it worse “for the subject,” not worse (merely) 
for someone else or in some detached, impersonal way.  The 
Integration requirement poses real difficulties for the claim 
that probabilities, in the frequentist sense, can be harmful or 
beneficial. 
Consider OS and OR.  What differentiates the two outcomes 
is the following fact: in OR, an event E occurs such that a high 
proportion of events “similar to” to E result in premature death 
to people “similar to” P.  The notion of “similarity,” here, may 
be cashed in statistical terms, in physical terms, or in some 
other terms.  However we generate our classes {Ei} and {Pi}, the 
essential point remains: A high “probability” of premature 
death for P, in the frequentist sense, means a high frequency of 
premature death within some group of persons, {Pi}, that 
includes P.  But this “group fact” does not change P’s own life—
or so it seems.182  Although a group including P may have a 
high frequency of some harmful attribute, what matters for P’s 
well-being is whether she herself has the attribute.  If P has 
the attribute, then she is harmed, and the fact that only a few 
other members of the group share the attribute does not lessen 
 
 180. But see Finkelstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 13) (arguing that 
the risk of harm in the frequentist sense is itself a harm, in the sense of being 
a setback to an “interest,” where “an agent’s interests [are] an expanded set of 
goods derivable in some way from the preferences the agent actually has”). 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 182. See Perry, supra note 25, at 335 (“[Frequentist probabilities] have 
been defined with respect to a certain class of persons . . . . But it is 
individuals who are said to suffer risk damage, not classes of persons, and 
therein lies the fallacy of the claim that risk damage constitutes injury in its 
own right.”). 
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the harm.  Likewise, if P lacks the attribute, then she is 
unharmed, and the fact that many other members of the group 
have the attribute does not amount to a harm for P herself.  
The high relatively frequency of premature death, or some 
other negative attribute, within a group of persons {Pi} that 
happens to includes P, is a feature of an outcome that 
(seemingly) is too remote from P’s own life to satisfy 
Integration. 
P is, let us imagine, a redhead; the first letter of his last 
name is “S”; and he owns a truck. Imagine a world in which 
many redheaded truck owners whose last names begin with “T” 
suffer from terrible cluster headaches.  Imagine another world 
in which few or no redheaded truck owners whose last names 
begin with “T” incur such headaches.  In short, in the first 
world there is a high relative frequency of cluster headaches 
among a group of persons excluding P, and in the second world 
there is a low relative frequency of cluster headaches among 
that group.  Does this difference between the two outcomes 
change P’s well-being?  No—at least not if the Integration 
requirement has any bite. 
Now change the example slightly so that P’s last name 
begins with “T.”  Thus, in the first world there is a high relative 
frequency of cluster headaches among a group of persons 
including P, and in the second world there is a low relative 
frequency of cluster headaches among that group.  Does the 
sheer fact of P’s inclusion in the group satisfy the Integration 
requirement, so that we now can say the second world is better 
for P than the first world?  All that P shares with his “fellow” 
group members is truck ownership, red hair, and a last name 
beginning with T.  In the first example, an increase in the rate 
of cluster headaches did not suffice to change P’s own life.  
Why, in the second example, should an increase in the rate of 
cluster headaches among a group of persons tenuously linked to 
P (redhaired, T-named truck owners) suffice to do so? 
The lesson of these examples, I submit, is that a high 
relative frequency of premature death or some other negative 
attribute within some group {Pi} does not satisfy the 
Integration requirement, with respect to P, merely because P is 
included within the {Pi}.  On the other hand, we can imagine 
much stronger links between P and the {Pi} than mere 
inclusion.183  For example, imagine that P identifies with the 
 
 183. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
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{Pi}.  P is a male Sephardic Jew; a high proportion of male 
Sephardic Jews suffer cluster headaches; and P self-identifies 
as a male, Sephardic Jew.  In this case, the Integration 
requirement arguably permits the high rate of cluster 
headaches among the {Pi} to be counted as a harm to P himself.  
The “group fact” about male Sephardic Jews is also, arguably, a 
fact about P’s own life.  Even if P avoids the headache, he 
himself is arguably worse off in a world in which many of his 
fellow male Sephardic Jews—a group that not only includes P, 
but is defined by characteristics that are highly salient to P—
suffer the headache. 
Now back to statistical probabilities.  OR is a world in 
which the relative frequency of premature death, among the 
class of persons {Pi}
STAT who are “statistically” similar to P, is 
high.  What P shares with the other members of {Pi}
STAT is 
having a particular set of characteristics whose correlation with 
premature death is relatively well documented.  P need not 
identify with {Pi}
STAT.  Indeed, where an event generates a high 
statistical probability of premature death for P, P need not 
(and, in the normal case, will not) have any idea what the 
defining characteristics of the statistical similarity class are.  
For that matter, P need not (and, in the normal case, will not) 
have any idea what a statistical similarity class is.  The linkage 
between P and the {Pi}
STAT is not personal (P’s own 
identification), nor is it social (how ordinary members of P’s 
society would characterize P), nor is it physical (the group 
sharing all of P’s causally relevant characteristics).  The 
linkage is, rather, forensic—{Pi}
STAT is the  grouping that would 
be salient to qualified statisticians, operating at a particular 
point in time, with a particular information base—and this 
linkage is probably not strong enough to satisfy any non-
minimal Integration requirement. 
C. PHYSICAL REFERENCE CLASSES 
Is a high physical probability of premature death a welfare 
setback?184  Consider our two outcomes, OS and OR, with the 
 
PUB. AFF. 107, 148-49 (1976) (defining “social group” and arguing that harms 
to social groups are harms to their members). 
 184. Perry suggests that a high physical probability of premature death, in 
an indeterministic universe, could well be a welfare setback.  See Perry, supra 
note 25, at 336-37.  I disagree, for reasons elaborated in the text immediately 
below.  See infra text accompanying notes 185-88.  In brief, the problems of 
Experience and Integration do not disappear with the shift from statistical to 
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difference between the two now specified in terms of physical 
(rather than statistical) probability. 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with  
Physical Probabilities 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs, and (2) the physical  
   probability that E results in P’s premature death is                                                             
   high.  In other words, the relative frequency of                                                     
   premature death within {Pi}
PHYS, as a result of events                                                     
   within {Ei}
PHYS (where {Pi}
PHYS is the class of persons                                                     
   sharing all of P’s causally relevant characteristics, and                                                     
   {Ei}
PHYS the class of events sharing all of E’s causally                                                     
   relevant   characteristics) is high. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
In my discussion above, I suggested that physical probabilities 
of premature death are plausibly dispreferred (even under full 
information) and that these physical probabilities are plausibly 
value reducing.  In short, OR is plausibly worse for P than OS, 
with respect to the Preference and Value components of well-
being.185  Should we conclude that risk, in the physical-
probability sense, is indeed a welfare setback? 
This conclusion would, I think, be too hasty.  First, the 
physical probability of premature death—like the statistical 
probability of premature death—is not a setback with respect 
to the Experience component of well-being.  Unless E is itself a 
 
physical probabilities. 
 185. It could be argued that OR is not worse than OS with respect to 
Preference, to the extent that the preferences must be fully informed, and 
therefore not worse with respect to Value either.  It seems quite plausible that 
a fully informed agent would ex ante disprefer the occurrence of an event 
involving a high physical probability of her premature death, as compared to 
nonoccurrence—but this is not the same as saying that she would disprefer an 
outcome characterized by a high physical probability of premature death, as 
compared to an otherwise-identical outcome characterized by a lower physical 
probability.  Insofar as she is motivated by physical security, her preference 
against the occurrence of such an event is purely instrumental, not intrinsic, 
and thus outcomes differentiated solely by the occurrence of that event are 
just the same for her welfare.  A possible response here, I suppose, is that P’s 
preferences over outcomes are determined by looking to her fully-informed ex 
ante preferences.  This response raises deep issues about the nature and 
determination of preferences over outcomes—over whole possible worlds—
which I will not pursue, since even if OR and OS are different with respect to 
Preference and Value, the putative welfare relevance of physical probability 
encounters further difficulties discussed in this section. 
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mental event (say, a shockingly scary nightmare), P’s mental 
states will not be different in OS and OR.  And in the case where 
E is itself a mental event, it will be that experiential feature of 
OR, not the physical probability of premature death associated 
with E, that (according to the Experientialist) makes OR worse 
for P than OS. 
Second, it is doubtful, or at least very unclear, whether OR 
is worse than OS with respect to the Integration component of 
well-being.  In OR, an event E occurs such that physically 
similar events (events within {Ei}
PHYS) frequently cause 
premature death to persons physically similar  to P (persons 
within {Pi}
PHYS).  Is this “group fact” about OR sufficient to make 
OR worse for P?  In discussing statistical probabilities, I 
suggested that a high frequency of harm within some group {Pi} 
could not be taken as a harm to P—given the Integration 
requirement—merely because {Pi} includes P.  I conceded, 
however, that a high frequency of harm within some group {Pi} 
could be taken as a harm to P—consistent with that 
requirement—if P identifies with the {Pi}.186  Clearly, P need 
not identify with the class of persons physically similar to him.  
A high physical probability of premature death does not entail 
P’s awareness of that probability; likewise, it does not entail P’s 
awareness of the causally relevant characteristics that he 
shares with the other members of {Pi}
PHYS, or his identification 
with that group. 
Perhaps my demand that P identify with the {Pi}
PHYS is too 
robust.  Could there be some linkage between a person and a 
group suffering a high frequency of harm, weaker than 
identification, which suffices for that group fact to be counted 
as a welfare loss for the person himself?  One such linkage 
might be social.  If P is conventionally or socially linked to the 
group, then arguably a high frequency of harm within the 
group is sufficiently integrated within P’s life to be welfare 
reducing for him, even if P himself does not identify with the 
group.187  Does the linkage of physical similarity between P and 
a group also function to integrate the group’s harm into P’s own 
 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
 187. Cf. Fiss, supra note 183, at 148.  Fiss points to individual 
identification in determining an individual’s membership in a  “social group” 
but also suggests that social identification plays a role: “Blacks are viewed as a 
group; they view themselves as a group; their identity is in large part 
determined by membership in the group; their social status is linked to the 
status of the group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is 
based on these perspectives.”  Id. 
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life? 
I doubt it.  Imagine that P has two genetically identical 
siblings, Q and R, who were separated from P at birth and live 
in a different country.  P considers Q and R to be virtual 
strangers to him; they mean little more to him than a stranger 
he might meet on the train.188  In short, P does not identify 
with Q and R; nor do the members of P’s society identify him 
with Q and R, given their residence elsewhere.  We might 
imagine that P prefers that Q and R not suffer harm, just as we 
might imagine that P prefers the stranger he meets on the 
train not to suffer harm.  Even if the stranger on the train does 
suffer harm, and P learns of that, P himself will be no worse off 
(if welfare includes an Integration requirement).  Imagine, 
instead, that Q and R are harmed, and P learns of that.  What 
differentiates Q and R from the stranger on the train is their 
genetic similarity to P; but neither P nor others in P’s society 
see this similarity as creating a stronger bond between P and 
Q/R, than between P and the stranger.  If so, I suggest, harms 
to Q and R are just as remote from P’s own life as harms to the 
stranger.  To be sure, physical similarity and genetic similarity 
are conceptually different, but it is very hard to see why 
physical similarity absent individual identification or social 
linkage should satisfy Integration, while genetic similarity 
absent individual identification or social linkage does not. 
Third and finally, even if the objections from Experience 
and Integration are answered, and a high physical probability 
of premature death is properly viewed as a welfare setback, it 
is unclear how much relevance this type of harm would have 
for risk regulators.  Why?  Consider the following crucial 
feature of physical probabilities.  Physical probabilities can lie 
between 0 and 1 only if causal laws are indeterministic.189  In a 
world with deterministic causal laws, where every occurrence is 
in principle predictable, with certainty, from preexisting 
conditions, the physical probability of an event having some 
attribute is either 1 (if the event ends up having the attribute) 
or 0 (if it does not). 
To see this point, imagine that the pitch of a canary’s song 
is completely determined by the canary’s weight, length, and 
 
 188. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the “stranger on the 
train” example, which illustrates that people can have preferences for 
outcomes detached from their own welfare, viz., the stranger’s success). 
 189. See sources cited supra note 173 (discussing the link between physical 
probabilities and indeterminism). 
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eye color.  For a given combination of weight, length, and eye 
color, the casual laws necessitate that the canary’s pitch will 
either be high or low.  What is the physical probability that the 
song a particular canary, Candy, sings tomorrow will have a 
high pitch?  Note that the statistical probability of Candy’s 
song having a high pitch might lie between 0 and 1.  It might 
be, say, 0.3.  If we only have reliable statistics linking weight 
and pitch, and if the frequency with which canaries statistically 
similar to Candy—canaries weighing the same amount—have a 
high-pitched song is 0.3, then the statistical probability of 
Candy’s song having a high pitch is 0.3.  However, the physical 
probability of Candy’s song having a high pitch is necessarily 
either 1 (just in case the song will, in fact, turn out to be high-
pitched) or 0 (just in case the song will, in fact, turn out to be 
low-pitched).  Assume the song will have a high pitch.  Then 
Candy has a combination of weight, length, and eye-color 
characteristics necessitating a high-pitched song.  The class of 
canaries physically identical to Candy is the class of canaries 
that are the same weight, length, and eye color as Candy.  And 
the relative frequency of high-pitched songs within this class is 
1 (since the causal laws necessitate, for each and every member 
of this group, that its song be high pitched).  Similarly, if 
Candy’s song will turn out to be low pitched, the relative 
frequency of low-pitched songs within the class of physically 
similar canaries is 1, and the relative frequency of high-pitched 
songs within that class is 0. 
Modern physics tells us that determinism does not obtain 
at the level of quantum mechanics.  But it could well be the 
case that causal laws at the level of human physiology—causal 
laws linking the large-scale events of interest to risk 
regulators, with premature human death—are deterministic.  
As Stephen Perry explains, 
It seems clear . . . that true indeterminism exists at the level of sub-
atomic particles, but there is some reason to think that random 
deviations in different directions compensate for one another, in effect 
washing indeterminism out of the system at the macroscopic level.  If 
that were the case then interactions among what J.L. Austin called 
medium-sized dry goods would, for all intents and purposes, be 
deterministic in character.190 
 
 190. Perry, supra note 25, at 337; see HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73, 
at 341 (similarly distinguishing between macro-level determinism and micro-
level indeterminism); Kenneth F. Schaffner, Causing Harm: Epidemiological 
and Physiological Concepts of Causation, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE 
AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 204, 208 (1991) (same); Alvin Goldman, 
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In short, notwithstanding the indeterminacy of quantum 
mechanics, it is quite unclear whether the physical probability 
of some macroscopic event E resulting in a given person’s 
premature death—where E is, say, a toxic release, the ingestion 
of some food, an industrial practice, the emission of some 
pollutant or some such event targeted by regulatory agencies—
ever takes a numerical value other than 1, in the case where 
death results, or 0, in the case where it doesn’t.  If the causal 
laws relevant to risk regulators are indeed deterministic, it is 
incoherent to conceptualize a high physical probability of 
premature death as a harm that is separate from, and 
additional to, the harm of death itself. 
D. CONVENTIONAL REFERENCE CLASSES 
The probability that E results in P’s premature death could 
be determined by placing E and P within classes of events and 
persons that are conventionally similar to E and P, rather than 
statistically similar or physically similar.191  We might ask how 
an ordinary person, within P’s society, would characterize E 
and P—more precisely, how an ordinary person, concerned to 
gauge the risk that E imposes on P, would characterize E and 
P.  For example, if E is the ingestion, at 10 p.m., on a hot 
summer day, of an all-beef hot dog containing sodium nitrite by 
a thirty-five-year old Caucasian man P weighing 200 pounds, 
with a family history of liver cancer, and who tends to eat red 
meat and other high-fat, high-cholesterol foods, then the 
ordinary person might see this as a case of a large white man 
eating a meat product. {Ei}
CONV, the class of events 
conventionally similar to E, would be the class of all eatings of 
meat products by large white men; {Pi}
CONV is the class of men 
who eat these products.  Clearly, {Ei}
CONV and {Pi}
CONV are 
different from {Ei}
STAT and {Pi}
STAT, and {Ei}
PHYS and {Pi}
PHYS, 
respectively.192  The “conventional” probability that E results in 
 
Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence 14-15 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (same). 
 191. Sociologists, in particular, have emphasized the conventionality of risk 
ascriptions.  For reviews of the sociological literature on risk, see SHRADER-
FRECHETTE, supra note 5, at 27-52; Kasperson, supra note 69; Palmlund, 
supra note 69; Rayner, supra note 69; Renn, supra note 69. 
 192. The huge literature on the discrepancy between “lay” and “expert” risk 
perceptions bears out my point that the conventional (i.e., lay) and statistical 
(i.e., expert) reference classes used to generate probabilities in the frequentist 
sense can differ.  See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1071-85 
(discussing the lay/expert discrepancy and citing sources); Richard H. Pildes & 
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P’s premature death is, let us say, the frequency with which 
persons within {Pi}
CONV die earlier than they would have had the 
matching events within {Ei}
CONV not occurred. 
Is OR worse than OS for P, when the difference between the 
two outcomes is specified in terms of conventional probability? 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with  
Conventional Probabilities 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs, and (2) the  
   conventional probability that E results in P’s premature                                                     
   death is high.  In other words, the relative frequency of                                                      
   premature death within {Pi}
CONV, as a result of events                                                     
   within {Ei}
CONV, is high. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
Note that the conventional probability of premature death, like 
the statistical probability of premature death—and unlike the 
physical probability of premature death—can take a value 
other than 0 or 1, and can be distinguished from the actual 
occurrence of premature death, even in a world where causal 
laws are deterministic.  Note too that a high conventional 
probability of premature death—unlike a high statistical or 
physical probability—arguably satisfies the Integration 
requirement.  As I have already suggested, it is arguable that a 
high frequency of harm to some group is sufficiently integrated 
into P’s own life, to count as a welfare setback to him, if P is 
socially or conventionally linked to the group even if P himself 
does not identify with the group.193 
Nonetheless, it is problematic to claim that a high 
conventional probability of premature death is itself a welfare 
setback.  First, that claim runs afoul of the Experiential 
component of welfare, for just the same reason that the parallel 
claims with respect to statistical and physical probability do.194  
Second, I am not persuaded that OR—specified in terms of 
conventional probability—is worse than OS as a matter of 
Preference or Value.  P might prefer OS to OR, but would he 
prefer OS under conditions of full information?  Physical 
probability is a better gauge of P’s security from premature 
 
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48-
64 (1995) (same). 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71, 185. 
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death than either statistical or conventional probability, so why 
think that fully informed P would care about a high 
conventional probability of a premature death?  Similarly, why 
think that agents under ideal conditions (including full 
information) would converge on the judgment that it is better 
to be P in OS than P in OR? 
The answer could be that fully informed P, and ideal 
agents more generally, would care about a high conventional 
probability of P’s premature death under some heading other 
than “security from premature death.”  Consider this analogy.  
An outcome in which P is conventionally thought to be stupid is 
worse for P, with respect to Value and Preference, than an 
outcome in which P is not conventionally thought to be stupid.  
But this is not because conventional judgments of stupidity are 
the best gauge of stupidity.  Rather, it is intrinsically bad to be 
thought stupid; and thus fully informed P, and ideal agents, 
would disprefer an outcome in which the ordinary member of 
P’s society takes him to be stupid, even though there are much 
better indicators of P’s real intelligence than this ordinary 
judgment.195 
I am not persuaded that the analogy works.  Certain 
beliefs that others might hold about P—in particular, the belief 
that P is less than a full person, or lacks some characteristic 
ordinarily held by full persons, or has acted in a way that full 
persons do not or ought not act—surely do satisfy the Value 
and Preference components of well-being.  Fully informed P, 
and ideal agents considering the prospect of being P, would 
disprefer outcomes in which others have such beliefs about P—
quite apart from other, negative consequences with which such 
beliefs might be linked.  Yet beliefs about P’s security are not, I 
think, like this.  P’s stupidity detracts from her full personhood; 
her vulnerability to premature death does not, since even the 
fullest of (human) persons must die, and indeed will die 
prematurely as a result of some event, relative to the time of 
death had the event not occurred.  Imagine two outcomes 
differentiated solely by the fact that, in one outcome, P’s fellow 
 
 195. Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical 
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1422-25, 1432-33, 1445-47 (2000) 
(describing the widespread argument, within constitutional and criminal-law 
scholarship, that draws a link between the lowered social status for a given 
category of individuals constituted by prevalent beliefs that they lack full 
personhood, and the harm of lowered self-respect suffered by those 
individuals). 
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citizens believe him to be at high risk of an early heart attack, 
while in the second outcome they do not possess this belief.  
The citizens’ remaining beliefs, and their actions, are identical 
in both outcomes.  Would P under full information disprefer the 
first outcome, even if (as he knows under full information) the 
physical probability of an early heart attack is low?  It is hard 
to see why he would. 
Finally, it is an open question whether conventional 
probabilities actually exist.  Given some event E, E has a 
conventional probability (high or low) of some attribute only if 
there are existing norms, practices, or understandings, within 
the relevant society, for characterizing E.196  When we 
hypothesize how an “ordinary” person would envision the 
threat that E poses to P’s security, we mean a person who 
follows the prevailing norms for characterizing risky events.  
Absent some such norms, there would be no reason to expect 
any consensus in the characterization of E—no single reference 
class that all or most members of the society would deploy in 
judging E’s riskiness. 
Much work in sociology suggests that collective norms for 
characterizing risky events (if they ever existed) have broken 
down, at least in the United States and other developed 
countries.  Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, in their so-
called “cultural” theory of risk, famously argue that three 
divergent “cultures,” or socially constructed forms of life and 
world-views—a market culture, a hierarchical culture, and a 
sectarian culture—coexist in the United States and 
substantially shape risk perception. 
[P]ublic perception of risk and its acceptable levels are collective 
constructs, a bit like language and a bit like aesthetic judgment . . . . 
   . . . . 
   . . . Analysis of this kind recognizes different types of cultures 
resulting from their members’ sustained attention to feasible social 
goals. Three have seemed sufficient for the thesis being argued.  Two 
of these derive from the established stock of political thought in the 
West, market individualism and hierarchy. Neither encompasses the 
structure and goals of the environmental movement. [That movement 
exemplifies] the [cultural] type we have called sectarian. . . . [T]he 
risks of war are not acceptable to the hierarchist because he is 
 
 196. On social facts in general, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF SOCIAL REALITY 1-126 (1995).  Social norms, in particular, have garnered 
much recent attention by legal scholars.  See Adler, supra note 195, at 1373 
n.44.  Helping to define a legally operative concept (in this case, risk) is 
certainly the kind of legal role that social norms could play. 
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focused on dangers of foreign relations . . . . Risks of economic collapse 
are ever present to the mind of the market individualist . . . . Risks 
from technology are uppermost in the sectarian mind . . . .197 
In short, whether an individual tends to perceive a high 
level of “risks of human violence,” as opposed to “risks from 
technology,” or “risks from economic failure,” depends on her 
“cultural” type (hierarchical, sectarian, market).198  To be sure, 
Douglas and Wildavsky’s reduction of risk perception and 
evaluation to three cultural types, thus specified, is quite 
controversial within the sociological literature on risk.199  But 
their work advances a broader point: that in a modern society 
there exist multiple and competing socially constructed entities 
that guide risk perception and evaluation.  These socially 
constructed entities are what I referred to above as norms for 
characterizing risky events.  They might be specified as “ways 
of life,” perspectives, world-views, or cultural patterns.  In any 
event, the broader Douglas/Wildavsky thesis that in a 
developed society divergent norms will produce divergent 
perceptions of the riskiness, and appropriate response to, a 
given event is not controversial among sociologists.  To quote 
one recent review article, 
  By going beyond purely psychological analyses, the social 
approaches to risk perception highlight . . . that the notion of a ‘lay’ 
public as an undifferentiated risk-perceiving entity is a misnomer: a 
society is always composed of many groups with very different 
attitudes towards, and appraisals of, what risk is, which risks should 
be run, and what values are relevant to making acceptability 
decisions.200 
E. HYBRID ACCOUNTS 
I have repeatedly noted that risk, in the frequentist sense, 
is not harmful with respect to the Experience component of 
welfare.201  The reader might wonder why the complaint is not 
answered by hybridizing a frequentist probability with a 
 
 197. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY 
ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 186-88 
(1982). 
 198. Id. at 187. 
 199. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 5, at 29-39; Rayner, supra 
note 69, at 83. 
 200. Nick F. Pidgeon & Jane Beattie, The Psychology of Risk and 
Uncertainty, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT 289, 302 (Peter Calow ed., 1998). 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71, 185, 194. 
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mental state, such as a belief.202  In other words, construe OR 
and OS as follows: 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Hybrid Account, with  
Frequentist Probabilities 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the                            
    frequentist probability (in some sense) of P dying                                                                
    prematurely as a result of E is high, and in addition (3)                                                      
    P “experiences” the difference between the outcomes,                                                          
    i.e., believes he is subject to a high frequentist                                                                   
    probability of dying prematurely as a result of E. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
Isn’t it now the case that OR is worse for P than OS?  After all, 
the Experientialist demand for supervenience is satisfied, since 
P in OR has a mental state (a belief) which he lacks in OS.  Note 
further that the Integration component of welfare is also 
satisfied, since (as I shall argue at greater length below)203 
differences in someone’s mental states are plausibly sufficient if 
not necessary to satisfy Integration. 
Still, it is not clear that OR is really worse for OS.  Here 
again is a point that shall be developed at greater length below, 
in the course of my analysis of the Bayesian view of risk: it is 
open to question whether mere differences in what someone 
believes can change the value of outcomes for him. 204  To begin, 
assume that mere beliefs do not change the value of outcomes.  
If so, and if the high frequentist “probability” in OR is either a 
high statistical probability or a high conventional probability, 
the upshot will be that OR is not worse than OS with respect to 
the Value and Preference components of welfare.  As I have 
already argued, neither a high statistical probability of 
premature death, nor a high conventional probability, is a 
 
 202. It is a standard view, within the philosophical literature on value, that 
things can be valuable as parts of larger wholes.  See, e.g., NOAH M. LEMOS, 
supra note 178, at 32 (articulating the “principle of organic unities,” namely 
“that the value of some wholes is not the same as the sum of the values of 
their parts”); RAMON M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 41-52 (discussing 
“contributory value”).  By extension (or equivalently), it is plausible that the 
welfare impact of a hybrid entity is not always separable into the welfare 
value of its parts.  In the economic tradition, this problem goes under the 
heading of “separability.”  See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS 60-89 (1991) 
(discussing separability). 
 203. See infra text accompanying notes 208-10. 
 204. See infra text accompanying notes 214-22. 
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setback with respect to either Value or Preference.205  If, 
alternatively, the high frequentist probability in OR is a high 
physical probability, the problem of determinism emerges—a 
problem that besets any physicalist defense of the “risk is 
harm” claim, be it a hybrid or simple defense. 
Next, let us assume that mere differences in what someone 
believes can change the value of outcomes from him.  Now, 
OR—construed as a hybrid of a high frequentist probability of 
premature death for P, plus P’s belief that this probability 
obtains—is worse for P than OS.  Experience and Integration 
are satisfied and, given our altered assumption about value, so 
are Value and Preference.  But by altering the assumption 
about Value (and Preference), we have made frequentist 
probability superfluous to any harm that P suffers.  Imagine a 
world OR*, in which (1) E occurs, and (2) P is subject to a 
trivially low frequentist probability of premature death as a 
result of E, but (3) P has the same belief as in OR, namely that 
he is subject to a high frequentist probability of premature 
death.  Given the altered assumption about the power of mere 
belief-differences to affect value, it follows that OR* is worse for 
P than OS.  Further, OR is not worse for P than OR*; the two 
outcomes differ only in the frequentist probability, and that 
difference (without more) does not constitute a welfare 
difference.206 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 172-80, 194-95. 
 206. It might be objected that my analysis fails to consider (1) the 
possibility that frequentist risk plus a belief is harmful even though neither is 
harmful alone, and (2) the possibility that, although beliefs alone can be 
harmful, frequentist risk compounds the harm.  My response is that neither 
possibility is warranted by the nonepistemic values I have considered or will 
consider, e.g., the value of security or freedom from fear.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 174-75, 185, 195; infra Part IV.B.  As for epistemic 
values, such as the putative values of knowledge, justified belief, or true belief, 
these values do allow the welfare importance of beliefs to change depending on 
other factors (truth and/or justifiability), but they would not warrant the 
conclusion that OR is worse for P than OS in virtue (in part) of the frequentist 
risk.  If, for example, the relevant epistemic value is avoiding false beliefs, 
then OR may not be worse than OS (because in OR P truly believes that a high 
frequentist probability obtains, although falsely believes he will die 
prematurely), and in any event OR* is even worse (because in OR* P both falsely 
believes he will die prematurely and falsely believes there is a high frequentist 
probability).  If the relevant epistemic value is avoiding unjustified beliefs, 
then OR is no worse than OS (because P’s belief in his premature death is 
justified by the frequentist probability) and again OR* is worse than OR 
(because there the belief in premature death is not justified).  In short, the 
strategy of adding a belief about frequentist probabilities to the outcome in 
which P is (without awareness) subject to a high frequentist probability of 
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In sum, the flaws in the frequentist version of the risk-is-
harm claim, elaborated in sections B, C, and D above, are not 
cured by hybridizing relative frequencies with beliefs.  More 
generally, these flaws are not cured by hybridizing relative 
frequencies with any mental states, be they beliefs, feelings, 
affects, urges, preferences, or something else. 
IV.  IS THE RISK OF DEATH A HARM?  BAYESIAN 
THEORIES OF RISK   
The prior Part argued that risk in the frequentist sense is 
not harmful.  More precisely, there are a plurality of 
frequentist accounts of risk, corresponding to different types of 
reference classes: statistical, physical, and conventional.  The 
claim advanced above was that no such account makes risk a 
welfare setback. 
This Part examines the Bayesian view of risk.  Here too, as 
we shall see, there are a plurality of accounts.  The Bayesian 
views risk as a “degree of belief,” a partial belief or state of 
uncertainty that can be represented by numbers conforming to 
the probability calculus.207  But whose beliefs are at issue?  Are 
they actual or hypothetical?  Are they separated from other 
mental states, or rather packaged together with feelings, 
volitions, desires, or other non-belief states to create a 
psychological hybrid?  Different answers to these questions 
generate different Bayesian accounts of risk. 
Since we are concerned with the risk of premature death, 
the probabilistic beliefs underlying the various accounts are 
(actual or hypothetical) probabilistic beliefs about premature 
death—more precisely, beliefs that a particular event E will 
result in the premature death of some particular person P.  I 
will argue that P’s own probabilistic belief that E will result in 
P’s premature death, taken alone, may not be a welfare setback 
for P.  However, this belief, as part of a complex psychological 
hybrid that amounts to a kind of fear on P’s part—a hybrid 
including not only P’s probabilistic belief about his premature 
death, but also the distress or other such negative affective 
state occasioned by P’s belief—does constitute a welfare setback 
for P.  Finally, I will suggest that Bayesian accounts that 
 
premature death tends to improve, not degrade, the outcome with respect to 
plausible epistemic values because the frequentist probability functions as a 
truth maker or justification maker with respect to the belief. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
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prescind from P’s actual beliefs, and look instead to his 
hypothetical beliefs, or to the actual or hypothetical beliefs of 
other persons, face more substantial difficulties in explaining 
why risk is harmful. 
A. FIRST-PERSON ACTUAL BELIEFS 
Throughout this Part, we will be comparing two outcomes, 
OS and OR, that differ only in the occurrence of an event (E) 
such that someone has a high degree of belief that E will result 
in P’s premature death.  That person might be P himself.  If so, 
and if this belief is taken to be actual not hypothetical, the 
Bayesian account will specify the difference between OS and OR 
as follows: 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Bayesian Account, with  
Actual First-Person Beliefs 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) P actually  
   believes, to a high numerical degree, that E will result                                                     
   in P’s premature death. 
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
Is OR, thus specified, worse for P’s welfare than OS? 
Consider once more the four plausible components of a 
welfare account: Experience, Integration, Preference, and 
Value.  Experientialists (at least those who specify the 
Experience component in terms of a supervenience 
requirement) will readily agree that OR can be worse for P than 
OS.  There is a psychological difference between OR and OS.  P 
possesses a particular probabilistic belief in the first outcome, 
but not the second.  Because belief is a mental state, and 
because the Bayesian equates risk with a certain kind of belief, 
a mental-state supervenience requirement poses no substantial 
obstacle to a Bayesian’s claim that risk is harmful. 
The Integration component of welfare stipulates that the 
difference between OR and OS must concern P’s own life.  This is 
very vague, but still I think we can see that OR and OS (as here 
specified) do thus differ.  More generally, I suggest that two 
outcomes differing in P’s psychological properties are different 
“for P.”  A psychological difference is sufficient, if not necessary, 
for Integration. 208  What could be more intimately part of P 
 
 208. See Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Well-Being, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 169, 
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than his own mental states?  Mark Overvold’s version of 
Integration, which remains the leading version within the 
philosophical literature, bears out my suggestion that 
psychological differences will always satisfy the Integration 
demand.209  Overvold suggests that O* is better or worse for P 
than O only if some proposition is true in O* but not O, where 
this proposition concerns P because it entails P’s existence.210  
The fact that P possesses a given psychological state in O*—
such as a probabilistic belief—clearly entails that P exists in 
O*.  Many propositions would not have this entailment.  For 
example, the pains and pleasures of other persons cannot, on 
Overvold’s view, change P’s own welfare, because these pains 
and pleasures might obtain without P ever existing.  So the 
Integration requirement, in Overvold’s hands, is quite 
demanding—but the requirement is structured in such a way 
that psychological changes in a person, including the cognitive 
changes highlighted by Bayesians, will always satisfy it. 
Value and Preference pose more serious obstacles to the 
claim that OR is worse for P than OS.  Consider Value first.  
Values, as already discussed, plausibly satisfy a condition of 
convergence under idealized conditions.211  OS is more welfare 
valuable for P than OR only if everyone, deliberating under 
these conditions, would prefer to be P in OS rather than P in OR.  
In general, there is nothing puzzling in the claim that mental 
states are valuable or disvaluable.  Take the case of physical 
pain.  Assume that P is in a state of pain in O*, but not O.  
Presumably our idealized agent will not himself be in a state of 
pain.  Still, it is straightforward that the agent could prefer to 
be P in O, rather than P in O*.  Pain feels bad; idealized 
agents, contemplating the prospect of being various persons in 
various non-ideal scenarios, could readily prefer non-ideal 
 
182-87 (1992)  (suggesting that changes in our mental states paradigmatically 
satisfy the Integration demand because they are changes in our intrinsic 
rather than relational properties). 
 209. See sources cited supra note 61. 
 210. This is a rough formulation of Overvold’s view.  More precisely, he 
proposes, 
[T]he only desires and aversions that are logically relevant to the 
determination of an individual’s self-interest are those in which (1) it 
is logically necessary that the individual exist at t for the object of 
one’s desire or aversion to obtain at t, and (2) the reason for this 
desire is due to one’s essential involvement in the state of affairs. 
Overvold, Self-Interest, supra note 61, at 190. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79. 
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scenarios that are less painful.212 
Could the same be said about P’s beliefs, specifically his 
probabilistic beliefs concerning his own premature death?  In 
OS, E does not occur; in OR, E occurs and P believes to a high 
degree that this event will result in his premature death.  Let 
us assume that our idealized agent is perfectly informed and 
thus knows the truth about E and P, namely, that E will not 
result in P’s premature death.  Still, the idealized agent could 
prefer being P in OS to being P in OR.  The idealized agent’s 
knowledge does not erase the psychological difference between 
the two non-ideal states under comparison: the fact that P 
possesses a certain belief in OR, and not in OS.213  Perfectly 
informed agents, choosing between life histories where the 
subjects of these histories will be imperfectly informed, could 
prefer life histories in which those subjects lack certain 
beliefs—for example, beliefs that the choosers, in their position 
of perfect information, know to be false.  There is no conceptual 
incoherence in the claim that false beliefs, or some other class 
of beliefs, are per se disvaluable. 
But is the claim correct?  Is the possession of false beliefs 
really an intrinsic setback to welfare value?  Or are such beliefs 
only instrumentally disvaluable, in that the choices of ignorant 
actors produce consequences which are typically worse for 
those actors than the consequences that would have resulted 
from better-informed choices?214  I see no clear, intuitive 
answer to this question.  Beliefs, unlike pains, are affectively 
neutral.215  False beliefs do not feel worse than true beliefs.  
Indeed, beliefs (unlike pains) need not be occurrent.  I need not 
be conscious of my beliefs, be they full beliefs or partial 
 
 212. While the Benthamite reduction of happiness or welfare to pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain is implausible, those quite plausibly “belong instead 
in our inventory of the (typical or standard) sources of happiness or misery.”  
SUMNER, supra note 8, at 142. 
 213. See SMITH, supra note 179, at 151-52 (distinguishing between the 
“evaluating possible world,” where the evaluator has full information, and the 
“evaluated possible world,” where the person whose choices or life history are 
being evaluated does not). 
 214. See, e.g., NOAH M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 3-31 (analyzing the 
concept of intrinsic value); RAMON M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 34-71 (same). 
 215. See Ramsey, supra note 76, at 71 (considering and rejecting the notion 
of equating a person’s degree of belief with the intensity of his feeling of 
conviction in the proposition believed—“the beliefs which we hold most 
strongly are often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels 
strongly about things he takes for granted”). 
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(probabilistic) beliefs.216 
A number of prominent value theorists have argued that 
knowledge is an intrinsic welfare value.  For example, George 
Sher writes, 
[D]espite our manifest differences, each of us has both a native 
capacity to understand the world and an inescapable tendency to try 
to exercise that capacity.  We seek such understanding not only when 
we propose a scientific hypothesis or try to predict the stock market, 
but when we idly read the newspaper, engage in conversation, or 
simply look about us. . . . In each case, our mental activity centers on 
some proposition, or some structured set of propositions, that has 
engaged our attention; and in each case, our guiding question is 
whether these propositions are true.  Even when we try to avoid all 
truth seeking, our success is temporary at best. . . . Thus, if what has 
inherent value is the successful exercise of fundamental capacities, it 
would be very surprising if reason-based true belief—or, in other 
words, knowledge—were not inherently good.217 
John Finnis,  James Griffin, and Derek Parfit also include 
“knowledge” or “understanding” on their lists of objective 
values.218  On the other hand, Martha Nussbaum suggests that 
value inheres in the process of thinking, in intellectual activity, 
not in the sheer possession of knowledge.219  Thomas Hurka has 
shown, in a systematic way, that a value theory predicated (in 
part) on the intellectual capacities of persons need not end up 
valuing knowledge.  Instead, such a theory could focus on the 
justifiability or reasonableness of beliefs, or even on the simple 
 
 216. See JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13-14, 158 (1996) 
(explaining that beliefs and desires are “propositional attitudes,” which have 
no distinctive “feel” and can be unconscious); see also Wayne A. Davis, The 
Varieties of Fear, 51 PHIL. STUD. 287, 287 (1987) (noting that “propositional 
fear”—meaning a desire that some harm not occur plus a belief that it may 
occur—“need not be occurrent, and may have no physiological effect”). 
 217. SHER, supra note 49, at 203. 
 218. See FINNIS, supra note 49, at 59-80 (arguing for intrinsic value of 
knowledge); GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 29-30 (including “understanding” on a 
list of basic welfare values, and stating that “[s]imply knowing about oneself 
and one’s place in the world—certain important anthropocentric knowledge—
is part of a good life”); PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499 (proposing a list of 
objective values that includes “knowledge”). 
 219. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 78-79.  Nussbaum includes “Senses, 
Imagination, and Thought” on a list of basic values and specifies this series of 
values as follows:  
     Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to 
do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education . . . . Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and 
producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice . . . .   
Id. 
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number of beliefs (true or false), rather than on the truth of 
belief. 
[We have a] choice between four views that I call attempt, deserving 
attempt, success, and deserved success. . . . [These] views would say a 
person has one state of theoretical perfection [and thereby produces 
intrinsic value] for every: 
1.  belief he has (attempt); 
2.  justified belief he has (deserving attempt); 
3.  true belief he has (success); [or] 
4.  justified true belief, that is, item of knowledge, he has (deserved 
success).220 
In defense of Hurka’s second option, “deserving attempt,” note 
the following.  It may be essentially human, and unavoidable 
for humans, to aim at true belief, but humans (except in 
unusual cases) lack direct access to truth, and regulate their 
intellectual activities by criteria to which they do have access, 
namely “justifiability” or “reasonableness.”221  Arguably, then, 
it is the possession of justified beliefs, and the activity of 
testing beliefs for justification, not true belief (or true justified 
belief) that constitutes a kind of welfare value. 
In sum, both sides of the Value issue are plausible, given 
the current state of philosophical writing about Value.  Neither 
the claim that OR is worse than OS with respect to welfare 
value, nor the claim that the two outcomes are just the same, is 
clearly correct.222  Therefore it is also unclear whether OR is 
worse than OS with respect to the Preference component of 
welfare—given the tight linkage between Value and fully 
informed preferences. 
 
 220. HURKA, supra note 49, at 103.  But see id. at 112 (suggesting that the 
“deserved success” view is intuitively most appealing). 
 221. See generally JONATHAN DANCY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY (1985) (discussing concepts central to 
epistemology, including knowledge and justification). 
 222. Note that, strictly, the view that knowledge (justified true belief) is 
beneficial would not entail a welfare difference between OS and OR as here 
described.  In OS, P lacks a belief about E’s connection to her premature death; 
in OR, she falsely believes that E will cause her premature death.  In neither 
outcome does she possess knowledge about E.  Still, the view that knowledge 
is beneficial sits comfortably with the further claim that false beliefs are 
harmful relative to a no-belief state.  On this view, persons at risk in the 
Bayesian sense are thereby harmed, except in the unusual case where their 
beliefs are correct—the risky event will in fact kill them—in which case, 
assuming the belief is justified, the beliefs actually benefit them!  On Hurka’s 
“deserving attempt” view, some persons merely at risk are also actually 
benefited, not harmed, by their beliefs (insofar as the beliefs are justified); 
only those whose beliefs are unjustified are not. 
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I should emphasize that I have not definitively concluded 
that OR and OS are equal with respect to Value or fully informed 
Preference.  P’s probabilistic belief that E will result in his 
premature death is arguably disvaluable, without more.  
Readers who think it is—because false beliefs are intrinsically 
disvaluable, or perhaps on other grounds—should conclude that 
OR is worse for P than OS.  But readers who doubt that false 
probabilistic beliefs, or other categories of probabilistic beliefs, 
are intrinsically disvaluable, taken alone, should not conclude 
that Bayesian risk is harmless.  Bayesian risk, although 
harmless on its own, could be harmful as part of a larger 
psychological hybrid such as fear or cognate emotional states.  
This is the possibility I shall now consider. 
B. FEAR 
What is fear?  It is a standard view within experimental 
psychology and philosophy that fear and other emotions have 
cognitive, attitudinal, and affective components.223  Wayne 
Davis offers a crisp and paradigmatic analysis along these 
lines.224  He distinguishes between “propositional fear” and 
“experiential fear.”  As for propositional fear, 
[p]ropositional fears have attitudinal and cognitive components.  If I 
am afraid that it will rain, then I must not want it to rain; indeed, I 
must desire (on balance) that it not rain. Moreover, I must be neither 
certain that it will rain, nor certain that it will not.  Fear, in other 
words, entails aversion and uncertainty.225 
 
 223. The literature on emotions is vast.  Important works in the 
philosophical literature include: RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF 
EMOTION (1987); PETER GOLDIE, THE EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLORATION (2000); ROBERT M. GORDON, THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS: 
INVESTIGATIONS IN COGNITIVE PHILOSOPHY (1987); O.H. GREEN, THE 
EMOTIONS (1992); PATRICIA GREENSPAN, EMOTIONS & REASONS: AN INQUIRY 
INTO EMOTIONAL JUSTIFICATION (1988); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF 
THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ON 
THE EMOTIONS (1999); John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions, 104 
ETHICS 824 (1994).  This literature is, in turn, dwarfed by the psychological 
literature.  For an overview, see RANDOLPH R. CORNELIUS, THE SCIENCE OF 
EMOTION: RESEARCH AND TRADITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION (1996).  
Economists have also begun to study emotions, see Eric A. Posner, Law and 
the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1978 n.2 (2001) (citing scholarship), as have 
legal scholars, see Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Posner, supra, at 1978 n.1;  cf. George F. 
Loewenstein et al., Risks as Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267, 267-71 (2001) 
(focusing on role of affect in explaining behavior under uncertainty). 
 224. See Davis, supra note 216; see also Wayne Davis, A Causal Theory of 
Experiential Fear, 18 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 459 (1988). 
 225. Davis, supra note 216, at 289. 
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There is an obvious connection between what Davis calls 
“propositional fear,” and risk in the Bayesian sense.  Risk in 
the Bayesian sense is a kind of uncertainty—an uncertainty 
whose degree can be expressed in terms of numbers conforming 
to the probability calculus.  If a person (1) has a probabilistic 
belief that he will die prematurely, and (2) prefers not to die 
prematurely, then—according to Davis—that person has a 
“propositional fear” of premature death.  “Propositional fear” 
does not entail bad feelings, or other affective states, on the 
subject’s part.  A subject may not even be aware of his 
“propositional fears,” since he need not be aware of his beliefs 
or his preferences.  By contrast, “experiential fear” necessarily 
includes an affective component.  Davis defines “experiential 
fear” as a combination of occurrent propositional fear plus 
“involuntary arousal” and “unhappiness”: 
  A subject experiencing fear must have some propositional fears.  
These fears must, furthermore, be occurrent: they must be before the 
subject’s mind; he must be thinking about them. . . . 
  An occurrent propositional fear is not sufficient for experiential 
fear, however. If Alan is having the time of his life with Monique, and 
the thought that he might fail his exam just pops into his mind for an 
instant, it does not follow that he is in a state of fear.  What else is 
required?  For one thing, the propositional fear must cause a 
particular condition characterized by symptoms like rapid heartbeat, 
increased respiration rate, perspiration, abdominal distress, pallor, 
restless sleep, channeled and disorderly cognition, muscular tension, 
and impulsive or reflexive motor action. I refer to this condition as 
involuntary arousal. . . . It must be stressed that the symptoms of 
involuntary arousal are not perfectly correlated with each other, and 
that no one symptom is necessary for fear. A subject with a pounding 
heart but no abdominal distress, for example, could still be afraid.226 
Davis stipulates that “experiential fear” involves propositional 
fear plus both (1) involuntary arousal and (2) “unhappiness” 
(that is, a sense of distress), so as to distinguish the genuine 
experience of fear from cases where people enjoy scary thrills. 
People seek out scary thrills to enjoy themselves. The involuntary 
arousal is part of the fun.  Similarly, a performer suffering from 
stage-fright may be ecstatic because this is his “big break.”  Fear, 
however, is a type of mental pain or anguish.  Subjects must be 
miserable or distressed because they fear that some harm will 
occur.227 
In short, according to Davis, “S is experiencing fear iff [if and 
only if] S is in a state of involuntary arousal and unhappiness 
 
 226. Id. at 299. 
 227. Id. at 301. 
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as a direct result of the occurrent propositional fear that 
something will be harmed.”228 
Davis’s analysis, and the numerous similar accounts of fear 
within the psychological and philosophical literatures,229 
suggests a modification to the Bayesian account that will make 
risk an essential component of harm, if not harmful on its own.  
Combine the cognitive state of probabilistic belief with a 
negative affective state (paradigmatically, one that involves 
both “involuntary arousal” and “unhappiness”), and then add 
suitable preferences.230  In other words, replace outcome OR 
with OR+A (risk plus affect), as follows: 
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Bayesian Account, with  
Actual First-Person Beliefs Plus Negative Affect 
— OS is a world in which E does not occur. 
— OR+A is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) P  
   experientially fears that E will result in P’s premature                                                    
   death.  Specifically, P believes, to a high numerical                                                     
   degree, that E will result in his premature death; this                                                     
   probabilistic belief is occurrent; and it causes P to                                                     
   experience involuntary arousal plus a sense of distress                  
   or  unhappiness. 
— OS and OR+A are otherwise identical with respect to P’s  
   welfare. 
— In both outcomes, P disprefers premature death and the  
   experiential fear of premature death. 
I suggest that OR+A is worse for P than OS. 
In the preceding section, I argued that OR (an outcome 
involving P’s probabilistic belief about premature death, but no 
negative affect) is worse than OS with respect to Experience 
and Integration, but might not be worse than OS with respect to 
Value and Preference.  What do these arguments imply for the 
comparison of OR+A (an outcome involving P’s experiential fear 
of premature death, including both probabilistic belief and 
negative affect) and OS?  First, the arguments imply that OR+A, 
like OR, is worse than OS with respect to Experience and 
 
 228. Id. at 302. 
 229. See, e.g., AHARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 473-89 
(2000); GREENSPAN, supra note 223, at 15-36; Barrie Falk, What Are We 
Frightened of?, 25 INQUIRY 165, 186-95 (1982); Robert Gordon, Fear, 89 PHIL. 
REV. 560 (1980); O.H. Green, Fear of Death, 43 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RES. 99, 105 (1982); Mohan Matthen, Biological Universals and the Nature of 
Fear, 95 J. PHIL. 105, 121-32 (1998). 
 230. On hybrids, see supra note 202. 
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Integration.  The difference between OR and OS satisfies the 
Experientialist demand for supervenience; a fortiori, the 
difference between OR+A and OS does, since these outcomes now 
differ with respect to two aspects of P’s psychology, his affect 
and his cognitions, not just with respect to his cognitions.  
Similarly, if the difference between OR and OS concerns P’s own 
life, then it follows a fortiori that the difference between OR+A 
and OS does. 
How about the Value component of welfare?  It is here that 
the shift from OR to OR+A becomes important.  Experiential fear 
involves a physically “aroused” sense of unhappiness or 
distress.  That affective state is, intuitively, a bad state to be in: 
not just bad in some impersonal sense, but bad for the unhappy 
subject, bad for her well-being.  Many (although perhaps not 
all) value theorists would recognize experiential fear as a 
disvaluable state.  In her list of welfare constituents, 
Nussbaum explicitly singles out “fear” and “anxiety” as welfare 
setbacks. 
[The] Central Human . . . Capabilities [include] . . . Emotions.—Being 
able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; . . .  
in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and 
justified anger.  Not having one’s emotional development blighted by 
overwhelming fear and anxiety . . . .231 
Griffin’s list includes “enjoyment”; he writes under this rubric 
that “[w]e value pleasures, the perception of beauty, the 
enjoyment of the day-to-day textures of life,”232 and presumably 
would agree that pain or suffering (including the physically 
aroused type of distress that is partly constitutive of fear) are 
bad things.  Sher argues, 
[T]he elements of a good life include knowledge, rational action, close 
relationships, and various other forms of contact with the world.  This 
means that whether someone lives a good life cannot depend 
exclusively on the quality of his experience. But neither is the quality 
of his experience irrelevant.  We can hardly deny that happiness, 
pleasure, and enjoyment are among life’s goods, so any satisfactory 
unifying theory must appeal to a property or relation that is capable 
of belonging to experiential as well as nonexperiential states.233 
Sher’s own theory of value—one that sees value in those 
activities, experiences, etc., closely connected to “near-
 
 231. NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 79. 
 232. GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 30; see also id. (including under the value 
of human agency “the basic capabilities that enable one to act,” including 
“freedom from great pain and anxiety”). 
 233. SHER, supra note 49, at 229. 
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universal, near-unavoidable goals”234—supports the view that 
fear and other unpleasant experiences are harmful, since “no 
one can altogether suppress his impulses to pursue pleasant 
sensations and escape unpleasant ones.”235  By contrast, value 
theorists such as Hurka who ground value in the human 
essence236 might not recognize fear as a welfare setback, since 
the capability to experience pain or negative feelings, as 
opposed to the capability to think and to plan, might not be 
essentially human.  A human person who could think and plan, 
but couldn’t experience fear or other emotions, would still be a 
human person237—or perhaps she wouldn’t be, in which case an 
essentialist view of Value might be able to recognize the 
disvalue intrinsic to fear.  In any event, powerful arguments 
have been advanced that essentialism is an overly narrow view 
of Value.238 
As for Preference: a person could, in principle, be 
indifferent to (or even prefer) a state of experiential fear.  It is 
certainly possible for P to be indifferent to or even prefer 
painful, unpleasant, distressing, or unhappy experiences.  Thus 
the theorist who builds actual preferences into her account of 
welfare will only agree that experiential fear is harmful on the 
contingent condition that it is actually dispreferred.239  I have 
specified OR+A and OS accordingly.  What of the theorist who 
looks to fully informed or otherwise idealized preferences, in 
lieu of or in addition to actual preferences?  Given the 
conceptual links between Value and idealized preference, the 
arguments just advanced to show that experiential fear is 
disvaluable also demonstrate that this complex of mental states 
is ideally dispreferred.240  A stipulation that P not only 
disprefers but ideally disprefers OR+A would be otiose. 
In sum, the experiential fear of premature death (including 
as components both an occurrent probabilistic belief that 
premature death is likely, and a physically powerful sense of 
distress occasioned by this belief) is harmful, at least if actually 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 231. 
 236. HURKA, supra note 49, at 9-51. 
 237. Cf. id. at 44, 139-40 (suggesting that emotions are valuable in virtue 
of the beliefs and desires but not the feelings that they incorporate). 
 238. See, e.g., SHER, supra note 49, at 225-26; SUMNER, supra note 8, at 
194-95. 
 239. On the need to incorporate actual preferences within welfare accounts, 
see Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 200-02. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79. 
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dispreferred.  OR+A is worse than OS with respect to all four of 
the now-familiar dimensions of welfare.241  Nor should this 
conclusion be surprising to lawyers and legal scholars, since the 
law has long recognized fear as a welfare setback.  Consider the 
tort of assault.  At common law, the infliction of emotional 
distress without physical injury was not generally tortious,242 
but the infliction of fear was—at least if that infliction was 
intentional and was produced by the threat of immediate 
physical injury, thereby constituting an assault.243  Richard 
Epstein goes so far as to suggest that the fright/shock 
paradigm—“A frightened B”—is one of four basic paradigms of 
tortious conduct, along with paradigms that express the 
causation of harm through force, compulsion, and the creation 
of a dangerous condition.244  Modern tort doctrine recognizes a 
tort of “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” including 
although not limited to the infliction of fear. 245  If fear is not 
harmful, then assaults and fear inflictions ought not be 
tortious, unless the widely held view that harm is a 
precondition for tort liability is rejected.  A similar point could 
be made about the compensability of fear as an element of tort 
damages, under the rubric of “pain and suffering.”  If A causes 
physical injury to B, causing him pecuniary loss, physical pain, 
and emotional distress such as fear, then B is entitled to 
compensation from A for all three of these setbacks, not just the 
pecuniary loss and physical pain.246 
What objections might be raised to my claim that risk is 
harmful as a component of a hybrid psychological state, namely 
experiential fear?  One objection runs as follows.  Fear, as 
defined by Davis and by other philosophers who offer similar 
 
 241. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 
GEO. L.J. 2025, 2030-41 (1999) (describing the dread-reduction benefits of 
environmental regulation).  Heinzerling argues that “reducing risk is itself a 
benefit, separate and apart from the prevention of illness and death,” in part 
because “a reduction in risk carries with it a decrease in dread and its 
debilitating effects on individuals and communities.”  Id. at 2030.  But see 
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 249-71 (1990) (arguing that 
belief-mediated distress is not harmful). 
 242. See 2 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.1 (2d ed. 1986) 
(noting “the older rule that there could be no recovery for mere mental 
distress,” with the exception of assault). 
 243. See 1 id. §§ 3.4-.5 (3d ed. 1996). 
 244. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A 
REFORMULATION OF TORT LAW 22-46 (1980). 
 245. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 242, §§ 9.1-.7. 
 246. See 4 id. § 25.10. 
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accounts, is a hybrid of a cognitive state, namely uncertainty—
the subject’s uncertainty whether he, or something else he 
cares about, will be harmed—and an affective state.247  But 
people can be uncertain without being at risk.248  Risk, in the 
Bayesian sense, is a state of uncertainty, or partial belief, that 
can be assigned a precise number satisfying the axioms of the 
probability calculus.249  For various reasons, it might be 
impossible to assign P’s partial belief this sort of number.250  
Therefore, risk is not an essential component of fear.  If P is 
uncertain whether E will cause his premature death, and this 
uncertainty causes P involuntary arousal and unhappiness, 
then P is fearful of dying prematurely whether or not his 
uncertainty is measurable on a numerical scale. 
My response to this objection is as follows.  According to 
Davis’s definition, fear has an essential, cognitive component.  
Some kind of uncertainty is a necessary part of fear;251 mere 
arousal and unhappiness is not sufficient.  The cognitive 
component of fear might take different forms.  It might take the 
form of P’s probabilistic belief, or it might take the form of a 
partial belief of P’s that is not a probabilistic belief, where (for 
whatever reason) P’s belief cannot be assigned a precise 
number satisfying the probability calculus.  By claiming that 
P’s risk of premature death is harmful as a component of P’s 
fear of premature death, I do not mean to suggest that the 
fearful P who possesses a probabilistic belief concerning 
premature death is worse off than the fearful P whose 
uncertainty about premature death cannot be assigned a 
 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 223-28. 
 248. See generally MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY: 
EMERGING PARADIGMS 41-151 (1989) (discussing both Bayesian probability 
and other approaches to conceptualizing uncertainty). 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
 250. If probability numbers are assigned along with the assignment of a 
“utility function,” it might emerge that P’s preferences are not sufficiently well 
behaved to be represented by such a function.  If probability numbers are 
assigned by asking what odds P would demand for various sorts of bets, it 
might emerge that P is just not the betting type—or that he is, but that his 
betting odds are radically incoherent, and cannot be easily adjusted to satisfy 
the probability calculus.  If probability numbers are assigned by asking P to 
express his degree of uncertainty on a zero-one scale, he might be unwilling or 
unable to do that, or able only to generate numbers that, once more, are 
radically inconsistent with the axioms of probability.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing different methods for assigning 
Bayesian probabilities). 
 251. See Davis, supra note 216, at 289-90. 
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number.  OR'+A may well be just as bad for P as OR+A, where OR'+A 
and OR+A are identical but for the fact that in OR'+A P is 
nonprobabilistically uncertain whether E will result in his 
premature death.  However, it remains true that fear 
(including risk as a component) is harmful, since OR+A is worse 
for P than OS.  Perhaps a more precise formulation of my “risk 
is harmful as part of fear” claim would be this: The fear of 
premature death is harmful; fear essentially includes a 
cognitive component, namely uncertainty; and this cognitive 
component is realized, inter alia, by a state of probabilistic 
belief, i.e., by risk in the Bayesian sense. 
A second objection to my “risk is harmful as part of fear” 
claim is more troubling: Whatever might be the cognitive 
component of fear, that component is irrelevant as far as 
welfare is concerned.  In OR+A, P possesses a partial belief that 
E will result in his premature death, and he also experiences a 
negative affective state (analyzed by Davis as “involuntary 
arousal and unhappiness”252).  Imagine OA, where P experiences 
that very same affective state, but lacks the partial belief he 
possesses in OR+A.  OA is just as bad for P as OR+A—or so the 
critic of my account might argue.  What makes fear bad is its 
affective component, not its cognitive component.  Although 
OR+A is worse for P than OS, it is worse than OS solely in virtue of 
the affective states (“involuntary arousal and unhappiness”) 
that differentiate the two outcomes.  Risk, or uncertainty more 
generally, is no essential part of the welfare story. 
A number of philosophers have pointed out that a person 
can indeed experience the affective state characteristic of fear 
without possessing the characteristic cognitive state, namely 
uncertainty.253  Consider the phobic person: she is aroused and 
made unhappy by the object of her phobia, even though she 
believes quite definitely that the object will not harm her.  Or 
consider the person who is “scared” by a scary movie.  She 
might experience all the feelings of the truly frightened, yet be 
completely certain that nothing depicted in the movie will 
actually occur. 
A heavy smoker may believe an article in a medical journal giving 
statistics on the correlation of smoking with cancer, but that belief 
may not scare her in the way watching an autopsy on a smoker with 
 
 252. Id. at 302. 
 253. The seminal article here is Kendall L. Walton, Fearing Fictions, 75 J. 
PHIL. 5, 6-10 (1978).  For more recent discussions, see Deigh, supra note 223, 
at 835-42; and John Morreall, Fear Without Belief, 90 J. PHIL. 359 (1993). 
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lung cancer would.  Indeed, watching a fictional scene in a movie of 
such an autopsy might well be able to scare her more than believing 
the statistics would.  Some “mere thoughts” about danger . . . are 
better able to cause fear than some beliefs about danger. . . . David 
Hume gave the example of how, as we look over a cliff, we can become 
afraid by imagining falling to our death:  “[W]e tremble on the brink 
of a precipice, tho’ we know ourselves to be in perfect security, and 
have it in our choice whether we will advance a step farther.”254 
Although I agree that the distress and arousal 
characteristic of fear might occur without a concomitant belief, 
I would deny that fear is harmful solely in virtue of its affective 
component.  Phobia about premature death may be a bad thing, 
but full-blooded fear of premature death is worse.  OS is our 
baseline outcome, where P is neither distressed and aroused 
about the prospect of premature death, nor has a probabilistic 
belief that premature death will occur.  OA is our affectively 
charged outcome, where P is distressed and aroused at that 
prospect, even though he is quite certain it will not occur.  OR+A 
is the outcome where P fully fears premature death, since he 
experiences distress and arousal as a result of the risk, i.e., his 
probabilistic belief that death will occur.  Then, OA might be 
worse for P than OS, but in any event OR+A is worse for P than 
OA.  The harmfulness of fear is partly grounded in its 
characteristic cognitions; it is not solely grounded in fear’s 
characteristic affects. 
What warrants my claim that OR+A is worse for P’s welfare 
than OA?  Consider that P’s distress in OR+A is a warranted 
response to his belief state; while in OA P recognizes, or would 
recognize if he considered the matter, that he lacks any 
epistemic basis for these feelings.  Wholehearted distress is 
worse, ceteris paribus, than ambivalent distress.  It is clear that 
the wholehearted distress/ambivalent distress distinction 
satisfies Experience, Integration, and (if wholehearted distress 
is dispreferred) actual Preference, so the only real sticking 
point is Value and its close cousin, fully informed Preference.  
Here I would suggest that our inability to discount the 
frightening situation as riskless—the fact that there is genuine 
uncertainty about whether harm will occur—is one essential 
part of fear’s characteristic disvalue. 
Consider the parallel with pain.  P’s feeling of pain, 
coupled with a belief that the pain results or may result from 
some permanent damage to his body, is worse for P than the 
 
 254. Morreall, supra note 253, at 365 (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE 
OF HUMAN NATURE 445 (L.A. Selby-Brigge ed., Oxford 1888) (1739)). 
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very same pain coupled with assurance that his bodily integrity 
is intact.  Pain plus a belief that bodily integrity has been 
damaged amounts to a kind of suffering;255 pain itself does not, 
except in special cases where pain is chronic or very severe.  
Similarly, P’s distress and arousal plus a belief that harm may 
occur amounts to fear, and fear is worse, ceteris paribus, than 
P’s distress and arousal coupled with a firm belief that 
everything is safe.256 
In closing, I should note that the hybrid account of risk’s 
harmfulness, presented in this section, might be broadened to 
include other emotions besides fear.  Arguably, there are a 
range of negative emotions that are welfare setbacks, that 
essentially include uncertainty as a cognitive component, and 
that P’s probabilistic belief concerning premature death will 
give rise to, when combined with a suitable negative affect.  For 
example, that belief might make P anxious about premature 
death, rather than fearful of premature death, assuming 
anxiety and fear have the same cognitive component but differ 
in the way they feel.257  If so, the arguments presented in this 
section carry over to the case of anxiety.  P’s anxiety about 
premature death will be a welfare setback for him if 
 
 255. See Eric J. Cassel, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 639, 640-41 (1982) (distinguishing between pain and 
suffering). 
 256. Crucial to my claim here is the “ceteris paribus” clause: Wholehearted 
distress is worse, ceteris paribus, than ambivalent distress.  We may be 
tempted to think that phobia is just as bad as fear, or even worse, by 
imagining the intense distress and arousal that phobics often feel.  We may 
also be tempted to think that phobia or other epistemically ungrounded 
affective states are worse than fear states by imagining that these states are 
accompanied by frustration—that is, by higher-order feelings of distress 
occasioned by the fact that the subject is feeling first-order distress without 
any reason.  Clearly, intense phobia may be worse than low-level fear; and 
phobia plus second-order distress may be worse than fear without second-
order distress.  But these comparisons are irrelevant to the claim I am 
advancing that the cognitive component of fear contributes to its harmfulness, 
in other words that OR+A is both worse than OS and worse than OA.  OR+A is an 
outcome in which P’s negative feelings are just as intense as in OA, and  which 
is otherwise identical to OA except for the belief state which characterizes P in 
OR+A but not in OA.  Hold fixed the intensity of feeling, and the emotional 
background, and it becomes quite plausible that fear is worse than phobia, the 
feelings one experiences during scary movies, and other such epistemically 
ungrounded affective states. 
 257. Cf. Davis, supra note 216, at 300, 302 (noting that “[f]ear is closely 
related to anxiety” and delineating affective and cognitive distinctions between 
these two emotions: “anxiety requires arousal but not unhappiness; and the 
arousal may result from any fear, not just from the fear of harm”). 
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dispreferred, and P’s probabilistic belief concerning premature 
death will contribute to the harmfulness of anxiety (that is, 
anxiety will be worse than a state in which P lacks both the 
belief and anxious affect and worse than a state in which P is 
certain that premature death will not ensue, but nonetheless 
experiences the negative feelings associated with anxiety).  
Risk in the Bayesian sense is harmful as part of any welfare-
reducing emotional complex, including but not necessarily 
limited to fear, that is predicated on the subject’s uncertainty 
about harmful occurrences such as her own death. 
C. OTHER BAYESIAN ACCOUNTS: THIRD-PERSON BELIEFS AND 
HYPOTHETICAL FIRST-PERSON BELIEFS 
The Bayesian account just considered conceptualizes the 
“risk” of premature death as the actual, probabilistic belief of 
the very person whose death is at issue.  Arguably, that 
person’s probabilistic belief is itself a harm, without more; and 
in any event that belief may constitute the cognitive component 
of fear, which is a harmful package of mental states.  This 
Bayesian account is an actual, first-person account—by 
contrast with hypothetical, first-person accounts and third-
person accounts.  Hypothetical, first-person accounts are 
Bayesian accounts that conceptualize the “risk” of premature 
death as the hypothetical, probabilistic belief of the very person 
whose death is at issue.  Third-person accounts conceptualize 
the “risk” of premature death as the actual or hypothetical 
probabilistic belief of other persons concerning the premature 
death of the person “at risk” of that misfortune.  Neither 
hypothetical, first-person accounts, nor third-person accounts, 
construe “risk” in a way that makes the risk of premature 
death a welfare setback. 
Consider, to begin, the hypothetical, first-person account of 
risk.  OR, the risky world, is here construed as a world identical 
to OS but for the fact that E occurs and P hypothetically would 
possess—under appropriate conditions—the numerically high 
probabilistic belief that E will result in his premature death.258  
Is OR worse for P than OS?  OS and OR do not differ with respect 
to P’s actual mental states; thus, the supervenience 
requirement, standardly invoked by Experientialists, is not 
satisfied here.  Integration is doubtful.  For any event, P could 
 
 258. See Ramsey, supra note 76, at 67 (distinguishing between actual and 
hypothetical degrees of belief). 
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be brought to have all manner of hypothetical beliefs or other 
mental states concerning the event, given the right 
specification of the hypothetical condition.  If the occurrence of 
some event that hypothetically would prompt P to have a 
particular reaction, under some condition, is taken as a welfare 
setback for P, then every event harms P—which is absurd, and 
erases the Integration requirement.  If the occurrence of some 
event that hypothetically would prompt P to have a particular 
reaction, under a specified condition, is taken as a welfare 
setback for P, then we will need to understand why the 
specified condition is special—more intimately connected to P’s 
welfare than other hypothetical conditions.  As far as I am 
aware, the only hypothetical condition that philosophers have 
singled out as specially connected to P’s welfare is the condition 
of full information.259  At this juncture, the problem of 
determinism reemerges.  If the connection between macroscopic 
events and human death is deterministic, only those persons 
who will actually die as a result of such events are “put at risk” 
by them in the hypothetical full-information Bayesian sense. 
As for Value, Value theorists who argue that knowledge 
possession is a welfare value, and false beliefs a welfare 
setback, look to actual beliefs, not hypothetical beliefs.260  And 
value theorists who argue that fear is a welfare setback look to 
actual fears—actual beliefs packaged with actual affect—not 
hypothetical fears. 
The arguments just advanced strongly suggest that 
Bayesian risk in the hypothetical, first-person, sense is not a 
welfare setback.  They also carry over, in part, to the case of 
Bayesian risk in the third-person sense.  Third-person accounts 
divide into two subcategories: accounts that look to the 
hypothetical probabilistic beliefs of some third person 
concerning P’s premature death, and accounts that look to the 
actual probabilistic beliefs of some third person concerning P’s 
premature death.  If P’s own hypothetical probabilistic beliefs 
concerning his premature death are not welfare-reducing for 
him, then a fortiori the hypothetical, probabilistic beliefs of 
some third party concerning P’s premature death are not 
welfare reducing for P. 
We are left with Bayesian accounts that construe P’s “risk” 
 
 259. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 179, at 155-61; sources cited supra note 
45. 
 260. See sources cited supra notes 217-18. 
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of premature death as the actual probabilistic beliefs of some 
third person concerning that eventuality.  Is risk, in this sense, 
harmful for P?  The answer depends upon who the third person 
is.  Risk might be construed as the actual probabilistic beliefs of 
ordinary members of P’s society; but “risk” on this construal is 
vulnerable to all the objections leveled against the frequentist 
view of risk as conventional relative frequencies plus more.  
The ordinary members of P’s society may not have convergent 
probabilistic beliefs about the harmfulness of a given event; 
even if they do, such beliefs are not value reducing for P, 
because they neither constitute the best gauge of his security, 
nor detract from his full personhood.  Further, P would not 
prefer under full information that ordinary members of his 
society lack such beliefs; and Integration fails because the 
beliefs and fears of the ordinary members of P’s society do not, 
without more, fall inside the boundary of P’s own life.  Shifting 
from the actual probabilistic beliefs of “ordinary” third persons, 
to the actual probabilistic beliefs of those persons who are 
expert in some specified domain, does not solve any of these 
problems—certainly not the last three.261 
A somewhat more promising approach is to identify the 
relevant third parties as those persons with whom P is linked 
by ties of love and affection—his friends and family—or a 
subcategory of this group.262  However, the “friends and family” 
account, like the others just considered, runs up against the 
problem that the third persons whose probabilistic beliefs are 
defined as P’s “risk” may not have convergent beliefs.  Consider 
that one friend of P’s might ascribe a high probability to the 
prospect of E causing P’s premature death, while another 
friend might ascribe that a low probability.  There are also 
conceptual difficulties with the “friends and family” account.  
Assume P has a single, best friend Q, such that Q’s beliefs or at 
least fears are harms for P himself.  Let us say that P faces a 
 
 261. Cf. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 
DUKE L.J. 629, 630-31 (2001) (arguing that the legal system should be 
cautious in relying on expert judgments of risk). 
 262. In short, P’s “risk” of premature death could be equated with the 
actual, probabilistic beliefs of his circle of intimates.  Some Integrationists 
might insist that no third party’s beliefs or fears can constitute a welfare 
setback for P, but this seems too strong.  The fact that P’s good friend, spouse, 
or child is scared that P will die prematurely can—intuitively—constitute a 
harm for P.  Experientialists, too, may balk here, but we might resolve this 
objection by stipulating that P becomes aware of the beliefs and fears of his 
loved ones. 
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high, low, or intermediate risk of premature death from event 
E depending on whether Q has a numerically high, low, or 
intermediate probabilistic belief that E will result in P’s death.  
The conceptual problem here is that we have lost our 
placeholder for P’s own beliefs concerning his premature 
demise.  We will need to construct some artificial term for those 
first-person beliefs—since it is those beliefs (not Q’s) that 
explain P’s actions, and since those beliefs (not just Q’s) 
constitute a welfare setback for P.  Another conceptual oddity is 
that P ends up being harmed by his “risk” of premature death 
(Q’s beliefs) only if P is an altruist.  If P does not care about Q’s 
beliefs or fears, they do not harm P.  But surely, the risk of 
premature death—like death itself—should, if harmful, be a 
harm that can befall altruists and egoists alike. 
The conceptually simpler course, and one that does much 
less violence to our pretheoretical understanding of “risk,” is to 
equate the Bayesian “risk” to P with his own actual 
probabilistic beliefs.  The actual beliefs of certain other persons 
(friends and family) may be harmful to P, but those beliefs are 
not, properly speaking, “risks.”  They constitute a third and 
additional kind of harm that can result if fatal activities are left 
unregulated—call this harm flowing from third-party beliefs—
where the first is the harm to those who die prematurely, and 
the second is the harm to those at risk in the Bayesian sense of 
dying prematurely, i.e., those who actually possess a 
probabilistic belief (and resultant fear) that they will die 
prematurely. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS   
Death is a harm to the person who dies. The risk of death, 
on a Bayesian account that equates risk with actual, first-party 
probabilistic beliefs, is a harm to the person at risk—at least 
where those beliefs are packaged together with appropriate 
affective states and preferences and create a condition of fear, 
anxiety, or some such negative emotion.  The risk of death, on a 
Bayesian account that equates risk with hypothetical, first-
party probabilistic beliefs, or with third-party probabilistic 
beliefs, is not a harm to the person at risk.  The risk of death, 
on a frequentist account that equates risk with statistical, 
conventional, physical, or other such relative frequencies, is not 
a harm to the person at risk. 263 
 
 263. By “harm,” as already explained, I mean to denote a setback to 
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These propositions are the fruits of the analytic labors 
undertaken in Parts II, III and IV of this Article.  To 
summarize this analysis even more compactly: risk regulation 
properly rests on what might be called a Hybrid (Bayesian) 
View of risk, death, and harm, not a Risk View, a Death View, 
a Null View, or a Hybrid (Frequentist) View. 
 
                       Is the Risk of Death a Harm? 
 
                        No                     Yes 
 
            No           Null View        Risk View (Frequentist 
Is Death                                           and/or Bayesian) 
a Harm? 
         Yes          Death View       Hybrid View (Frequentist  
                                                  and/or Bayesian) 
 
What, concretely, are the implications for risk regulation of 
the Hybrid (Bayesian) View?  Answering this question in detail 
would take another article, or more.  But the reader is entitled 
to wonder whether the philosophical claims defended in the 
main body of this Article have genuine relevance for the 
decisions of real risk regulatory agencies, such as the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), and others.  I submit that the Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View has very large implications for the actual 
practices of risk regulators, and in this Part I will sketch what 
those implications are. 
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Decisions by risk regulators are, increasingly, a product of 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA).264  Federal risk regulators now 
 
lifetime well-being in the ex post sense: a feature of a possible life history that 
makes that life history worse for the subject than alternatives.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 101-09, 147-48. 
 264. On CBA, see generally Adler & Posner, supra note 2.  For a brief 
overview of the use of CBA in the federal government, see id. at 169-76.  For 
more detailed empirical studies on how federal agencies use CBA and what its 
effects are—both econometric studies and qualitative studies—see Matthew D. 
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standardly engage in CBA when faced with large-scale 
regulatory choices, those with substantial economic impacts.265  
Systematic federal use of CBA dates to 1981 when the Reagan 
administration issued Executive Order 12,291, requiring that 
most regulations issued by federal executive agencies satisfy a 
cost-benefit test (in contexts where that test was statutorily 
permissible) and directing agencies to submit written cost-
benefit analyses of “major rules” to the President’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).266  The Bush administration 
kept Order 12,291 in force.  The Clinton administration 
replaced it with Executive Order 12,866, which retains the 
central features of the earlier order, namely a general cost-
benefit test for regulation by executive agencies and OMB 
review of major rules.267  Specifically, Order 12,866 requires 
that executive agencies adhere to the following principle, “to 
the extent permitted by law”: 
Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of [a 
proposed] regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits 
are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a 
reasoned determination that the benefits of the . . . regulation justify 
its costs.268 
Where an agency is considering a “significant regulatory 
action,” centrally a rule whose annual costs exceed $100 
million, the agency must prepare a written cost-benefit analysis 
of the proposed rule, for review by OMB.269 
 
Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment on 
Johnston, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1450 n.46 (2002). 
 265. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, Conducting an Economic Analysis: 
Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: 
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 25, 25 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA] (noting that the EPA has 
conducted more than 100 formal cost-benefit analyses since the issuance of 
Executive Order 12,291); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact 
Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 861 (2000) (studying 48 formal cost-benefit 
analyses issued for environmental, health, and safety regulations between 
1996 and 1999). 
 266. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (1988). 
 267. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (2000).  For a comparison of the two executive orders, see Peter M. 
Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case 
of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 174-92 (1995). 
 268. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601. 
 269. Id. §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3); see also Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 
U.S.C. § 1532 (2000) (requiring the preparation of cost-benefit analyses for 
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Despite the recent change of administration, Executive 
Order 12,866 remains governing law.270  The current 
presidency has reaffirmed the general commitment to CBA 
expressed first by Order 12,291 and now by 12,866.  To be sure, 
these orders apply a cost-benefit test to agency rules only 
where that test is statutorily permissible.  Some federal 
statutes, in the area of risk regulation, do clearly preclude 
CBA.271  Instead, these statutes give priority to health and 
safety benefits over economic and other costs.  For example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act stipulates that OSHA shall 
regulate toxic substances in the workplace so as to ensure, to 
the extent feasible, that no worker suffers “material 
impairment of health or functional capacity.”272  The pre-1990 
version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which covers 
“hazardous air pollutants,” instructed the EPA to set 
permissible emissions of each such pollutant at a level that 
“provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public 
health.”273 
On the other hand, a substantial number of federal 
statutes permit or require risk regulators to use CBA.  One or 
two do so quite explicitly;274 others do so by using balancing 
language that courts and agencies quite straightforwardly have 
interpreted as permitting or requiring CBA.275  For example, 
the Toxic Substances Control Act allows the EPA to ban or 
restrict chemicals that the agency has “a reasonable basis to 
conclude . . . will present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment”;276 the Consumer Product Safety 
 
significant regulatory actions). 
 270. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (making 
amendments to Executive Order 12,866, mainly with respect to the Vice 
President’s role). 
 271. For a general discussion of the legal status of CBA under current 
environmental and other social regulatory statutes, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1663-67 (2001). 
 272. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000). 
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 
§ 301 (1990); see Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk 
from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 300-04 (1992) 
(describing the original version of § 112 of the Clean Air Act). 
 274. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6) 
(2000). 
 275. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1666-67 (discussing statutes that 
clearly or arguably permit or require CBA). 
 276. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2000). 
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Act employs a similar “unreasonable risk of injury” standard;277 
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
instructs the EPA to license pesticides that will not cause 
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”278  Finally, 
numerous federal statutes in the area of risk regulation are 
ambiguous with respect to CBA; they neither clearly permit it, 
nor clearly preclude it.279  Consider the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act provision governing pharmaceuticals, which 
requires them to be “safe” and “effect[ive],”280 or the provision of 
the same statute applicable to foods, which prohibits foods 
containing “poisonous or deleterious” substances “unless the 
quantity of such substance . . . does not ordinarily render it 
injurious to health.”281  The emerging trend in the case law is to 
read ambiguous statutes as permitting or even requiring 
CBA.282  Cass Sunstein has gone so far as to suggest that there 
is now a canon of statutory interpretation favoring the use of 
CBA unless Congress’s intent to prohibit CBA is clearly 
expressed.283 
It bears emphasis that CBA is not confined to the federal 
government.  A recent survey of state regulatory review 
structures notes that some states “strongly encourage the use 
of cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis” by state 
administrative agencies, and that “[o]ver half of the states 
require agencies to assess the economic impact of all proposed 
rules.”284 
 
 277. Id. § 2056(a). 
 278. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000). 
 279. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1666 (“A large number of statutes ask 
agencies to ‘take into consideration’ various factors, including cost, in addition 
to the principal factor to which the statute draws the agency’s attention . . . .”). 
 280. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000). 
 281. Id. § 342(a)(1). 
 282. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1668-82; see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Regulating Risks After ATA, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27-30 (reading Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), to embrace the principle 
that agencies are allowed to consider costs absent a clear statutory 
prohibition).  But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in 
Environmental Regulation 19-22 (Geo. Wash. U.L. Sch., Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 
36) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301479 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (reading American Trucking to suggest that agency 
consideration of costs is disfavored, and concluding that the opinion gives no 
useful guidance as to the applicability of this “anti-cost” canon versus the “pro-
cost” canon previously recognized by lower courts). 
 283. Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1668. 
 284. Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
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Why should federal and state agencies, including risk 
regulatory agencies, rely on CBA to assess their options?  CBA 
is traditionally linked to economic efficiency, more precisely to 
the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.285  Eric Posner and I 
have argued that this linkage is mistaken, since Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency lacks moral significance.286  Rather, CBA is a 
workable proxy for the criterion of overall well-being.287  The 
regulatory option favored by CBA will typically (if not always) 
be the option that maximizes overall well-being.  And overall 
well-being does have moral significance, if not conclusively so.  
It is one moral factor, among others, that bears upon what 
agencies morally ought to do, all things considered. 
This view helps explain what “costs” and “benefits” are, for 
purposes of CBA.  A regulatory outcome involves a “cost,” 
relative to some alternative, if it involves a setback to some 
aspect of well-being.  A regulatory outcome involves a “benefit,” 
relative to some alternative, if it improves human well-being in 
some way.  And distinct categories of “costs” or “benefits” 
represent different aspects or dimensions of welfare—different 
ways in which human welfare can be advanced or impeded. 
CBA comes in two versions: monetized and 
nonmonetized.288  Both versions start by describing the costs 
and benefits of possible regulatory outcomes along various 
dimensions of welfare, with different, easily measurable units 
used for each dimension.  For example, it might be calculated 
that an air pollution regulation will prevent 360 deaths, 6800 
cases of chronic bronchitis, 1300 hospital admissions for 
congestive heart failure, and 106,000 lost days of work; will 
improve visibility, measured in kilometers of visual range, by 
11%, for an affected population of 50 million; will impose 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 37, 38 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS]. 
 285. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 187-94 (discussing the 
conventional defenses of CBA). 
 286. Id. at 190-91. 
 287. This view of CBA is presented and defended in Matthew D. Adler & 
Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are 
Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 284, at 269, 272-80; Adler, 
Incommensurability, supra note 96, at 1371-83; Adler & Posner, supra note 2, 
at 194-238. 
 288. See, e.g., LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: 
DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 17-19, 23-25 (1981) (describing these two 
variants of CBA); Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 177-87, 233-36 (describing 
“CBA,” meaning monetized cost-benefit analysis, and “qualitative direct 
multidimensional assessment,” meaning nonmonetized cost-benefit analysis). 
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financial costs of $100 million on the regulated companies; and 
will result in 20,000 fewer jobs.  The monetized version of CBA 
then reduces each cost and benefit of the regulatory proposal to 
a dollar figure, and calculates a net monetary cost or benefit for 
the proposal.  The nonmonetized version of CBA relies on 
intuition and judgment rather than formal commensuration to 
balance the divergent costs and benefits of the proposal.  No 
attempt is made to reduce all these welfare impacts to a 
common scale, be it a dollar scale or some other.289 
The analysis presented in the earlier parts of this Article 
has large and quite obvious implications for CBA, in both the 
monetized and nonmonetized versions.  The analysis clarifies 
what the appropriate dimensions of CBA are—what properly 
counts as a cost or benefit. 
Imagine that some risky activity or substance E produces 
(1) X premature deaths; (2) Y cases in which persons are at 
substantial risk, in the actual first-party Bayesian sense, of 
dying prematurely as a result of E, i.e., they actually believe to 
a high probabilistic degree that they will die prematurely as a 
result of E; and (3) Z cases in which persons have a high risk, 
in some frequentist sense, of dying prematurely as a result of 
E.290  An agency is choosing between the status quo, with the 
 
 289. For a series of case studies that nicely illustrate how agencies actually 
do both monetized and nonmonetized CBA, see ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, 
supra note 265. 
 290. This is a simplified case, similar to those presented in welfare 
economics and CBA textbooks, where the outcome of the proposal is certain (in 
this case with respect to the number of adverse events, if not the identities of 
the persons involved).  See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 226-34 (1984) (discussing monetary measurement of individual 
welfare effects under uncertainty after discussing valuation under certainty); 
E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION 375-419 
(4th ed. 1988) (discussing uncertainty at the end of the text).  This simplified 
case is designed to show how the views defended in this Article concerning the 
harmfulness of death, Bayesian risk, and frequentist risk bear upon the CBA 
valuation of outcomes.  More realistically, a regulatory agency will be 
considering various possible choices or “options,” the possible outcomes of 
which are uncertain.  (For example, the agency might be uncertain about the 
number of premature deaths prevented by each regulatory option.  Perhaps a 
given option might prevent between zero and 100 deaths, with the agency 
ascribing frequentist or Bayesian probabilities to each such possible outcome.)  
In this more realistic case, applying CBA will involve a view about how one 
“translates” the CBA valuation of possible outcomes into a CBA valuation of 
the possible choices facing the decision maker—a view about how one moves 
from the ex post to the ex ante.  See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.  
This is an issue which I have deliberately avoided discussing in this Article, 
given space constraints.  See id.  Still, it seems clear that, on any plausible 
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activity or substance left unregulated, and a regulatory scheme 
that will control it—and thereby prevent the X premature 
deaths, Y cases of first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of 
frequentist risk.  According to the Null View of risk regulation, 
neither the X premature deaths, nor the Y cases of Bayesian 
risk, nor the Z cases of frequentist risk count as a cost of 
leaving the status quo in place (or, reciprocally, as a benefit of 
the regulation).  According to the Death View, the X premature 
deaths count as a cost of leaving the status quo in place (and, 
reciprocally, as a benefit of the regulation), but the Y cases of 
Bayesian risk and the Z cases of frequentist risk do not.  
According to a Risk (Bayesian) View, only the Y cases of 
Bayesian risk count as a cost of the status quo; according to a 
Risk (frequentist) View, only the Z cases of frequentist risk 
count as a cost. 
Finally, under the view defended here—the Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View—both the X premature deaths and the Y cases 
of first-person, Bayesian risk count as costs of the status quo, 
for purposes of CBA.  Reciprocally, the regulation has two 
benefits: eliminating the deaths and eliminating the Bayesian 
risk.  But the Z cases of frequentist risk are irrelevant to the 
CBA analysis. 
Clearly, the choice between the Null View, Risk Views, 
Death View, and Hybrid Views has large implications for the 
proper practice of CBA.  How revisionary are these 
implications?  To what extent does CBA, as actually practiced 
by risk regulatory agencies, deviate from the Hybrid (Bayesian) 
View?  Let us consider first the monetized and then the 
nonmonetized versions of CBA. 
1. CBA: Monetized Version 
Faced with a risky substance or activity E that produces X 
cases of premature death, Y cases in which persons actually 
believe to a high degree that E will result in their premature 
deaths, and Z cases in which persons have a high frequentist 
risk of dying prematurely, the monetized cost of that substance 
or activity is properly calculated as follows: ∑iVdeath,i + ∑jVBayesian-
 
account of the ex post/ex ante “translation,” the CBA valuation of outcomes 
will be a crucial ingredient in determining the CBA ranking of possible actions 
facing an uncertain regulator.  Thus, I feel quite confident that the choice 
between the Death, Null, Risk, and Hybrid Views has much relevance for the 
real-world regulatory application of CBA, and more generally for real-world 
regulatory choice. 
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risk,j.  Vdeath,i represents the monetized cost of death for person i, 
where person i is one of the X persons who will die prematurely 
as a result of E.  VBayesian-risk,j represents the monetized cost for 
person j of actually believing to a high degree that E will result 
in his premature death, where person j is one of the Y persons 
who possess this belief.  VBayesian-risk,j will presumably depend on 
what probability person j attributes to premature death.  Note 
that there is no third term, in this formula, for the putative 
“cost” of the Z cases of high frequentist risk, since on the proper 
view of welfare frequentist risk is no cost (welfare setback) at 
all. 
How do we calculate VBayesian-risk,j and Vdeath,i?  CBA standardly 
monetizes costs and benefits by asking what the individuals 
affected would be willing to pay, or accept, for these welfare 
changes.291  This technique is plausibly applied to monetize the 
cost of first-person, Bayesian risk.  If person j believes that the 
risky event or substance creates a given probability of her 
premature death, then VBayesian-risk,j is plausibly the amount that 
person j would pay to prevent an event with that probability 
(and with no other welfare impact on her), or would accept in 
compensation for the occurrence of such an event.  Indeed there 
is now a large econometric and survey literature documenting 
the amounts that persons are willing to pay or accept in return 
for small probabilities of premature death.292 
We might think that first-person Bayesian risk is not a 
harm, taken alone, but is only harmful as a component of fear, 
anxiety, or cognate affectively laden states.  On that view, 
VBayesian-risk,j is zero if person j is not fearful of the risky event.  If 
she is fearful, VBayesian-risk,j is the amount she would be willing to 
pay to eliminate an event causing her to experience that level 
of fear (and with no other welfare impact on her), or to accept 
in compensation for the occurrence of such an event.293 
 
 291. A standard textbook on monetized CBA is MISHAN, supra note 290.  
Numerous other such works are cited in Adler, supra note 58, at 249-51 nn.29, 
34 & 36-37. 
 292. Much of this literature is summarized in W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL 
TRADEOFFS 34-74 (1992).  I say “plausibly” because it might be argued that 
what is being measured here is the ex ante cost of death, not the ex post cost of 
being under a risk (assuming the latter can be a cost without associated 
affective states).  Whether the two kinds of monetary valuation indeed differ, 
and if so how to measure the latter rather than the former, cannot be 
addressed here. 
 293. There are surely many subtleties in the monetization of fear, which 
unfortunately I do not have space to discuss here.  The issue merits much 
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Calculating Vdeath,i is much trickier.294  We cannot ask what 
person i would be willing to pay to avoid premature death or to 
accept in return for premature death, since in many cases these 
numbers will be infinite, or bounded only by the person’s total 
wealth.  Nor are the financial consequences of person i’s death, 
e.g., lost wages or income, an appropriate measure of Vdeath,i.  It 
is tempting to think that Vdeath,i is simply incalculable295—that 
death cannot be priced in dollars, for CBA purposes.  This 
temptation should be resisted.  CBA is a rough proxy for 
judgments of overall well-being.  The proper method for 
calculating Vdeath,i takes account of this construal of CBA.  Vdeath,i 
is the amount of money that tracks the effect of person i’s death 
on overall welfare.  It is the amount of money that—used as an 
input into a CBA analysis—minimizes the deviation between 
the output of that analysis, and the underlying criterion of 
overall well-being. 
This definition of Vdeath,i is vague, but it can be made more 
precise.  Assume that each person’s lifetime well-being, in 
various outcomes, can be represented by a “utility” function Ui. 
This is a standard assumption of welfare economists.  Further, 
assume that these “utilities” are interpersonally comparable.  
In other words, assume that outcome O1 is better for overall 
well-being than outcome O2 if and only if the cumulative utility 
of O1, across the population, is larger than the cumulative 
utility of O2.  For welfare effects other than death—welfare 
effects that are monetized, for purposes of CBA, using the 
willingness to pay/accept methodology—we can calculate a 
ratio between the monetized value of the welfare effect and its 
utility value. 
For example, if a new car has a monetary value for some 
person of $10,000, and improves his utility by 200 units, then 
the ratio of monetary value and utility value here is 50.  If 
eliminating annoying noise has a monetary value for some 
 
more scholarly attention than it has received.  On the closely related issue of 
valuing anxiety, see Mordechai Shechter, Incorporating Anxiety Induced by 
Environmental Episodes in Life Valuation, in 2 APPLIED BEHAVIOURAL 
ECONOMICS 529 (Shlomo Maital ed., 1988); and Bruce H. Smith, Anxiety as a 
Cost of Commuting to Work, 29 J. URB. ECON. 260 (1991).  Cf. Loewenstein et 
al., supra note 223, at 267-71 (focusing on the role of affect in explaining 
behavior under uncertainty). 
 294. For an overview of the problem of monetizing the value of life, see 
JOHN KLEINIG, VALUING LIFE 145-63 (1991). 
 295. See John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 91-95 
(1978). 
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person of $600, and improves his utility by 10 units, then the 
ratio of monetary value and utility value for this welfare effect 
is 60.  Now, calculate the average ratio between monetary value 
and utility value, for all welfare effects (other than death) 
priced by CBA.  Then Vdeath,i is the loss of utility incurred by 
person i, multiplied by this average ratio.296 
Of course, it is very difficult to know what person i’s 
particular loss of utility will be—especially since risk regulators 
almost never know, in advance, who in particular will die 
prematurely as a consequence of some risky substance or event.  
Yet economists and public policy analysts might try to calculate 
what the typical or average loss of utility is when people die 
prematurely as a result of the kinds of substances or activities 
generally targeted by risk regulators, and then multiply this 
typical utility loss by the ratio described in the preceding 
paragraph to arrive at a typical or average cost of death, Vdeath.  
Using this average or typical value, the cost for CBA purposes 
of an activity or substance E that results in X premature 
deaths is: X*Vdeath.  And our formula for calculating the 
monetized cost of an activity that results in X premature 
deaths, Y cases of first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of 
frequentist risk, becomes: 
X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j 
We are finally in a position to assess the actual practices of 
risk regulators.  The standard approach to monetizing the costs 
of a risky substance or activity such as E—as explained in the 
economics literature on CBA and now generally employed by 
regulatory agencies—is to multiply the number of premature 
deaths resulting from E by the so-called value of statistical life 
(VOSL).297  The current best estimate for VOSL is $6 million.298  
 
 296. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A Comment on Judge 
Williams’ Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 285-86 
(2001) (proposing such an approach to valuing life). 
 297. This approach derives from the work of E.J. Mishan and Thomas 
Schelling.  See E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical 
Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687 (1971); T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May 
Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel 
Chase, Jr. ed., 1968).  The current literature on VOSL is vast.  For good 
surveys, see, for example, A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS 314-66 
(1993); VISCUSI, supra note 292, at 34-74; W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK 
POLICY 45-68 (1998); M.W. Jones-Lee, Safety and the Saving of Life: The 
Economics of Safety and Physical Risk, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 290, 290-
318 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994); David Pearce, 
Valuing Risks, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
ADLER.3FMT.DOC 4·28·2003  7:23 PM 
2003] RISK, DEATH AND HARM 1399 
 
Further, as a matter of standard CBA practice, the Bayesian or 
frequentist “risks” resulting from a hazardous substance or 
activity are not monetized separately from the premature 
deaths that the activity or substance causes.299  In other words, 
the monetized cost of E causing X premature deaths, Y cases of 
first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of frequentist risk 
would be calculated as: X*VOSL.  No separate terms for the Y 
belief states or Z instances of frequentist risk appear in this 
formula. 
VOSL, in turn, is calculated as follows.  A premature death 
resulting from some substance or activity is seen as imposing a 
small “risk” of death on each person who is “exposed” (in some 
sense) to the substance or activity.  For example, if one person 
dies out of an exposed population of 1 million, then the “risk” of 
death for each person is seen to be 1 in 1 million.  If the 
exposed population is 100,000, then the “risk” of death for each 
person is seen to be 1 in 100,000. The VOSL is the dollar 
amount that the members of the population would be willing to 
pay, in the aggregate, to avoid these “risks.”  As Kip Viscusi, a 
leading proponent of the VOSL method, explains, 
[I]magine a group of 10,000 people, such as an audience in a 
stadium. . . . If there was one expected statistical death from this 
large audience of 10,000 participants, and if each of the participants 
is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk, then it would be possible 
to raise $5 million collectively from this audience to eliminate the one 
statistical death to the group, thus establishing the value of life.300 
On the assumption that (1) the exposed population is large, and 
that (2) the willingness to pay/accept for risk increases in a 
linear fashion with the risk level, given small risks, this 
aggregate amount—the VOSL—will be the same number 
regardless of the precise population size.  “[T]he statistical 
value of life is the total amount of compensation n workers 
would require to face one expected death from their group, 
where n is a large number.”301 
How does the standard formula for monetizing the costs of 
a risky substance or activity (X*VOSL) compare with the 
 
MANAGEMENT 345, supra note 200, at 345-75; and W. Kip Viscusi, The Value 
of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (1993). 
 298. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 1-2. 
 299. See ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 265 (providing case 
studies illustrating how the EPA performs monetized CBA); sources cited 
supra note 297 (explaining VOSL methodology). 
 300. VISCUSI, supra note 297, at 46. 
 301. Viscusi, supra note 297, at 1930. 
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approach recommended here, namely, X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j?  
First, X*VOSL should not be taken as an approximation for the 
second term in my equation, ∑jVBayesian-risk,j.  This second term, 
∑jVBayesian-risk,j, asks how much those who actually have certain 
probabilistic beliefs about E would pay to prevent it.  For 
example, if E is a toxic release which occurs in a population of 1 
million and will kill 1 person, but only 3000 are actually aware 
of E, then at most 3000 people can be at risk in the actual, first-
person Bayesian sense.  Only a person in this small group of 
3000 can actually possess a high probabilistic belief that his or 
her death will occur prematurely as a result of E.  Y, in this 
example, is no greater than 3000.  But the VOSL calculation, as 
explained above, assumes that everyone in the population of 1 
million is “at risk” of dying prematurely.  The term “risk” is—in 
effect—used by VOSL proponents to mean a hypothetical first-
person Bayesian risk, not an actual first-person Bayesian risk.  
We calculate VOSL by asking what each person in the 
population would, hypothetically, pay to prevent E, were she to 
believe that her probability of dying prematurely as a result of 
E were the number of premature deaths (1 in the example here) 
divided by the population size (1 million)—and then 
aggregating the amounts.  This produces a dollar sum very 
different from the sum of willingness to pay/accept among those 
actually aware of, or afraid of, the hazard.  For instance, while 
X*VOSL in the example under consideration is $6 million, 
∑jVBayesian-risk,j might well be as low as $18,000!302 
Even if X*VOSL were a decent approximation for ∑jVBayesian-
risk,j, this would hardly vindicate CBA as currently practiced.  
The appropriate formula for calculating the costs of a risky 
substance or activity E is: X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j.  If X*VOSL 
does approximate ∑jVBayesian-risk,j, the upshot would be that CBA 
as currently practiced dramatically underestimates the costs of 
risky substances and activities, and dramatically understates 
the benefits of risk regulation.  Why?  Consider that, if the 
approximation just described were to obtain, then CBA as 
currently practiced would include a cost term roughly equaling 
∑jVBayesian risk,j (namely X*VOSL), but would lack any cost term at 
all for X*Vdeath. 
A better argument in defense of current practice runs as 
 
 302. A $6 million VOSL implies a willingness to pay $6 to avoid a 1 in 1 
million risk.  If this amount is used to calculate ∑jVBayesian risk,j in the example at 
hand, where 3000 people are actually aware of the risky event, that equals 
$18,000. 
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follows.  For complicated reasons that cannot be elaborated 
here, it turns out that VOSL may be a decent approximation for 
Vdeath303—on the premise that people price small risks of death 
in accordance with the standard economic theory of individual 
decision making known as “expected utility” theory.  Further, it 
seems reasonable to assume that ∑jVBayesian-risk,j will often be 
small.  After all, many individuals are unaware of (let alone 
fear) the dangerous substances and activities that regulatory 
agencies target.  So X*VOSL could be a decent approximation 
for the formula advocated here: X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian risk,j. 
Does this line of argument succeed?  It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to evaluate whether VOSL really is a decent 
approximation for Vdeath.  Let me note, however, that the 
premise on which the argument rests—that expected utility 
theory successfully predicts how individuals price small risks of 
death—is highly contestable.  Much literature in experimental 
psychology suggests that expected utility theory is a poor 
predictor of individual behavior, including pricing behavior.304  
VOSL is predicated on econometric studies of the incremental 
wages that workers demand to work in hazardous jobs, and on 
other such evidence of what individuals are willing to pay or 
accept in return for fatality risks.  If this pricing behavior is not 
driven by expected utility calculations, but instead by social 
norms, by altruistic considerations, or by other psychological 
mechanisms inconsistent with expected utility theory, then the 
approximate equivalence of VOSL and Vdeath is undermined.305 
To sum up, there is considerable reason to think that the 
current approach to monetizing the costs of death and risk, in 
the area of risk regulation, is incorrect.  The correct formula 
(X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j) is conceptually quite different from the 
currently employed formula (X*VOSL), and it is far from clear 
whether the two formulae are even approximately equal. 
 
 303. See Adler, supra note 296, at 285-86. 
 304. For an accessible introduction to this literature, see PLOUS, supra note 
68, at 79-161. 
 305. The point that individuals do not actually price fatality risks in 
accordance with expected utility theory is developed in PETER DORMAN, 
MARKETS AND MORTALITY: ECONOMICS, DANGEROUS WORK, AND THE VALUE 
OF HUMAN LIFE 142-50 (1996).  It should be noted that expected utility theory 
has different variants.  One variant—the variant required to make VOSL a 
decent approximation for Vdeath—presumes self-interested behavior, and is 
therefore inconsistent with altruistic behavior. 
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2. CBA: Nonmonetized Version 
Agencies engaged in CBA pursuant to Executive Order 
12,866, or in other contexts, do not invariably reduce the “costs” 
and “benefits” of proposed rules to monetary amounts.  Indeed, 
a recent study found that a majority of cost-benefit analyses 
submitted by health, safety, and environmental agencies to 
OMB failed to monetize at least some of the welfare impacts 
delineated therein.306  Because there is no scholarly work 
documenting in any systematic way how agencies actually 
perform nonmonetized CBA—how they actually identify and 
commensurate costs and benefits that are measured on diverse 
scales and not rescaled in terms of dollars or some other 
common metric—it would be overreaching for me to make 
claims about the “normal” or “average” practices of agencies 
here.  It appears, however, that at least some risk-regulatory 
agencies engaged in nonmonetized CBA count the elimination 
of risk in the frequentist sense as a benefit of regulatory 
proposals, distinct from the prevention of premature death.307  
This represents an important divergence between 
nonmonetized and monetized CBA, since as explained above 
the standard methodology for monetized CBA is to calculate 
and monetize the premature deaths prevented by a regulatory 
proposal, and to ignore frequentist risk. 
Why might frequentist risk become a factor in agency 
decision making?  A good answer requires some attention to the 
role of so-called “risk assessment” within the modern 
administrative state.308  A risk assessment is, in effect, a 
systematic and carefully structured description of the fatalities, 
fatality risks, and other health or safety setbacks caused by 
some hazard.309  Risk-regulatory agencies that use CBA (either 
 
 306. See Hahn et al., supra note 265, at 866-70. 
 307. See infra text accompanying notes 319-22. 
 308. On that role, see CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
103-51 (1993); QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION (Lester Lave 
ed., 1982); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk 
Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89, 95-126 (1988); Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, 
at 295-322; Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk 
Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 417-68 (1995); Symposium, Risk, 63 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1531 (1995); and Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium, Risk 
Assessment]. 
 309. See generally VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY W. MERKHOFER, RISK 
ASSESSMENT METHODS: APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1993); HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
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the monetized or nonmonetized version) to evaluate policy 
alternatives frequently employ risk assessment as an initial 
step in that analysis.  Indeed, the OMB guidance document 
issued pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 states that the 
documentation for major rulemakings should include a risk 
assessment. 
The risk assessment should generate a credible, objective, realistic, 
and scientifically balanced analysis [of risks to health, safety, and the 
environment]; present information on hazard, dose-response, and 
exposure . . . ; and explain the confidence in each assessment by 
clearly delineating strengths, uncertainties, and assumptions, along 
with the impacts of these factors on the overall assessment.310 
Risk assessments are used in other contexts as well, for 
example when federal agencies implement statutes that 
preclude CBA but still require or permit a systematic agency 
review of the fatalities, illnesses, etc., caused by hazardous 
substances or activities.311 
The techniques of risk assessment have become quite 
standardized—in part because risk analysis has become a 
distinct academic discipline with its own norms and practices, 
including a conventional framework for risk assessment,312 and 
in part because that framework was articulated and codified by 
the National Research Council in a highly influential 1983 
study, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing 
the Process.313  This study, known as the Red Book, divided risk 
assessment into the following steps: hazard identification, dose-
response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk 
characterization.314  “Hazard identification,” crudely, means 
 
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 200, at 9-245; HUMAN AND 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-366 (Dennis J. 
Paustenbach ed., 2002); THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS: A TEXTBOOK OF CASE STUDIES 1-328 (Dennis J. 
Paustenbach ed., 1989). 
 310. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 at § III.A.4, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html (Jan. 11, 1996). 
 311. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 295-322 (describing the EPA’s 
use of risk assessment in a variety of statutory contexts). 
 312. On the history of risk assessment, see Dennis J. Paustenbach, 
Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6 
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 285-87 (1995). 
 313. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983). 
 314. See id. at 19-20; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4-6 (1995) (summarizing the Red Book 
framework). 
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identifying some substance or activity for which there is 
scientific evidence of a causal link to fatalities and other health 
or safety setbacks.  “Dose-response assessment” means 
quantifying that causal link.  Paradigmatically, risk 
assessment focuses on toxic substances (such as air or water 
pollutants, pesticides, toxic food additives or naturally 
occurring food constituents, workplace carcinogens or other 
workplace toxins, or substances used in consumer products) 
and the dose-response assessment takes the form of a graph or 
mathematical equation showing the relationship between the 
dose of the toxic substance and the percentage of individuals 
exposed to that dose who develop an adverse effect.  “Exposure 
assessment” means characterizing the pattern of exposures to 
the toxic substance or other hazard that would occur if the 
status quo were left unregulated and if various regulatory 
alternatives were put in place.  Finally, “risk characterization” 
means integrating the dose-response assessment and the 
exposure assessment so as to generate a prediction of the 
fatalities, illnesses, etc., that would occur in the status quo 
outcome and in the various outcomes of the regulatory 
alternatives under consideration.315 
Risk assessments typically generate two kinds of 
predictions, insofar as fatalities are concerned: (1) a prediction 
of the total number of premature deaths that would occur as a 
result of different regulatory choices; and (2) a prediction of the 
distribution of the frequentist risk of premature death that 
would occur as a result of these choices.  This frequentist risk is 
what risk assessments typically call “individual risk.”  As one 
textbook on risk assessment explains, 
     Most [risk assessments] include several common measures of 
individual and societal risk, in particular: 
• Individual risk, which is the probability of a specified individual   
dying prematurely as a result of exposure to the risk agents. . . . 
• Individual risk contours show the geographical distribution of 
individual risk . . . . 
• Maximum individual risk is the individual risk to the person 
experiencing the highest risk in the exposed population. . . . 
• Various measures of societal risk, such as . . . the expected number 
 
 315. On the meaning of “hazard identification,” “dose-response 
assessment,” “exposure assessment,” and “risk characterization,” see, for 
example, COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 27-29; and NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 313, at 19-20. 
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of fatalities as a function of location or population subgroup . . . .316 
To see why the “individual risk” numbers generated by 
traditional risk assessment are frequentist, not Bayesian risks, 
and to understand why risk assessment readily lends itself to 
this kind of prediction, consider the following simple example.  
Imagine that our “hazard identification” has identified some 
chemical compound that has accumulated in a waste dump and 
that is causally linked to an inevitably fatal cancer.  One 
million people drink water that is contaminated, to some 
degree, by the dump.  Our “dose-response assessment” 
determines that the relationship between the amount of the 
compound ingested (over a lifetime) and the percentage of a 
group ingesting this particular dose that would incur fatal 
cancer as a result can be represented by the following graph. 
 
Figure 1: Dose-Response Curve for Carcinogen in Waste Dump 
 
Finally, our “exposure assessment” determines that, absent 
regulation, the one million people drinking the contaminated 
water would in fact be exposed to the following lifetime doses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 316. COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 231. 
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                             Exposure Level 
 
                  Very Low    Low          Moderate     High 
                  (1 gram)       (5 grams)   (15 grams)     (25 grams) 
Number of 
Individuals     500,000       400,000      80,000            20,000 
 
Combining the “dose-response assessment” and the “exposure 
assessment,” we can predict that absent regulation (1) the total 
number of premature deaths caused by the compound would be 
12; and (2) the Very Low Exposure, Low Exposure, Moderate 
Exposure, and High Exposure segments of the population 
would face the following “individual risks.” 
 
                                Exposure Level 
 
          Very Low      Low              Moderate    High 
Individual 
Risk          1 in 250,000   1 in 100,000   1 in 20,000   1 in 10,000 
 
These “individual risks” are frequentist risks.  They are a 
function of the individual’s dosage of the toxic substance 
concerned—indeed, can be read directly off the dose-response 
curve—and equal the frequency with which persons (or persons 
of a particular type) exposed to that dose die prematurely as a 
result.  In this example, the dose-response curve is quite crude 
and shows the percentage of a group consisting of all persons 
exposed to a particular dose of the toxin that would die 
prematurely as a result of the toxin.  A more refined dose-
response curve might display the percentage of a group 
consisting of all persons (1) with characteristics C1 . . . Cn, and 
(2) exposed to a particular dose of the toxin that would die 
prematurely as a result.  (For example, a risk assessment could 
have one dose-response curve for adults, and another for 
children.)  Whether the dose-response curve is simple or 
refined, the “individual risks” generated by risk assessments 
have nothing to do with degrees of belief (actual or 
hypothetical), but instead are calculated by subsuming the 
given individual, P, within some class of persons exposed to the 
toxic substance, and determining what percentage of that class 
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would die prematurely because of it.317 
How are the dual predictions of the typical risk 
assessment—a prediction concerning total premature deaths, 
and a prediction concerning the frequentist risk of premature 
death incurred by various members of the population—
employed by agencies conducting monetized or nonmonetized 
CBA?  In the case of monetized CBA, the prediction concerning 
frequentist risk is typically ignored.  As I have already 
explained, monetized CBA takes the number of premature 
deaths prevented by a regulatory proposal, multiplies that 
number by VOSL ($6 million) to determine the monetized value 
of lifesaving, and moves on; there is no separate term for the 
Bayesian or frequentist risks that would be eliminated by the 
proposal.318  However, at least some agencies conducting 
nonmonetized CBA do give weight to the risk assessor’s 
prediction concerning frequentist risk.  Alon Rosenthal, George 
Gray, and John Graham surveyed the use of risk assessment by 
the EPA with respect to carcinogenic chemicals, and identified 
several instances in which that agency, in the course of 
implementing “balancing” statutes, took account of “individual 
risk” in making regulatory choices.319  For example, the authors 
found that the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was 
administered as follows: 
The OTS [the office within EPA that administers the TSCA]  has not 
formalized its risk management criteria, in part because TSCA 
requires a discretionary, judgmental balancing of numerous factors.  
Generally, the OTS believes that situations in which lifetime 
individual risk is less than 10-6, or in which population risk (i.e., the 
number of expected cases of cancer per year) is less than one, do not 
warrant the attention of the agency. . . . [T]he OTS considers both 
individual risk and population risk [total deaths] in deciding whether 
to regulate.  For example, in deciding to phase out the use of asbestos 
in almost all products over a seven-year period, the OTS concluded 
that the rule would prevent 200 cases of cancer and would also relieve 
certain highly exposed individuals of a 10-3 lifetime excess cancer risk. 
It cited both of these factors as justifying the costs caused by the 
suspension.320 
Similarly, the authors found that the EPA, in applying the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—
another balancing statute—placed some emphasis on 
 
 317. See, e.g., COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 151-68 
(discussing dose-response models). 
 318. See supra text accompanying notes 297-99. 
 319. Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 295-322. 
 320. Id. at 308-09 (citations omitted). 
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“individual risk.”  “The [EPA under FIFRA] tends to set 
acceptable risk levels for the food-consuming population within 
or below the range of 10-5 to 10-6, while it tends to accept 
occupational risks that are less than 10-4 to 10-5.”321  Several 
further examples where the EPA has counted the elimination of 
frequentist risk as a benefit of regulation, for purposes of 
nonmonetized CBA, are provided in a recent study describing 
the use of economic analysis by that agency.322 
The cases I have just described are not cases in which (1) 
the frequentist risk information simply recapitulates 
information about the number of premature deaths in different 
outcomes, and is not given additional weight by the agency; or 
(2) frequentist risks are the “bridging” probabilities that an 
agency, uncertain about which outcomes will result from its 
various possible choices, employs to move from the “ex post” 
ranking of outcomes to the “ex ante” ranking of choices.323  
Rather, it appears, these are cases in which agencies take the 
level of frequentist risk to be an independent dimension of 
welfare—a welfare-relevant feature of a possible outcome that 
has independent negative weight, quite apart from the 
occurrence of premature death, in determining the ranking of 
that outcome. 
This practice should be ended.  Agencies that use 
nonmonetized CBA to evaluate regulatory proposals should not 
give independent weight to frequentist risk in determining the 
CBA ranking of outcomes.  CBA is a proxy for overall well-
being—genuine “costs” and “benefits” track genuine dimensions 
of welfare.  Frequent risk, however, is not a genuine welfare 
setback, and the elimination of frequentist risk is not a genuine 
welfare improvement.  Part III of this Article argued that 
neither a high statistical probability of some person’s 
premature death, nor a high physical probability, nor a high 
conventional probability, diminishes that person’s well-being.324 
The frequentist risk numbers that are predicted by risk 
 
 321. Id. at 306 (citations omitted). 
 322. See Peter Caulkins & Stuart Sessions, Water Pollution and the 
Organic Chemicals Industry, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 87, supra note 
265, at 108, 110-11, 115; Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES AT EPA 205, supra note 265, at 225; Mahesh Podar et al., Municipal 
Sewage Sludge Management, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 365, supra note 
265, at 371. 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100. 
 324. See supra Part III.B-D. 
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assessment documents and sometimes figure within agency 
decision making—so-called “individual risks”—are in fact 
either statistical or conventional probabilities, not physical 
probabilities.  “Individual risk” is not calculated by subsuming 
the individual within a reference class sharing all of his 
causally relevant characteristics.  Rather, as I explained above, 
the reference class is much cruder, often consisting simply of all 
persons exposed to a particular dose of the toxic substance 
under assessment,325 and in any event will be heterogeneous 
with respect to some characteristics that affect individual 
responses to that dose.  Consider the crude calculation that P, 
who consumes a lifetime dose of 1 gram of some carcinogen C, 
has an “individual risk” of 1 in 20,000 of dying as a result, 
because the frequency with which members of the reference 
class of “all individuals who consume a lifetime dose of 1 gram 
of C” die prematurely is 1/20,000.  This 1 in 20,000 probability 
will be P’s statistical probability of dying prematurely from C if 
and only if the narrowest P-containing reference class for which 
reliable frequency information is available is the crude class 
defined in terms of lifetime dosage.  That might not be the case; 
better information could be available.  Even so, the 1 in 20,000 
probability is a kind of conventional probability.  P’s lifetime 
dosage represents a conventionally salient casual feature, 
albeit not the only causal feature or the only one about which 
statisticians might be informed. 
Whether statistical, conventional, or both, the frequentist 
probabilities of premature death that are predicted by risk 
assessments should not be used—within the context of 
monetized or nonmonetized CBA—as a partial determinant of 
the agency’s ranking of outcomes and therewith its ranking of 
the regulatory choices possibly resulting in those outcomes.  A 
change in someone’s level of frequentist risk, be it statistical, 
conventional, or even physical, is neither a welfare setback nor 
an improvement and therefore is not a cost or benefit for CBA 
purposes.326 
 
 325. See supra text accompanying note 317. 
 326. Nor can the frequentist risks predicted by risk assessments be 
reinterpreted as hypothetical Bayesian risks or as actual third-party Bayesian 
risks (for example, the probabilistic beliefs of experts concerning the likely 
death of persons exposed to toxic substances), and thereby given a legitimate 
outcome-ranking role within CBA.  As I demonstrated in Part IV.C, 
hypothetical Bayesian risk and third-party Bayesian risk, like frequentist 
risk, are not welfare setbacks. 
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B. RISK-RISK ANALYSIS 
I have shown that the Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk has 
large implications for cost-benefit analysis.  What are the 
implications if we shift from CBA to competing frameworks for 
regulatory choice?  I have argued at length, elsewhere, that 
CBA is the appropriate framework,327 as have numerous other 
scholars,328 and CBA is now widely practiced by administrative 
agencies.329  But it is still premature to suggest, as does Cass 
Sunstein in a recent article, that we have moved from “first 
generation” to “second generation” debate about CBA—where 
“second generation” debate concerns “how (not whether) to 
engage in cost-benefit analysis.”330  CBA remains controversial, 
particularly among academics.331  One competing framework, 
for purposes of risk regulation, is the framework known as 
“risk-risk” analysis (RRA).332  RRA focuses on the health and 
safety effects of regulatory options, rather than on other types 
of costs or benefits. 
One way of stating the objective [of RRA] is that society desires to 
minimize the adverse health effects associated with a given food such 
as bacon [or with other toxic substances or activities]. Thus society 
would permit nitrite [a carcinogen] in bacon if the improvement in the 
health of consumers from botulism protection exceeded the decrement 
in health from the risk of cancer.  Yet it is evident that the direct risk-
risk framework takes only the first step of considering the health of 
the person consuming the food. People are also associated with the 
production and distribution of food; society [under RRA] desires to 
minimize the adverse health effects associated with producing as well 
as consuming bacon . . . .333 
RRA has a robust version and a weak version.  The robust 
version of RRA ignores all nonhealth effects of regulatory 
options: financial costs, employment, aesthetic effects, 
 
 327. See sources cited supra note 287. 
 328. See, e.g., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 284.  This book is an 
anthology of papers on CBA, many of which defend the practice. 
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 264-84. 
 330. Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1655-56. 
 331. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 170-72 nn.12-18 (citing sources). 
 332. See, e.g., LAVE, supra note 288, at 15-17; Frank B. Cross, When 
Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 729 (1995); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, 
Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 1, supra note 5, at 1-41; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1538-52 
(1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7 
(1994). 
 333. LAVE, supra note 288, at 16. 
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convenience, and so on.334  The weak version of RRA accords 
priority to health and safety—it gives these dimensions of well-
being more weight than they would have within CBA—but does 
not wholly ignore nonhealth effects.335  The case for RRA is 
either a moral case (namely, that agencies are morally obliged 
not to maximize well-being, but instead to give special weight 
to health and safety)336 or an institutional case (that RRA turns 
out to be  a more administrable proxy for overall well-being 
than CBA, given the limited resources, information, and 
capabilities of agencies).337 
What is the legal status of RRA?  Some statutes governing 
risk-regulatory agencies are best interpreted as requiring those 
agencies to use RRA rather than CBA.338  Other statutes use 
general balancing language without clearly choosing between 
RRA and CBA.339  Proponents of RRA would argue that these 
statutes, too, should be read as setting forth RRA (not CBA) as 
the framework for agency choice. 
The view of risk, death, and harm defended in this Article 
has substantial relevance for RRA.  Consider the choice 
between the Null View, the Death View, the Hybrid 
(Frequentist) View, and the Hybrid (Bayesian) View.  On the 
Null View, RRA should focus on illness or injury, not on death 
itself or the risk of premature death.  The fact that a policy 
reduces the incidence of, say, emphysema, headaches, or 
paraplegia, would legitimately count in favor of the policy.340  
However, the fact that a policy reduces fatalities or fatality 
 
 334. See, e.g., id. at 15-18 (contrasting risk-risk framework, which on 
Lave’s construal “precludes consideration of non-health effects,” and “risk-
benefit” framework, which does consider non-health effects). 
 335. See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the 
Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 116-28 
(2001) (arguing for a modified version of CBA that gives extra weight to safety 
interests but does not ignore other interests). 
 336. See id. 
 337. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 229-33. 
 338. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1664-65. 
 339. See id. at 1666-67. 
 340. For discussions of valuation of morbidity, see generally Mark Berger 
et al., Framework for Valuing Health Risks, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 
23, supra note 29; Richard Clemmer et al., Household Health Production, 
Property Values and the Value of Health, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 105, 
supra note 29; Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR 
POLICY 118, supra note 29; Donald Kenkel et al., Contingent Valuation of 
Health, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 72, supra note 29; and Donald 
Kenkel, Cost of Illness Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 42, supra 
note 29. 
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risks would not.  Morbidity is policy relevant, but mortality is 
not.  On the Death View, mortality as well as morbidity is 
policy relevant, but the risk of mortality is not.  On the Hybrid 
(Frequentist) View, mortality, morbidity, and, arguably, the 
frequentist risk of mortality or morbidity would all be 
legitimate factors for RRA. 
Finally, and interestingly, the Hybrid (Bayesian) View has 
the same implications for RRA as the Death View.  Death is a 
welfare setback, pace the Null View.  If so, it is exceedingly 
difficult to see why RRA should be structured as a technique 
that aims at, or gives priority to, the reduction of morbidity, but 
does not aim at or give priority to the reduction of mortality.  
Death is, typically, a more serious welfare setback than injury 
and illness.  Death is the more extreme result of the processes 
that produce injury and illness, namely, injurious events and 
disease.  Death, like injury and illness, reduces the subject’s 
well-being in (broadly speaking) the same way, namely, by 
intruding on her physical integrity.  All these considerations 
suggest that RRA should focus on reducing death as well as 
reducing injury and illness. 
Fear and Bayesian risk are different.  These are welfare 
setbacks, according to the Hybrid (Bayesian) View, but are 
typically less serious setbacks than injury, illness, and death; 
and fear and Bayesian risk do not, except in very unusual 
cases, represent a bodily dysfunction or failure of physical 
integrity.  Bayesian risk is merely a kind of belief; fear is a kind 
of emotion.  Well-functioning humans have beliefs and 
experience emotions.  It is hard to see what moral or 
institutional considerations could counsel agencies to (1) ignore 
or give lower priority to financial costs, unemployment, 
convenience, ecosystem disruption, and other serious nonhealth 
effects, but (2) aim at or give high priority to emotional and 
epistemic well-being.  Finally, since risk in the frequentist 
sense is not a welfare setback, frequentist risk should be no 
more relevant to RRA than it is to CBA. 
In short, assuming that there are good moral or 
institutional grounds for agencies to engage in RRA rather 
than CBA, agencies should aim at or give priority to the 
reduction of premature death (along with illness and injury) 
but should not aim at or give priority to the reduction of risk in 
the frequentist or Bayesian sense.341 
 
 341. By “aim at,” here, I mean to maintain the focus on outcomes that has 
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I do not know how this recommendation squares with the 
actual practices of agencies engaged in RRA.  However, it is 
inconsistent with the view taken by John Graham and 
Jonathan Wiener in a major scholarly work on RRA, Risk 
Versus Risk.  Wiener and Graham argue that all of the 
following considerations should be relevant to risk-risk 
tradeoffs: “magnitude [of risk], degree of population exposure, 
certainty, type of adverse outcome, distribution, and timing.”342  
They elaborate as follows: 
  Magnitude (Probability) of Risk.  Recall that risk is defined as the 
probability of an adverse outcome. . . . If the adverse outcomes are 
similar or identical (for example, fatal cancer vs. fatal cancer) . . . the 
relative probabilities of the adverse outcomes become critical. 
  . . .[I]t is important for decisionmakers to recognize the difference 
between a lifetime probability of, say, 1 in 100 and a lifetime 
probability of 1 in 100,000. . . . 
  . . . . 
  Size of Population. If we hold constant the probability of adverse 
outcome to a specified individual . . ., the relative size of the exposed 
populations is an important consideration.  Statistics such as 
aggregate cancer incidence (sometimes called “population risk” in 
contrast to “individual risk”) are useful in capturing the importance of 
the size of an exposed population.343 
In short, Graham and Wiener claim that both “individual risk” 
(in the frequentist sense) and “population risk” (the total 
number of deaths, illnesses, or injuries) should figure in 
RRA.344  Imagine that in outcome O1 one cancer death occurs, 
out of a population of 100 unknowingly exposed to the 
carcinogen; and in outcome O2 two cancer deaths occur, out of a 
population of 10,000,000 unknowingly exposed to the 
carcinogen.  According to Graham and Wiener, as I read them, 
the policy maker here has prima facie reason to favor the 
outcome, O2, with more deaths, since the other outcome exposes 
individuals to a much higher frequentist risk.  Indeed, given 
the stark disparity between the two outcomes on the risk 
 
characterized this entire Article.  Neither frequentist risk nor Bayesian risk 
should bear on the RRA ranking of outcomes.  Death should bear on the RRA 
ranking of outcomes; and so the Bayesian or frequentist probabilities of 
different regulatory choices resulting in outcomes characterized by death are 
potentially relevant—relevant “ex ante”—to the RRA analyst.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 95-100. 
 342. Graham & Wiener, supra note 332, at 30. 
 343. Id. at 30-31. 
 344. For a similar claim, see Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks 
Thoughtfully, 7 RISK 325, 342-44 (1996). 
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dimension, and the smaller disparity on the death dimension, it 
seems likely that—under the Graham and Wiener approach—it 
would be best, all things considered, for outcome O2 to obtain.  
O1 has one premature death, and 100 cases of a very high (1 in 
100) frequentist risk of premature death, while O2 has two 
premature deaths, and ten million cases of a trivially low (2 in 
10 million) frequentist risk of premature death. 
One upshot of the Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk defended 
in this Article is that the Graham and Wiener conception of 
RRA—the leading conception within the scholarly literature—
is mistaken.  In applying RRA to the hypothetical outcomes 
just described, the policy maker should unequivocally rank O1, 
the outcome with fewer premature deaths, over outcome O2; he 
has no reason whatsoever to give a higher ranking to O2.  More 
generally, although “distribution,” “timing,” “type of adverse 
outcome,” and perhaps other considerations could properly 
figure in RRA along with “degree of population exposure” (the 
number of actual deaths, illnesses and injuries), risk in the 
frequentist sense should not. 
C. HEALTH AND SAFETY THRESHOLDS 
Numerous regulatory statutes set health or safety 
thresholds; they direct agencies to determine whether a 
particular level of some substance, or amount of some activity, 
would be “safe” or “unsafe,” “healthy” or “unhealthy,” or 
cognate terms.  These thresholds arise in a variety of statutory 
contexts.  Sometimes, the health or safety thresholds function 
as statutory goals and seem entirely to displace a balancing 
analysis.  In such instances, the agency is seemingly enjoined 
by statute to eliminate health or safety threats above the 
threshold, regardless of countervailing costs, financial or 
other.345  For example, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
requires food additives to be “safe.”346  Section 112 of the Clean 
Air Act, until its amendment in 1990, instructed the EPA to set 
 
 345. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1663-64.  I say “seemingly” because, 
arguably, even statutes that facially require agencies to maximize health or 
safety should be interpreted to incorporate some cost considerations, absent 
very clear language to the contrary.  See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (interpreting the pre-
1990 version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act to authorize the EPA to give 
limited consideration to cost and technological feasibility).  But see Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (reading section 109(b) 
of the Clean Air Act to preclude the EPA from considering costs). 
 346. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000). 
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emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants at a level that 
would “protect the public health” with an “ample margin of 
safety.”347 
In other cases, statutes create health or safety thresholds 
that function as goals and preclude CBA- or RRA-type 
balancing, but place a constraint of technological or economic 
“feasibility” on regulation; since regulations that are so costly 
as to cause widespread bankruptcy among regulated firms 
would be economically “infeasible,” and since the elimination of 
safety risks where that necessitates a complete cessation in the 
production of some good or service is often seen as 
technologically “infeasible,” this “feasibility” constraint 
amounts to a crude type of balancing.348  Section 6(b)(5) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act is a good example of  this 
type of statute.  OSHA is directed to set a standard for each 
toxic substance in the workplace that “most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity.”349  
Another example is the pre-1996 version of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act.  The EPA was required first to set nonenforceable 
“maximum contaminant level goals” (MCLGs) for water 
pollutants, which are concentrations at which no adverse 
human health effects are believed to occur, and then to 
promulgate enforceable standards, “maximum contaminant 
levels,” which were to be set as close to the MCLGs as is 
“feasible with the use of the best technology, treatment 
techniques, and other [available] means.”350 
Finally, statutory health or safety thresholds are 
sometimes integrated with a CBA- or RRA-type balancing 
analysis, in more or less complex ways.  A statute might set a 
threshold, preclude regulation of substances or activities below 
the threshold,351 and instruct the agency to engage in CBA- or 
RRA-type balancing to determine whether to regulate 
 
 347. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 
§ 301 (1990); see Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 300-04 (describing the 
original version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act). 
 348. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1665-66. 
 349. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000). 
 350. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 309-13 (describing the pre-
1996 version of the Safe Drinking Water Act) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4), 
(5) (1988)).  The Act has subsequently been amended to include a cost-benefit 
provision.  See supra note 274.  
 351. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1664 (discussing statutes that 
require “significant” risk as a prerequisite for regulation). 
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substances or activities above the threshold.  The threshold, in 
this context, might be seen as the outcome of a legislative 
balancing sensitive to deliberation costs: The benefits of 
regulating activities or substances below the threshold are 
likely to be so small that they do not justify the (substantial) 
administrative deliberation costs involved in full-fledged CBA 
or RRA.352  Consider section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, which generally authorizes OSHA to issue 
standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and places of 
employment.”353  This statutory language arguably requires or 
permits OSHA to employ CBA or RRA in regulating dangerous 
activities or conditions—as opposed to toxic substances, which 
are covered not only by section 3(8) but also by the anti-
balancing language of section 6(b)(5)354—and indeed has been 
so interpreted by several circuit courts.355  However, section 
3(8) has also been read by a plurality of the Supreme Court as 
setting a health/safety threshold.  In Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case), 
Justice Stevens famously determined that OSHA lacked the 
power to regulate “insignificant” health or safety risks.356 
  By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment and places of employment,” the Act implies that, before 
promulgating any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that 
the workplaces in question are not safe.  But “safe” is not the 
equivalent of “risk-free.”  There are many activities that we engage in 
every day—such as driving a car or even breathing city air—that 
entail some risk of accident or material health impairment; 
nevertheless, few people would consider these activities “unsafe.”  
Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered “unsafe” unless it 
threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm. 
  Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or 
safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding 
that a place of employment is unsafe—in the sense that significant 
 
 352. On the deliberation costs involved in CBA, see Richard D. 
Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs, 
Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 455, supra note 265, at 460-62; 
and Paul R. Portney, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Analysis, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER 226 (V. Kerry 
Smith ed., 1984). 
 353. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8). 
 354. Id. § 655(b)(5). 
 355. See Cross, supra note 332, at 769-70 (discussing section 3(8) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act and relevant case law). 
 356. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in 
practices.357 
In short, the statutory regime governing OSHA regulation of 
dangerous activities and conditions is arguably the following: 
no regulation of activities or conditions posing “insignificant” 
safety risks, and cost-justified regulation of activities or 
conditions posing “significant” safety risks.   
 A more complicated statutory structure, combining a 
health/safety threshold with a balancing test, is found in the 
current version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, as amended 
in 1990.358  The Act lists various air pollutants.  For new 
sources of each pollutant, the EPA is required to set the most 
restrictive emission standard that is achievable under the best, 
currently utilized technology.  If this technology-based 
standard would still allow a level of pollution posing a non-
minimal health risk—if that level exceeds a health/safety 
threshold—and if a balancing analysis supports lowering the 
pollution level, then EPA must enact a more restrictive 
standard. 
In sum, health/safety thresholds appear in numerous 
federal statues, either as regulatory goals that displace a 
broader balancing test (perhaps hedged by a feasibility 
constraint), or as tests of significance that precede balancing, or 
in some more complicated way.  How are these thresholds 
implemented?  What does it mean for some substance or 
activity to be “unsafe,” or to pose a “substantial” or “significant” 
threat to health or safety, or to rise above a “de minimis” level 
of danger?  The answer: Agencies often (if not always) construe 
statutory safety or health thresholds as levels of frequentist risk.  
This practice was fueled by the Benzene case, where Justice 
Stevens not only interpreted section 3(8) of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act as precluding the agency from 
regulating “insignificant” workplace hazards, but also 
suggested that OSHA look at individual risk to determine 
whether this safety/health threshold was exceeded.  In a crucial 
passage, Justice Stevens wrote, 
[T]he requirement [under section 3(8)] that a “significant” risk be 
identified is not a mathematical straitjacket.  It is the Agency’s 
responsibility to determine, in the first instance, what it considers to 
be a “significant” risk.  Some risks are plainly acceptable and others 
 
 357.  Id. at 642. 
 358. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000); see Cross, supra note 332, at 770-72 
(discussing the structure of the current version of section 112). 
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are plainly unacceptable.  If, for example, the odds are one in a billion 
that a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated 
water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant.  On the 
other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation 
of gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable 
person might well consider the risk significant and take appropriate 
steps to decrease or eliminate it.359 
OSHA now generally uses a 1 in 1000 level of “individual risk” 
as its test of significance for carcinogens: If some such 
substance in the workplace creates more than a 1 in 1000 risk 
of premature death to any worker, that substance exceeds the 
health/safety threshold of section 3(8) and can be regulated.360  
The EPA interpreted the original version of section 112 of the 
Clean Air Act—which required an “ample margin of safety” for 
the public—as setting a 1 in 10,000 risk threshold: The 
permissible amount of a covered air pollutant would need to be 
set sufficiently low that the “maximally exposed individual” 
would face less than a 1 in 10,000 risk of premature death from 
the pollutant.361  The current version of section 112 explicitly 
states that its health/safety threshold should be specified in 
terms of “individual risk.”  The EPA must “reduce lifetime 
excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to 
emissions . . . to less than one in one million.”362  EPA also uses 
“individual risk” (either risk to the maximally exposed 
individual, or some average of individual risk across the 
population) in specifying safety thresholds under the Clean 
Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the “Superfund” 
statute (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).363  The FDA has at various junctures 
interpreted the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as including a “de 
minimis” safety threshold and defined that threshold as a 1 in 
1 million individual risk of premature death.364 
 
 359. Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 655. 
 360. See March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer 
Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17, 24-25 
(1995).  This valuable survey of agency threshold setting was published more 
than a half-decade ago; I am not aware of a more recent one.  It is possible 
that some of the agency practices which are described in the Sadowitz and 
Graham survey, and which I note here and immediately below, have changed 
since its publication. 
 361. See id. at 25-26; Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 300-04. 
 362. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A); see Cross, supra note 332, at 771 (discussing 
this provision). 
 363. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 309-22; Sadowitz & Graham, 
supra note 360, at 26-30. 
 364. See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 360, at 21-24.  For a discussion of 
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The FDA, EPA, OSHA, and other agencies that specify 
health/safety thresholds in terms of “individual risk” (from 1 in 
1000 at the high end, to 1 in 1 million at the low end) implicitly 
or explicitly understand “individual risk” in frequentist terms.  
A 1 in x risk of cancer, for these purposes, means a 1 in x risk 
as predicted by the methodology of risk assessment; but, as I 
have already explained, that methodology equates “individual 
risk” with the percentage of some exposed population that dies 
or becomes ill or injured. 
The Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk, defended in this 
Article, therefore has quite straightforward and dramatic 
implications for the pervasive agency practice of setting 
health/safety thresholds in terms of individual (frequentist) 
risk.  The practice cannot be justified, and ought not continue.  
The fact that an individual’s frequentist risk of premature 
death lies above or below a given level makes no difference to 
her well-being.  Therefore, it makes no sense for agencies to 
aim at health/safety thresholds defined in frequentist terms, or 
to specify the thresholds that trigger balancing in frequentist 
terms, or to equate the thresholds that play a more complicated 
statutory role with a frequentist risk of premature death.  
Consider the case of a health/safety threshold that functions as 
a regulatory goal and displaces balancing, for example, the 
original version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act.  Assume the 
EPA sets the health/safety goal for each pollutant at some level 
of frequentist risk L, say, 1 in 10,000.  This means the 
following: Given two outcomes O1 and O2, such that some 
individuals in O1 would have an above-L risk of premature 
death from the pollutant, while no individuals in O2 will have 
an above-L risk of premature death from the pollutant, EPA 
will prefer O2 to O1.  Unless, however, O1 and O2 differ with 
regard to some metric other than frequentist risk (for example, 
the aggregate number of deaths, or the level of fear), the 
Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk defended in this Article implies 
that the two outcomes are identical with respect to well-being.  
No one is worse off in O1 than in O2, absent some divergence 
between the outcomes other than the divergence captured by 
the EPA’s risk threshold L.365 
 
the use of “individual risk” by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and state 
agencies to set safety thresholds, see id. at 18-21, 31-33. 
 365. How can O1 and O2 differ with respect to the risk-threshold L but not 
the number of deaths?  As a simple example, imagine that in O1 n persons die 
out of a small exposed population, while in O2 n persons die out of a large 
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In the case of a health/safety threshold that serves as a 
trigger for balancing, or that plays a yet more complicated 
statutory role, the specification of that threshold in frequentist-
risk terms is vulnerable to the very same objection.  Why 
should the fact that one outcome lies below the risk threshold, 
while another lies above it, affect the regulatory status of the 
outcomes?  That difference between the outcomes does not, in 
itself, change anyone’s welfare. 
One possible response is that while the level of frequentist 
risk lacks welfare significance, it remains morally significant in 
some other way.  For example, safety and health might be 
understood as “primary goods” or “resources”; a “primary good” 
or “resource” is a precondition for welfare or a means to welfare 
rather than a part of welfare itself.366  Money is the classic 
example: Having more money does not itself improve someone’s 
welfare, but rather enables her to realize welfare improvements 
that would otherwise not be feasible for her.  However, given 
the arguments set forth in Part III of this Article, it is very 
hard to see how a lower frequentist risk of premature death 
could be a “resource” analogous to money or, for that matter, 
actual health and longevity.367  A high frequentist risk of 
premature death does not (at least if the individual is unaware 
of that risk) prevent her from living a perfectly good life, by 
contrast with ill health, hunger, fear, or death; nor can a low 
risk be traded for welfare improvements, by contrast with 
money. 
Alternatively, a high frequentist risk of premature death 
for some person could be seen as an infringement of his moral 
rights, rather than as a diminution of his welfare or 
resources.368  Arguably, rights infringements do not entail 
 
exposed population, with the frequentist risk equaling n divided by the 
population size.  A somewhat more complicated example is as follows: For one 
toxic substance the “maximally exposed individual” has an above-L risk, but 
most of the population has a small risk; while for another toxic substance most 
of the population has a larger risk, still below L, and the “maximally exposed 
individual” now also has a below-L risk.  Further, the probability distributions 
are such that the regulators predict the same number of deaths to occur as a 
result of each substance.  Examples like these help clarify that frequentist risk 
and the number of deaths are analytically distinct features of outcomes. 
 366. For a discussion of “primary goods” or “resources” and citations to the 
philosophical literature, see Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 211-12. 
 367. See supra Part III.B-D. 
 368. For an argument that risk imposition is indeed a kind of wrongdoing 
(rights violation), see McCarthy, supra note 64, at 208-15.  But see Stephen 
Perry, Imposing Risk 48-67 (unpublished paper, on file with author) 
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welfare or resource reductions.  For example, if I trespass on 
your property without damaging anything, and without 
harming you, I may still have violated your moral rights.369  
Might not I do the same by, say, playing a game of Russian 
Roulette with you as the unwitting target, or more generally by 
imposing a high frequentist death risk on you?  Perhaps so.  
The arguments presented in Part III focus on welfare, not 
rights, and thus do not settle the issue whether risk 
impositions (in the frequentist sense) can be rights violations.  
That important issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  It 
seems intuitively clear, however, that rights-violating risk 
impositions (if they exist) would involve a high frequentist risk 
plus other elements, for example a lack of voluntariness on the 
part of the victim.  If I sell you a dangerous substance, and tell 
you that, and you are a competent adult who understands my 
warning, then your rights have not been violated even though I 
may have a imposed a high frequentist risk of premature death 
on you.  Yet agencies that specify health and safety thresholds 
in terms of frequentist risk do so without reference to the 
further elements that would (seemingly) be required to 
establish a rights violation;370 and they do so in contexts where 
the statute is focused on welfare not rights. 
How should statutory health/safety thresholds be 
interpreted by regulatory agencies, if not as levels of 
frequentist risk?  This is a complicated question, whose answer 
may vary depending on the statutory role of the threshold.  In 
the case of a statute that instructs the agency to regulate a 
particular product or activity by aiming at safety or health, and 
ignoring cost considerations, one plausible answer is that the 
agency should set regulatory standards such that no one dies 
prematurely as a result of the product or activity.  In other 
words, the health/safety threshold could be specified as a 
maximum permissible number of deaths resulting from the 
product or activity, rather than a maximum “individual risk” 
level; since even one premature death is “unsafe” for the person 
who dies, the maximum permissible number should, 
intuitively, be zero.  One objection to this approach is that 
 
(criticizing McCarthy’s account). 
 369. For an in-depth, critical discussion of the possibility of harmless 
wrongdoing, focused on criminal law, see 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988). 
 370. See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 360 (surveying agency use of 
frequentist risk to set health and safety thresholds). 
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achieving a zero-death goal might be practically impossible.  
The objection becomes more powerful, the more broadly the 
regulated activity or product is defined.  Regulating “food 
additives” so that no premature deaths result from food 
additives is eminently possible.  If food additives are prohibited 
(and the prohibition is complied with), then they cause no 
deaths.  Regulating “foods” so that no premature deaths result 
from food consumption is not possible, short of banning all 
foods.  In any world in which people do consume food, there will 
be acts of food consumption such that the consumer dies earlier 
than she would have had she refrained.  Another objection is 
that a zero-death goal is misconceived, even if health and safety 
are given priority over other aspects of welfare.  Consider that, 
by banning a food additive which would cause deaths in some 
cases, the regulator might prevent the additive from blocking 
fatal processes that will result in many more deaths if the 
additive is banned.371  Imagine that Additive A is a carcinogen 
which, if permitted for use in foods, would cause one death but 
also prevent twenty botulism deaths.  Another way of phrasing 
this objection is that regulators instructed to prioritize health 
or safety should aim to maximize aggregate health or safety 
(concretely, to maximize aggregate longevity or health-adjusted 
longevity), rather than to eliminate deaths from particular 
causes (cancer versus botulism).  A plausible response to the 
objection is that some statutes not only displace cost 
considerations but quite explicitly focus on the deaths that 
result from particular products or activities, rather than on 
global longevity, and that minimizing the number of deaths of 
this type—regardless of countervailing costs, including deaths 
of other types—is what legislative supremacy requires of 
regulators operating under these statutes. 372 
Further complications arise when a statute articulates a 
health/safety threshold but permits some regulatory 
consideration of cost.  Consider the case where regulators are 
instructed to employ CBA in setting standards, but are 
precluded from regulating activities or products that are 
already “safe.”  In effect, “safe” activities or products are those 
that a full cost-benefit analysis likely would recommend leaving 
unregulated.  Here, too, the health/safety threshold could be 
specified in terms of a maximum permissible number of deaths 
 
 371. See, e.g., LAVE, supra note 288, at 15-16. 
 372. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1663-68 (describing the varying 
structures of safety-oriented statutes). 
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resulting from the activity or product.  Note, however, that the 
maximum permissible number, in this statutory context, could 
well be greater than zero.  Assume that an agency, to date, has 
regulated 100 different dangerous chemicals.  The average cost 
of regulation has been, say, $55 million.  If Vdeath is $6 million, 
and if it is assumed that the main benefit of regulation is the 
avoidance of premature death, then the agency or a court 
reviewing its decisions could reasonably determine that 
substances causing fewer than ten deaths are “safe.” 
In sum, agencies need not apply health/safety thresholds 
by looking to the levels of frequentist risk that occur in 
different regulatory outcomes.  The thresholds might be 
construed in other ways, as tracking the number of  premature 
deaths that occur in different outcomes, or the aggregate 
adjusted or unadjusted longevity.  The current, risk-focused 
regulatory practice can and should change, given the welfare 
irrelevance of frequentist risk.  What the revised practice ought 
to look like is a subtle and context-sensitive matter that 
deserves much greater attention than I have been able to give 
it here. 
D. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Arguably, risk regulators should not simply aim to 
maximize aggregate welfare (CBA), or to maximize aggregate 
health and safety (RRA), or to prevent health and safety 
setbacks of a particular kind, but should also take account of 
distributive considerations in shaping policy and setting 
regulatory and enforcement priorities.  This might be disputed, 
either on the basis of a moral view, such as utilitarianism, that 
makes distributive justice irrelevant,373 or on the institutional 
grounds that distributive justice is best achieved through the 
tax-and-transfer system, not regulation.374  These objections to 
redistributive regulation cannot be evaluated here.  Suffice it to 
say a wide range of moral theories, including but hardly limited 
to John Rawls’s, incorporate distributive criteria;375 and that 
our tax-and-transfer system is seemingly far too insensitive to 
 
 373. See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 48-54 (discussing the possible moral role 
of distributive considerations). 
 374. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less 
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
667, 667-69 (1994). 
 375. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 211 nn.126-30 (citing 
philosophical defenses of egalitarianism). 
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individual circumstance to warrant risk regulators in believing 
that inequities flowing from their policy choices will be 
corrected elsewhere.376 
The idea of incorporating distributive justice into risk 
regulation is hardly novel.  Activists in the so-called 
“environmental justice” movement, as well as numerous 
scholars writing about “environmental justice,” have argued 
quite vigorously that the geographic distribution of air and 
water pollutants,  toxic waste sites, and other health and safety 
hazards is unfair to racial and low-income groups, and that risk 
regulation should be structured to eliminate this inequity.377  
The Clinton administration was responsive to these arguments.  
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, 
entitled “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.”  The order 
states, 
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . . each 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its 
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations 
and low-income populations in the United States . . . .378 
This directive is reinforced by the broader mandate, set 
forth in Executive Order 12,866—the order generally requiring 
 
 376. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency 
Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2001) (noting that the existing 
income tax is quite imperfect with respect to redistribution). 
 377. The literature on “environmental justice” is vast.  See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE (1998); FENG LIU, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS: THEORIES, 
METHODS AND PRACTICE (2001); Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It: 
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, Leveling the Playing Field 
Through Environmental Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 453 (1999); Sheila R. Foster, 
Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in 
Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10992 (2000); Robert R. 
Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 (2000) 
[hereinafter Kuehn, Taxonomy]; Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice 
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 
[hereinafter Kuehn, Environmental Justice]; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 
“Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental 
Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable 
Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 7, supra note 284, at 7; Rae Zimmerman, Social 
Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649 (1993). 
 378. Exec. Order No. 12,898 § 1-101, 3 C.F.R. 859, 859 (1995), reprinted in 
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
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federal executive agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis—
that “distributive impacts” and “equity” should be considered as 
part of this analysis.  “[I]n choosing among alternative 
regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches 
that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, 
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; 
distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires 
another regulatory approach.”379 
Executive Orders 12,898 and 12,866 could not trump the 
statutory framework that governs risk regulators, nor do these 
orders purport to do so.  Instead, they enjoin regulators to 
weigh distributive considerations only where statutorily 
permissible. Yet the EPA, FDA, OSHA, CPSC, and other risk-
regulatory agencies do have substantial statutory discretion to 
take account of the racial or socioeconomic pattern of death, 
illness, injury, and exposure that their policy choices would 
produce.380  Statutes that enjoin agencies to balance health and 
safety against economic costs and other factors are typically 
open-ended enough to permit the incorporation of distributive 
justice into the balancing.  For example, the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act all articulate an 
“unreasonable risk” standard.381  An activity or substance that 
produces a higher rate of illness, injury or death for blacks, as 
compared with whites, can be characterized as “unreasonable” 
by virtue of this distributional inequity.  Some statutes that 
give priority to health and safety can also be read to license 
distributive sensitivity.  Consider the pre-1990 version of 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which required EPA to set 
legal emissions of hazardous air pollutants at a level that 
“provide[s] an ample margin of safety to protect the public 
health.”382  Assume that at the level proposed by industry for a 
given pollutant, virtually no premature deaths or serious 
illnesses will result but certain less serious impacts, such as 
mild illness or physical discomfort, will not be eliminated and 
 
 379. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39 (1994) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
 380. See Foster, supra note 377, at 10994-97; Richard J. Lazarus & 
Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting 
Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 625-50 (1999); Lazarus, supra note 377, at 
825-55. 
 381. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78. 
 382. See supra text accompanying note 273. 
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will be concentrated in areas populated by low-income groups 
and racial minorities.  Arguably, the proposed level would not 
“provide an ample margin of safety” for Clean Air Act purposes 
because it would produce a racially and socioeconomically 
skewed pattern of health setbacks. 
Even statutes that do not permit agencies to consider 
distributive justice in shaping legal directives—that is, in 
issuing legally binding rules or legally binding individualized 
orders, such as permits to particular facilities or licenses for 
particular products—may well allow agencies to inject 
distributive considerations into other choices.  Regulatory 
priorities, or enforcement priorities, could be influenced by 
racial or socioeconomic skews.  OSHA’s rules governing toxic 
workplace substances are supposed to ensure that no worker 
suffers “material impairment of health or functional 
capacity.”383  This may leave no space for distributive 
considerations at the rule-issuance phase.  But could OSHA, in 
deciding which workplace toxins to regulate first, give priority 
to those substances the toxic effects of which are borne 
disproportionately by blacks?  Or could the agency, in 
determining which firms to target for violations of existing 
rules, give priority to those firms whose illegalities cause 
disproportionate harm to low-income workers?  Arguably so.  
Finally, it should be noted that distributive considerations may 
bear upon state risk regulation—both as a matter of state law, 
and as a matter of federal law, in particular Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which precludes racial discrimination in 
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”384  Title VI has been widely understood by federal 
agencies to authorize regulations prohibiting recipients of 
federal funds, including state actors, from activities that have a 
disparate racial impact.385  The upshot is that state risk 
regulators may run afoul of federal regulations enacted under 
Title VI if their choices produce a racially skewed pattern of 
death, illness, injury, toxic exposure, or other setbacks.386 
 
 383. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
 384. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 385. See id. § 2000d-1 (instructing federal agencies, in section 602 of Title 
VI, to issue regulations to effectuate the statutory nondiscrimination norm); 
John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implication for 
Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2002) (describing 
agency practice under section 602 and the relevant case law). 
 386. See Lazarus, supra note 377, at 834-39; Bradford C. Mank, The Draft 
Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretion 
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A consensus methodology for implementing Executive 
Order 12,898, and more generally for measuring the degree of 
distributional skews with respect to health and safety, has yet 
to emerge.387  It is frequently suggested, however, that the 
racial or socioeconomic distribution of frequentist risk is an 
important part of the environmental justice inquiry.  For 
example, Robert Kuehn, a leading scholarly proponent of 
“environmental justice,” argues that agency risk assessments 
should not simply aim to determine the average, median, or 
maximal (frequentist) risk created by some health or safety 
threat, but should determine (frequentist) risk for racial and 
economic subgroups of the exposed population.  “[T]he inclusion 
of distributional information [should be] a matter of course in 
all risk assessments.  Risk assessors should be required to 
include information on the exposures and risks experienced by 
relevant subpopulations disaggregated by race, ethnicity, 
income, age, and other important variables.”388  John 
Graham—a very prominent scholar in the area of risk 
assessment, who now chairs the regulatory review office in 
OMB—agrees: 
[W]hen the same hazard poses more danger to some citizens than 
others, Congress should insist that agencies report that information 
through distributional methods of variability analysis.  For example, 
some citizens are more sensitive to environmental agents than 
others . . . . Some citizens are also exposed more to hazards than 
others . . . . Agencies should present to decision makers a public 
document with information about the number of citizens exposed to 
various levels of risk.  Since low-income and minority citizens often 
incur a disproportionate share of public health and environmental 
risks, agencies should make a special effort to investigate those 
citizens’ degree of exposure and susceptibility to hazards.389 
The approach sketched by Kuehn and Graham was endorsed in 
1996 by the National Research Council,390 and in 1997 by a 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment 
 
for EPA and a More Difficult Standard for Complainants?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11144, 11147-48 (2000). 
 387. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 310, § III.A.8 
(“There are no generally accepted principles for determining when one 
distribution of net benefits is more equitable than another.”). 
 388. Kuehn, Environmental Justice, supra note 377, at 151. 
 389. John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in 
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 183, supra note 31, at 190-91. 
 390. See COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 40-
41, 157 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996). 
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and Risk Management.391  It has also been used in empirical 
scholarship seeking to determine whether risk regulation and 
risky activities indeed produce distributional skews along 
racial or economic lines.392 
More recently, a risk-based methodology for identifying 
such skews was sanctioned by the EPA in its draft Title VI 
guidelines.393  The guidelines provide that a Title VI challenge 
to a state or local permitting decision should be evaluated by 
determining whether there is some group that is adversely 
affected by the decision and that has a higher proportion of 
racial minorities and suffers a greater adverse impact from the 
decision than an appropriate comparison group.  In turn, the 
risk imposed by the decision on the two groups is one legitimate 
measure of the decision’s impact. 
[The Title VI analysis] involves a disparity analysis that compares 
the affected population to an appropriate comparison population to 
determine whether [a] disparity exists that may violate EPA’s Title 
VI regulations . . . . 
  A disparity may be assessed using comparisons both of the 
different prevalence of race, color, or national origin of the two 
populations, and of the level of risk of adverse impacts experienced by 
each population.394 
“Risk,” for purposes of this disparate impact analysis, clearly 
means frequentist, not Bayesian risk. 
[Disparate impact analysis under Title VI] involves prediction of 
potentially significant exposures and risks resulting from stressors 
created by the [challenged] activities or other sources.  These 
predictions may be based on ambient levels of stressors derived from 
monitoring or modeling . . . . In estimating cancer risks, such unit risk 
factors estimate the probability of contracting a cancer case for a unit 
of exposure.  For example, an area’s predicted cancer risk could be 
based on the estimated ambient concentration times the unit risk 
 
 391. See 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT & RISK 
MGMT., RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION 
MAKING 72-77 (1997). 
 392. See JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS?: THE 
SPATIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 157-88 
(1999). 
 393.  Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering 
Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft 
Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints 
Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 
39,650 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter EPA Draft Title VI Guidance]; see Mank, 
supra note 386 (providing detailed analysis of EPA Draft Title VI Guidance).  
 394. EPA Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 393, at 39,681 (emphasis 
added). 
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factor.395 
To sum up, distributive justice is often a relevant 
consideration for state and federal risk regulators, under 
applicable statutes and executive orders, and frequentist risk is 
widely proposed and used as a metric for distributive 
injustice.396  But this approach is undermined by the Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View of risk—specifically by the proposition, 
defended above in Part III, that risk in the frequentist sense is 
not a welfare setback  Assume that E is an environmental 
hazard that imposes a higher frequentist risk on a group of 
persons G1 that live close to E, as compared to a group of 
persons G2 that live farther from E, where G1 is 
disproportionately nonwhite as compared to G2 or the total 
population (G1 + G2).  The Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk 
implies that the members of G1 are not worse off in welfare 
terms than their counterparts in G2, qua the difference in 
frequentist risk, nor are they worse off with respect to welfare 
resources.  Conceivably, the high level of frequentist risk 
among G1 might constitute a violation of its members’ rights—a 
violation not suffered by the members of G2—but distributive 
justice is standardly seen to depend on the distribution of 
welfare or welfare resources, not on the pattern of rights 
violations.  Further, a high level of frequentist risk could 
constitute a rights violation only when conjoined with further 
 
 395. Id. at 39,679; see also id. at 39,680 (endorsing the use of risk levels to 
determine whether a permitting decision has an adverse impact).  Other 
official EPA documents also endorse use of a risk-based methodology for 
identifying distributive skews.  See, e.g., 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 31-36 
(1992); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 309 REVIEWS 16 (1999). 
 396. At the risk of undue repetition, I should make clear that the kind of 
“metric” I am interested in is a metric for the distributive injustice of 
outcomes, which in turn will help determine what policies regulators ought to 
choose in light of distributive justice.  The legal proposals and academic 
commentary just described, as I read them, do conceptualize frequentist risk 
as a feature of outcomes, independent of premature death, that bears upon the 
justice of the outcomes.  This is different from saying that (1) in a given 
outcome, it is the differential death rate between two groups that make the 
outcome unequal, and (2) in evaluating choices, regulators should (ceteris 
paribus) avoid a choice with a higher risk, in some sense, of producing an 
outcome skewed with respect to its death rate.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 95-100 (distinguishing between ex post and ex ante views).  Although 
some advocates of incorporating risk in distributive justice analysis may 
merely be proposing the use of risk in this sort of “bridging” or ex ante role, 
the sources I have just cited seem to propose that it have a quite different role 
in the analysis, a role in ranking outcomes. 
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elements, such as a suitable lack of voluntariness and 
responsibility on the part of the person suffering the risk.  A 
metric for distributive skews focused on rights violations would 
need to be sensitive to these elements; but the risk-based 
metrics now proposed and used are not (typically) thus 
sensitive. 
What would be an appropriate welfare-based metric for 
determining whether the situation of G1 and G2 constitutes a 
distributive injustice?  Imagine that a substantially higher 
proportion of G1 dies as a result of E than does G2.  Since death 
is a welfare setback, the difference in death rates between G1 
and G2 could be seen as an unfair distribution of welfare or 
welfare resources, and thus as an instance of distributive 
injustice along racial lines.  To be sure, differences in death 
rates, as between population subgroups, will often track 
differences in frequentist risks.  But the two kinds of 
comparisons are analytically distinct.  For example, if the 
frequentist-risk comparison between G1 and G2 focuses on the 
maximally exposed individual, then clearly the two groups 
could have dramatically different levels of frequentist risk but 
not dramatically different death rates.  The same is true (a bit 
less obviously) if the frequentist-risk comparison focuses on the 
risk to the median members of G1 and G2. 
To be sure, death is not the only dimension of welfare 
relevant to “environmental justice.”  A full distributive justice 
analysis of regulatory outcomes would arguably consider illness 
and injury; wealth and income; unemployment; loss of natural 
resources; and many other welfare benefits or hindrances such 
as “[n]oise, odors, blowing trash, aesthetic concerns, increased 
traffic, termites, decreased property values and uses, fires, 
accidents, [and] psychological harm.”397  The Hybrid (Bayesian) 
View of risk implies that the distribution of Bayesian risk—by 
contrast with the distribution of frequentist risk—is, or might 
be, a relevant outcome-ranking factor for regulators authorized 
to consider “distributive impacts” and promote “environmental 
justice.”  If a large percentage of nonwhites believe to a high 
degree that they will die from environmental toxins, while a 
smaller percentage of whites believe that, then a 
disproportionate number of nonwhites suffer a kind of welfare 
setback—on the view that Bayesian risks need not be 
affectively charged to be harmful.  At a minimum, probabilistic 
 
 397. Kuehn, Taxonomy, supra note 377, at 10,687. 
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beliefs about premature death that are affectively charged are 
harmful; and in practice, of course, such beliefs will be 
affectively charged.  In short, the skewed distribution of fear is 
a kind of distributive injustice, one that (in principle) should be 
a relevant consideration under Executive Orders 12,898 and 
12,866 and similar regimes.  As the philosopher Keith Burgess-
Jackson has argued in a different context, 
[W]hile fear, or a certain amount . . . of fear, may be useful in keeping 
individuals safe from harm, it is, as a mental state, burdensome to 
those who experience it. Fear of crime in particular is a socially 
created burden . . . . [Further it is] women [who] bear a 
disproportionate share of this burden . . . . Justice, I maintain, 
requires that the state, employing institutions such as law and 
education and using the power of the purse, both reduce the overall 
level of fear in society and, more particularly, redistribute fear so that 
women no longer bear the brunt of it.398 
E. COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
“Risk assessment,” the influential methodology described 
above, is widely used by agencies at the rule-making stage.  
Paradigmatically, a risk assessment identifies the deaths and 
frequentist risks that would result were a particular toxic 
substance left unregulated, and that information is then used 
to determine the advisability of a proposed rule.399  So-called 
“comparative risk assessment” (CRA) is quite different.400  CRA 
is a priority-setting tool.  It informs threshold legislative, 
presidential, or administrative choices about which hazardous 
activities, substances, or conditions deserve governmental 
attention.  Threshold choices about the appropriate priority 
that risk regulators ought to give to various hazards are made 
 
 398. Keith Burgess-Jackson, Justice and the Distribution of Fear, 32 S. J. 
PHIL. 367, 368 (1994). 
 399. See supra text accompanying notes 308-17317. 
 400. The literature on CRA is large.  Important contributions include: 
BREYER, supra note 4; COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR 
SETTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996); WORST 
THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRIORITIES (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994); John S. 
Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment 
in Environmental Decision Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1656-67 (1995); 
Finkel, supra note 344; Baruch Fischoff, Ranking Risks, 6 RISK 191 (1995); 
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992); Symposium, Risk 
Assessment, supra note 308; and Symposium, Risk in the Republic: 
Comparative Risk Analysis and Public Policy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(1997). 
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by OMB and Congress in the budget-setting process and 
elsewhere.401  As for priority setting at the administrative level, 
that occurs, for example, when an agency decides which rule 
making to initiate first, or where to target enforcement effort. 
The EPA pioneered CRA in the late 1980s, when it studied 
the relative importance of thirty-one different environmental 
problems and published the results of the study in a now-
famous report, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment 
of Environmental Problems.402  The problems were ranked with 
respect to four different concerns: the occurrence of cancer and 
cancer risks, the occurrence of non-cancer health setbacks and 
risks, ecological effects, and “welfare effects” (meaning 
quantifiable non-health harms such as property damage).403  
The ranking of the thirty-one problems with respect to cancer, 
as follows, illustrate the typical scope and conclusions of a 
CRA. 
Consensus Ranking of Environmental Problem Areas on 
the Basis of Population Cancer Risk404 
Problem Rank (from most 
 to least important) 
Worker Exposure to Chemicals           1 (tied) 
Indoor Radon           1 (tied) 
Pesticide Residues on Food           3 
Indoor Air Pollutants other  
than Radon 
          4 (tied) 
Consumer Exposure to  
Chemicals 
          4 (tied) 
Hazardous Air Pollutants           6 
Depletion of Stratospheric 
Ozone 
          7 
Hazardous Waste Sites— 
Inactive 
          8 
Drinking Water           9 
Application of Pesticides           10 
 
 401. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992 pt. 2 § IX.C, at 371-76 (proposing 
use of risk assessment in determining agency budgets). 
 402. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter UNFINISHED 
BUSINESS]. 
 403. See id. at 5-16 (describing study methodology). 
 404. See id. at 28-34 (listing all thirty-one problems). 
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Since Unfinished Business, CRA has become an important 
feature of risk regulation.  The EPA has continued to conduct 
CRA studies and to rely upon these studies in its internal 
priority setting.405  Other federal agencies, too, have engaged in 
CRA, although not as visibly as the EPA.406  Executive Order 
12,866 implicitly directs federal executive agencies to conduct 
CRA, where permissible by statute, by mandating that, “[i]n 
setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall consider, to the 
extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed by 
various substances or activities within its jurisdiction.”407  In 
the early 1990s, then-Judge Stephen Breyer wrote a widely 
cited book which argued that the existing regime of risk 
regulation failed to direct governmental effort and social 
resources to the most pressing problems, and advocated the 
creation of an OMB-like oversight agency staffed by high-
quality civil servants to coordinate risk-regulatory efforts—in 
particular, to perform CRA studies and to implement these 
studies in setting intra- and interagency priorities.408  Prodded 
by this book, and by general enthusiasm for CRA among 
advocates of “regulatory reform,” various statutory proposals to 
impose a broad CRA requirement on agencies have been 
considered by Congress, although none has yet been enacted.409 
CRA has also become popular at the state and local level.  
California performed a major CRA study in 1994,410 and many 
 
 405. See Ken Sexton, Setting Environmental Priorities: Is Comparative 
Risk Assessment the Answer?, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: 
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 195, 199 
(Ken Sexton et al. eds., 1999) (describing use of CRA at the EPA).  For an 
important and often-cited follow-up study to Unfinished Business, see SCI. 
ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING 
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990). 
 406. See, e.g., Thomas P. Grumbly, Comparative Risk Analysis in the 
Department of Energy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23 (1997); see also 
CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 75-82 (1993) (recommending that 
all federal risk-regulatory agencies engage in CRA). 
 407. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
 408. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 59-81. 
 409. See Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk 
Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 89, 96-108 (2000) (describing recent regulatory reform proposals, 
including proposed CRA provisions). 
 410. CAL. COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: 
PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT (1994). 
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other states and localities have also done so.411  Finally, CRA 
has become a central focus of the academic literature on risk 
regulation.  The pros and cons of CRA and specific CRA 
methodologies has emerged as a major topic of academic 
debate.412 
The Hybrid (Bayesian) View advanced in this Article has 
important implications for CRA.  No welfare-focused CRA 
should rely upon frequentist risk as a kind of consequence 
relevant to regulatory priorities.  Frequentist risk is properly 
irrelevant to the ranking of outcomes within the context of 
CBA, RRA, the setting of health and safety thresholds, and 
distributive justice analysis, or so I have argued.413  Similarly, 
frequentist risk is irrelevant (at the outcome-ranking stage) for 
purposes of CRA—more precisely, for purposes of welfare-
focused CRA.  In principle, CRA might evaluate hazardous 
activities, substances, and conditions in light of their non-
welfare effects—for example, in order of the rights 
infringements they involve.  Since I am (for purposes of this 
Article) agnostic on the question whether the imposition of a 
high level of frequentist risk amounts to a harmless wrong, I 
am agnostic on the proper inclusion of frequentist risk in 
nonwelfarist CRA.  But CRA is typically conceptualized in 
welfarist terms: as a methodology for evaluating hazardous 
activities, etc., with a view to their impact on human welfare.  
Frequentist risk (whether risk to the average individual, risk to 
the maximally exposed individual, or frequentist risk in some 
other sense) should play no role in ranking outcomes within 
CRA thus conceptualized. 
What is the proper form of a welfare-focused CRA?  A 
generic answer is this: Hazards should be ranked with respect 
to one or more aspects of human welfare.  Most simply, hazards 
could be ranked in light of the total number of deaths they 
produce, under the regulatory status quo.  Indeed, this was the 
approach followed by the EPA in the seminal Unfinished 
 
 411. See David M. Konisky, Over a Decade of Comparative Risk Analysis: A 
Review of the Human Health Rankings, 12 RISK 41, 42 (2001) (noting that 
“over thirty states and municipalities have completed comparative risk 
projects”); Sexton, supra note 405, at 199 (describing state CRA activity).  CRA 
has also become important internationally.  See Richard D. Morgenstern et al., 
Comparative Risk Assessment: An International Comparison of Methodologies 
and Results, 78 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 19, 24-34 (2000) (surveying the 
international use of CRA). 
 412. See supra note 400. 
 413. See supra Part V.A-D. 
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Business study.414  This simple approach to ranking hazards 
ignores the costs of ameliorating the hazard, but developing 
that information is itself costly (particularly since the cost will 
depend on the particular regulatory approach used to 
ameliorate the hazard).  Once multiple dimensions of welfare 
are included, a problem of commensuration arises.415  If the 
analyst has available a dollar valuation of lifesaving that 
approximately tracks its welfare effect (what I have called 
Vdeath), then hazards might be ranked in terms of the predicted 
net dollar benefits of ameliorating or eliminating them.  
Alternatively, they might be ranked, without pricing life, in 
terms of their marginal or average cost per life saved—the cost 
per life saved of a small or large regulatory expenditure to 
address the hazard.416 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether 
welfarist CRA should be single- or multidimensional; which 
particular dimension(s) of welfare should be included; and how 
multiple dimensions should be commensurated.  The Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View does have direct implications, however, 
concerning the permissible dimensions of welfarist CRA.  Since 
death but not frequentist risk is a welfare setback, the number 
of deaths but not the level of frequentist risk is a permissible 
dimension for welfarist CRA—a kind of consequence 
permissibly given weight in welfarist priority setting. 
It appears that most CRA studies, at least by United 
States governmental entities, have emphasized the total deaths 
resulting from various hazards and have given less weight to 
the level of frequentist risk.417  On the other hand, the EPA’s 
Guidebook to Comparing Risks and Setting Environmental 
Priorities states that both “population risk” (the total number of 
deaths) and average or maximal “individual risk” (what I term 
 
 414. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 402, at 26, 41. 
 415. On multidimensional CRA, see John Kadvany, From Comparative 
Risk to Decision Analysis: Ranking Solutions to Multiple-Value Environmental 
Problems, 6 RISK 333, 342-49 (1995). 
 416. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 24-27 (ranking regulations by “[c]ost per 
premature death averted”); cf. LAVE, supra note 288, at 19-25 (describing both 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness techniques for regulatory analysis). 
 417. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDEBOOK TO COMPARING RISKS 
AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 2.2-15 (1993) (“While many 
regional and state comparative risk studies have estimated both individual 
risks and population risks, most have relied primarily on the population risk 
estimates in the final ranking of problem areas for cancer risks.”).  I have not 
surveyed the studies since 1993 to determine whether this statement still 
holds true. 
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frequentist risk) are equally valid criteria for comparing cancer 
hazards.418  According to the Guidebook, “[t]he most useful 
presentations of cancer risk estimates for comparative risk 
studies are excess individual lifetime risks and the excess 
numbers of annual cancer cases expected in the exposed 
populations.”419  Adam Finkel, a prominent expert on CRA, 
similarly claims that “population-based measures” and 
“[i]ndividual-risk measures independent of the number of 
persons at risk” are both appropriate dimensions for CRA.420 
Estimating the magnitude of risk either by population-wide 
consequence alone or by maximum (or average) individual risk alone 
necessarily discriminates against people who live in either densely-
populated or sparsely-populated areas.  The former type of measure 
regards a risk of 10-6/person in a city of two million as more serious 
than one of 10-2/person in a village of 100. . . . On the other hand, if 
the individual-risk criterion were used exclusively, urbanites would 
lose out . . . .421 
If, however, neither the urbanites nor the villagers in this 
hypothetical are aware of the hazards, and hazard-prevention 
costs are the same, then the city hazard should take regulatory 
priority over the village hazard, as a matter of overall welfare 
or welfare resources—since the city hazard will lead to more 
deaths than the village hazard.422  Notwithstanding claims to 
the contrary by Finkel, the EPA Guidebook, and other CRA 
analysts who have advanced similar suggestions, the level of 
“individual risk” created by some hazard should not be used, for 
purposes of regulatory priority setting, as a metric for the 
importance of the hazard distinct from the aggregate number of 
deaths it causes. 
F. TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW 
My focus in this Article has been risk regulation, but the 
view developed here also bears upon tort law and criminal law, 
 
 418. Id. at 2.2-15 to 2.2-18. 
 419. Id. at 2.2-15. 
 420. Finkel, supra note 344, at 343. 
 421. Id. 
 422. More precisely, in the simple case where the regulator knows for 
certain that one death will result in the village and two in the city, generating 
a 10-2 frequentist risk for everyone in the village and 10-6 risk for everyone in 
the city, the city hazard should take priority.  If (more realistically) the 
legislator uses his beliefs about the level of frequentist risk to generate a 
probability distribution, of some kind, over the number of deaths, then 
choosing which hazard to address raises issues of ex ante valuation—issues 
beyond the scope of this Article.  See supra Part I.C. 
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specifically with respect to the status of risk imposition as a 
crime or tort. 
Consider first tort law.  In a provocative article, 
Christopher Schroeder suggests that the actual occurrence of 
death, bodily injury, or other tangible harm need not be a 
standard prerequisite for a tort judgment.423  He delineates two 
hypothetical cases. 
The Toxic Dumper Case 
Amalgamated Manufacturing is discovered to have been dumping 
toxic chemicals into an underground aquifer.  Company records reveal 
fairly well the amounts that have been discharged. Studies suggest 
that individuals who have consumed well water from the aquifer have 
between a twenty and thirty-three percent chance of contracting 
cancer within their lifetimes because of this consumption. 
The Speeding Motorist Case 
A motorist, in a hurry to get from her house to an important 
engagement in the neighboring town, enters the connecting freeway 
and speeds up to ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit.  She 
arrives at her destination safely, only a few minutes late.424 
Schroeder argues that persons who impose risks of harms on 
others should be subject to tort liability—not merely in the 
special case of “toxic torts,” exemplified by Toxic Dumper, but 
also in the garden-variety case of risk imposition, exemplified 
by Speeding Motorist—if the administrative costs of doing so 
are low.425  Schroeder’s claim has been seconded, both by 
scholars (like him) who understand tort law as an institution 
properly designed to serve corrective justice,426 and by law-and-
economics scholars who see economic efficiency, social welfare, 
or similar welfarist goals as the purpose of that institution.427 
The view that tangible harm is not a precondition for tort 
liability is, to be sure, merely a proposal.  Current doctrine 
typically does require the occurrence of death, bodily injury, 
property damage, or at least emotional harm, for a tort suit to 
go forward.428  Risk imposition per se is, typically, not enough.  
 
 423. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for 
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990); see also Kenneth W. Simons, 
Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. 
REV. 113 (1990) (responding to Schroeder). 
 424. Schroeder, supra note 423, at 439-40. 
 425. See id. at 460-77. 
 426. See David McCarthy, Liability and Risk, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238 
(1996). 
 427. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 263-69 (1987). 
 428. See Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
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But there are a few important doctrinal exceptions from this 
demand for tangible harm.  First, in so-called “loss-of-chance” 
cases, some courts have imposed liability for the mere creation 
of a risk.429  The standard “loss-of-chance” scenario involves a 
person threatened by tangible harm and a defendant in a 
special relationship with that person, such that the defendant  
more likely than not was not in a position to avert the harm, 
but acted or failed to act in a way that increased the risk (in 
some sense) of the person suffering the harm.  For example, 
imagine that Pete now has advanced skin cancer, which doctor 
Dan negligently failed to diagnose.  Had Dan diagnosed and 
properly treated the cancer, Pete’s risk (in some sense) of dying 
from the cancer would have been sixty percent.  Dan’s failure to 
diagnose the disease increased Pete’s chance of dying to ninety 
percent.  Under current doctrine, in this hypothetical case, 
some courts would award Pete damages for the thirty percent 
“loss of chance” of avoiding death caused by Dan’s negligence.  
Other courts would not, but would have Dan pay damages to 
Pete’s survivors if he were to die—even though, on those facts, 
Dan would not be the likely cause of Pete’s death.430 
Second, even without the special relationship between the 
defendant and the risked or injured party characteristic of 
“loss-of-chance” cases, courts may impose risk liability on a 
defendant whose action has both caused present injury to some 
person and created a risk of future injury to that same person.  
For example, in a case where the defendant negligently caused 
head injury to the plaintiff, damages were increased to 
compensate for the small risk of epilepsy that might result from 
the head injury.431 
Finally, in the toxic tort context illustrated by Schroeder’s 
Toxic Dumper hypothetical, some courts do award damages to 
plaintiffs who have been exposed to a toxic substance and 
 
1505, 1505 (1998). 
 429. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 436-49 (2000); see also Joseph 
H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and other Retrofitting of 
the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 499-516 (1998) 
[hereinafter, Reduction of Likelihood]. For an early article that spurred 
development of this doctrine, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and 
Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
 430. See Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 502-11 (distinguishing 
between past-harm and future-harm variants of the “loss-of-a-chance” 
scenario). 
 431. Note, supra note 428, at 1510. 
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whose risk of death or disease has been increased by that 
exposure, but have not died and are currently asymptomatic for 
the diseases possibly resulting from the exposure.432  This 
occurs, typically, in class action suits, where the class is 
structured to include some plaintiffs who have already been 
injured by the exposure, and others merely at risk of injury.433 
What kind of “risk” is involved in the “loss-of-chance” 
cases, toxic torts cases, and others where liability has been 
imposed or increased for risk imposition?  The answer varies 
and is not always clear.  It appears that risk imposition 
involves either (1) a frequentist risk of premature death, 
relative to some kind of reference class; (2) a hypothetical 
Bayesian risk, namely the probabilistic belief of some 
hypothetical bystander or “reasonable person” that the 
defendant’s action will cause premature death or other injury; 
or (3) an actual Bayesian risk, specifically the actual 
probabilistic belief of the actor himself that his action will 
result in premature death or other injury.  The frequentist 
construal of risk imposition is certainly employed in the toxic 
tort context.434  If, for example, a firm’s toxic release has 
exposed 1000 persons to a carcinogenic substance, one of whom 
has already died, and experts predict that eight more will too, 
the court adjudicating a class action against the firm might 
well determine that the firm has imposed a 9-in-1000 or 8-in-
999 risk of death on each class member.  This is, of course, a 
frequentist risk relative to the reference group of all exposed 
persons (namely, the plaintiff class).  On the other hand, the 
increased risks that trigger liability in the “loss-of-chance 
context” may (at least sometimes) be Bayesian, not 
frequentist.435 
What does my Article imply for the practice of imposing 
tort liability for risk imposition: both the (fairly limited) 
 
 432. See id. at 1511; see also Tamsen Douglass Love, Deterring 
Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances: The Case for Legislative 
Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 VAND. L. REV. 789, 809-10 
(1996); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based 
Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 216-24 (1996). 
 433. Note, supra note 428, at 1511. 
 434. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 432, at 235.  See generally Schroeder, supra 
note 423, at 477 (suggesting that risk imposition should be tortious only in 
cases where the risks are “actuarial”). 
 435. Cf. Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 532-33 (arguing that 
both “individualized” and “statistical” evidence should be used to establish 
“loss of chance”). 
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practice under current doctrine, and the much broader practice 
advocated by Schroeder and other scholars?  The Article 
undercuts one important justification for that practice.436  One 
way to defend the practice, of course, is to argue that the risk of 
death, bodily injury, or other tangible harm is itself a harm to 
the person upon whom the risk has been imposed.  The Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View of risk I have presented here vitiates that 
defense—at least if risk is construed in one of the three senses I 
have just described.  Imagine that toxic dumper D1 imposes a 
high frequentist risk of premature death on P1.  Imagine, now, 
that doctor D2 fails to diagnose P2’s disease, such that the 
hypothetical observer’s probabilistic belief that P2 will die 
prematurely has increased substantially.  Imagine, finally, that 
doctor D3 fails to diagnose P3’s disease, and the good doctor 
herself possesses a probabilistic belief that this failure will 
cause P3’s death.  In none of these cases has the plaintiff yet 
been harmed (at least consequentially) by the defendant’s 
actions, absent some fear on the plaintiff’s part or some other 
impact additional to the enhanced risk of death that he now 
suffers.  That conclusion follows directly from the Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View of risk defended here.  Note that P2’s risk of 
death is what I earlier termed a “hypothetical” Bayesian risk, 
and that P3’s risk is an actual, third-party Bayesian risk rather 
than an actual, first-party Bayesian risk, since it is D3’s beliefs, 
not P3’s, that constitute the “risk” here.  Although my Hybrid 
(Bayesian) View recognizes that actual, first-party beliefs may 
be harmful, it denies that hypothetical or third-party beliefs 
are.437 
To be sure, risk imposition construed in a different way—in 
actual, first-party terms—is harmful, at a minimum if the 
actual beliefs on P’s part produced by defendant D’s action are 
a component of fear, anxiety, or some other epistemic-affective 
hybrid.  “Emotional harm” is a genuine harm.438  What courts 
 
 436. Stephen Perry, in his rigorous and important work on the tortiousness 
of risk imposition, concludes that risk imposition in the frequentist sense is 
not harmful, at least where the harm-causing processes are deterministic.  
Perry, supra note 25, at 336.  As stated earlier I endorse Perry’s conclusion 
and some (if not all) of his arguments.  See supra text accompanying notes 
160-65. 
 437. I do acknowledge that the beliefs or at least fears of a person’s friends 
and family members may be harmful to her.  See supra note 262 and 
accompanying text. 
 438. See Perry, supra note 25, at 338-39 (distinguishing risk imposition 
from the causation of psychological harm). 
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in the toxic tort and “loss-of-chance” contexts have done, 
however, is to recognize a tort cause of action for risk 
imposition separate from any cause of action for emotional 
distress.439  My Article suggests that this practice is justifiable, 
if at all, only on a revisionary understanding of tort law: only if 
tort liability is justifiably imposed without harm at all.  Many 
law and economists would accept that revisionary view of tort 
law.440  So would some corrective justice theorists—for example, 
theorists who think that an action which is wrongful but 
harmless (say, an action that ought not have been performed in 
light of its probable harms and benefits, but may not cause 
those harms and in any event has not yet) may, consistent with 
corrective justice, be adjudged tortious.441  On the other hand, 
corrective justice theorists, and others, who believe that the 
traditional doctrine that the tort plaintiff must show actual 
harm reflects a deep and important feature of tort law, should 
conclude that risk imposition ought not be tortious.442  Cases 
like Toxic Dumper and Speeding Motorist cannot be 
assimilated to the standard paradigm that identifies duty, 
breach of duty, causation, and harm as the individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient elements of a tort suit. 
This last claim is a bit too strong.  It might be argued that 
“harm” for purposes of the standard tort paradigm is a welfare 
setback understood in deontological rather than 
consequentialist terms.  On the consequentialist construal, P is 
harmed by D’s action (relative to an alternative choice) just in 
case the outcome resulting from that action is worse for P’s 
welfare than the outcome that would have resulted from the 
alternative choice.  If P can be harmed deontologically without 
being harmed consequentially, and if deontological harming 
suffices for tortious harming, then the arguments of this Article 
 
 439. See Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 504 (distinguishing 
claim for lost chance from claim for mental distress); Love, supra note 432, at 
809-10 (distinguishing claim for increased risk from claim for fear of future 
disease). 
 440. But see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 103-10 (2001) (arguing against liability for risk imposition). 
 441. See Schroeder, supra note 423, at 460-77 (arguing that corrective 
justice permits liability for expected harm).  Indeed, Schroeder’s position 
seems to be that corrective justice permits liability, in the amount of expected 
harm, for actions that do not cause harm and are not wrongful in any sense 
beyond their creating a risk of harm. 
 442. See Perry, supra note 25, at 338 (stating that he is “generally 
prepared to accept [the] claim” that “tort liability should only be imposed in 
order to compensate for damage caused”). 
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would not preclude assimilating risk imposition to the standard 
tort paradigm.  Still, the proponent of that approach to 
justifying tort liability for risk imposition has much 
philosophical work to do—the philosophical work of showing 
that the propositions contained in the two “if” clauses in the 
previous sentence are indeed true. 
This Article has implications for the criminal status of risk 
imposition similar to those for tort law.  Liability for risk 
imposition is less exceptional as a matter of current criminal 
law doctrine than it is as a matter of current tort doctrine.  The 
Model Penal Code includes reckless endangerment as a 
criminal offense: “A person commits a misdemeanor if he 
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place 
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”443  
Many jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code on this score;444 
many, too, criminalize types of risk imposition more specifically 
defined, for example drunk driving.445  Finally, inchoate 
crimes—attempts, conspiracies, and solicitations—might be 
seen as actions that risk choate crimes.446  By attempting to 
commit homicide, I have imposed a risk of death upon the 
attempted victim.  Liability for inchoate crimes is a centerpiece 
of the Model Penal Code and of enacted criminal codes.447 
John Stuart Mill famously advanced what might be termed 
the “Harm Principle”: Only those actions which cause harm to 
persons other than the actor ought to be criminally proscribed 
and punished.448  Joel Feinberg, one of the preeminent criminal 
law scholars of our time, and other contemporary theorists 
have adopted Mill’s view or variants of this view.449  If the 
 
 443. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2, reprinted in 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & 
AUSTIN SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW app. A (1986). 
 444. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW 312-13 (1986). 
 445. See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive 
Legislation, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 604-05 (1998) (conceptualizing 
reckless driving as a “simple inchoate offense,” which targets a risk of harm 
and is “simple” because it is not defined with reference to an object offense). 
 446. Cf.  id. at 602-03. 
 447. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 444, at 1-179. 
 448. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN 
STUART MILL: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS 187, 197 (Marshall Cohen 
ed., 1961) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others.”); see also 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 10-16 (1984) (discussing Mill’s view). 
 449. See FEINBERG, supra note 369, at ix-xx.  Feinberg does endorse an 
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Harm Principle is true, and if the kind of harm required by the 
principle is a welfare setback understood consequentially—that 
the “harmed” person be worse off than he would have been 
absent the harmful action—my Article has important 
implications regarding the criminality of risk imposition.  
Prohibitions on reckless endangerment, on drunk driving, on 
inchoate crimes, and on all other actions of risk imposition are 
inconsistent with the Harm Principle thus construed.450 
Lawrence Crocker, attentive to the deep tension between 
the Harm Principle and the criminality of risk imposition,451 
has distinguished between “harmful” attempts, which involve 
an “objective risk” of harm (on Crocker’s characterization, a 
kind of frequentist risk452), and “harmless” attempts, which 
involve no such risk.453  Crocker claims that the Harm Principle 
permits the proscription of “harmful” attempts and other 
actions which may not cause physical harm but impose a 
frequentist risk of harm on some victims.454  My Article 
undercuts Crocker’s claim.  Whether risk is seen in frequentist 
terms, or alternatively in Bayesian terms that do not refer to 
the actual beliefs of the victim, suffering a risk is not (without 
more) a welfare-reducing feature of someone’s life history.  
Anyone who takes the Harm Principle seriously must 
contemplate major changes in the structure of existing criminal 
law. 
To be sure, Mill might have been wrong.  Law and 
economics scholars deny that particular actions need be 
harmful or otherwise blameworthy to trigger criminal 
punishment.  Desert theorists will insist on blameworthiness, 
 
Offense Principle, but “[a]rguably . . . all the types of offensive conduct that 
liberals would wish to criminalize also involve harm.”  A.P. Simester & A. Von 
Hirsch, Some Questions about the Offense Principle 1 (unpublished paper, on 
file with author). 
 450. Making the causation of fear or other such emotional harm an element 
of these prohibitions—as in one variant of the crime of assault—would 
eliminate the inconsistency.  See generally 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 444, 
at 315-17 (discussing the crime of assault). 
 451. See Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing 
Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1057-63 (1992).  More precisely, 
Crocker argues that an “imposition” principle limits the proper scope of the 
criminal law: “[F]ree people should not become criminally liable unless they 
trespass upon someone else’s moral space, that is, unless they impose in some 
way.”  Id. at 1060. 
 452. See id. at 1099-1102. 
 453. Id. at 1096-1109. 
 454. Id. 
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but need not construe that to entail harm.455  Our old friend, 
harmless wrongdoing, surfaces here.  Some desert theorists will 
argue that harmless wrongdoing is blameworthy and properly 
punished, at least if the actor had a culpable mental state.456  
Other desert theorists, for example Larry Alexander, argue 
that culpability absent harm or wrongdoing is sufficient for 
criminal liability.457 
It would be foolhardy for me to enter these debates, here, 
just as it would be overreaching to take a stand on the goals 
and preconditions of tort liability.  My Article does not resolve 
the criminal or tort law status of risk imposition.  Rather, it 
makes an important contribution to the debate about that 
status, by showing that one important argument in favor of 
liability—the argument that risking is itself a kind of 
consequential harming—must be abandoned. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has rigorously analyzed the harmfulness—the 
welfare impact—of death and the risk of death.  The analysis 
was lengthy and complex because welfare plausibly involves 
various elements—what I termed Experience, Preference, 
Value, and Integration—and because the nature of risk is also 
quite contested.  My conclusion was that death is harmful, that 
Bayesian risk is harmful (at least the actual, first-person 
variant of Bayesian risk, and at least where linked with 
appropriate affective states), but that frequentist risk is not.  In 
the final part of the Article, I surveyed the large implications of 
my analysis for risk regulation.  How the CPSC, EPA, FDA, 
NHTSA, OSHA, and other risk-regulatory agencies should 
engage in cost-benefit analysis or risk-risk analysis, how they 
should specify health and safety “thresholds,” how they should 
take account of distributive considerations, and how these 
agencies should set priorities all depend on whether death, 
Bayesian risk, and frequentist risk are harmful.  Tort and 
criminal law doctrines, too, are implicated by the claims 
advanced here. 
 
 455. See Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 157, 209 (1994). 
 456. Id. at 208-15. 
 457. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 1, 1-2 (1994) (stating that culpable action, not harm production, is 
central to criminal law); id. at 21-22 (distinguishing between culpable action 
and wrongdoing in Hurd’s sense). 
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Much more remains to be said about regulatory 
implications, to be sure.  How, exactly, does one calculate the 
appropriate monetary valuation of death, “Vdeath,” one that 
follows from a welfarist rather than Kaldor-Hicks construal of 
cost-benefit analysis and from the premise that frequentist risk 
and hypothetical Bayesian risk are not welfare setbacks?  How 
should the predicted number of deaths be integrated with cost 
considerations, if at all, in setting safety thresholds, or 
performing comparative risk assessment?  How does one 
calculate a monetary value for fear states, for other epistemic-
affective hybrids, and for naked belief states if beliefs alone can 
be harmful?  Nor have I discussed the status of risk and harm 
with respect to moral considerations other than welfare.  When 
is the causation of death not just harmful but wrongful to the 
victim?  Can the imposition of a frequentist risk be a harmless 
wrong, if not a harmful one?  My Article has explored part of 
the normative underpinnings of risk regulation—the welfarist 
part—but I have nowhere claimed that risk regulation is 
merely a matter of overall or well-distributed welfare.  These 
vital questions, both foundational and practical, must await 
another day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADLER.3FMT.DOC 4·28·2003  7:23 PM 
1446 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
